BOOKS OF THE DAY
Talleyrand, the Diplomat
Talleyrand. By Louis Madelin. Translated by Rosalie Feltenstein. (J. Rolls. 18s.)
M. MADELIN disapproves of Talleyrand. This is not original. He was venal, corrupt, treacherous, cunning, malicious, profligate and arrogant ; coldly ambitious and totally unprincipled. Even Talley- rand himself scarcely bothered to repudiate the more notorious of these attributicns. But M. Madelin also thinks Talleyrand an indifferent diplomatist, and this, if not entirely original, has been an unfashionable view in recent years and would certainly have touched Talleyrand's own pride on the raw. As long ago as 1815 the Abbe de Pradt in his Du Congres de Vienne set out the stock criticism of Talleyrand at Vienna, that he sacrificed the interests of the small States of Europe, which looked to France for a lead, and that he alienated Prussia and Russia for the sake of his pet scheme of under- standing with Austria and England. The great French historian, Albert Mathiez (who certainly did not share M. Madelin's political prejudices), held the same view. France, he argued, should have taken the side of Russia and Prussia at Vienna, with a reduction of the terms of the Treaty of Paris as her price. She should have done everything possible to keep Austria and Prussia divided, should have reconstituted a strong Poland ("avant-garde menagant du slavisme jusqu'au coeur de l'Allemagne") and at all costs kept Prussia out of the Rhineland where indeed she was reluctant to establish herself.
M. Madelin follows much the same view, and undoubtedly there is a case to be answered here. But the verdict of the majority of historians has been in favour of Talleyrand, and M. Madelin fails to produce any new arguments to refute the view of Sorel,' Lacour- Gayet—and Talleyrand himself—that France owes him a great debt for the skill with which he extricated her from the collapse of the Empire and regained her a place in the Concert of Europe. M. Madelin's criticisms of Talleyrand include, as well as his policy at Vienna, his negotiation of the first Treaty of Paris with the Allies on the abdication of Napoleon in 1814. It is virtually the same criticism in both cases : that he failed to make the most of France's position. M. Madelin, the admirer of Napoleon, is reluctant to admit that by 1814 the great adventure had ended in defeat and that France, so recently the mistress of Europe, was no longer in a position to dictate terms to the Allies in occupation of Paris. To admit so much would be to admit also (what is true) that Napoleon had been wrong, and Talleyrand,• the most consistent critic of his extravagant ambition, right. Perhaps an Englishman is never a fair judge of French views of Napoleon, for to an Englishman M. Madelin appears to under- estimate the difficulties with which Talleyrand had to contend in 1814—to mention only two, the strength of the feeling against France (for so long, as M. Madelin admits, the " insolent Power " of Europe) and the determination of the English Government at least to push back France from the line of the natural frontiers on the Rhine. Indeed, M. Maddin throughout neglects the part England played in the war, barely mentions the Continental System or its failure, leaves the economic condition of Europe and France altogether out of account, and so neither presents a true picture of France's position in 1814 nor is able to account for Napoleon's defeat. With far more penetrating insight Talleyrand had foreseen that defeat as early as the days of Tilsit and Erfurt. His treachery to Napoleon is indefensible, but his judgement was right. He saw more clearly than any other Frenchman of his time—or than a good many Frenchmen since—that the flaw in the Napoleonic system was Napoleon himself, and that his unrestrained ambition made him the certain architect of his own ruin, that he would defeat himself by forcing Europe to unite against him.
Talleyrand had learnt the art of politics under the ancien regime ; he distrusted Napoleon's flamboyance, he was sceptical of France or any other nation maintaining a hegemony of Europe, his instinct was to seek a balance of power. The transition from the dazzling illusions of Tilsit and Erfurt was disconcerting and abrupt. Talley- rand's practical, down-to-earth policies (well illustrated by his co-operation with England in the Belgian settlement of the 183os) failed to satisfy the restless itch to cut a figure in Europe. Both the Republicans in 1848 and the Bonapartists under the Second Empire preferred the attractions of a flashy and adventurous foreign policy. It needed the disaster of 1870 to underline the wisdom of Talleyrand's counsels of moderation and restraint.
It is entertaining to speculate how well Talleyrand would have fitted into the Third Republic after 1870, with what skill he would have played the market in both politics and finance, what profits he would have made out of Panama. The truth is that Talleyrand, although he was born into the society of the ancien regime, was most at home in that bourgeois society which from the Directory to the Fourth Republic (with a brief interlude under the Bourbons) has constituted the ruling class of France, whatever the regime. Talley- rand was never forgiven by his own class for his treachery at the time of the Revolution. Making the best of his poF;tion, he exploited to the full the advantage of being a déclassé in a pLIvenu society.
M. Madelin's book is the by-product of his studies on the Revolution and the Empire. It is a clear, pleasantly readable, unpre- tentious book. It makes no claim to originality or the discovery of new material. In this respect it cannot be compared with the great life by Lacour-Gayet, still not translated into English. M. Madelin's gift is narration, especially the skill with which he keeps Talleyrand always in the forefront and never allows him to be obscured by the great events of the Revolution or the Empire. His economy in sketching the background in a few sentences is admirable. But his portrait of Talleyrand lacks depth ; it is clear, but not illuminating. M. Madelin fails to make us understand the contradictions or the motives of a personality which was never simple. Like everyone else who has ever studied Talleyrand, M. Madelin is puzzled by him, but at the end of his book he is no nearer than at the beginning to explaining how a character apparently so worthless and corrupt could exercise so great a charm and fascination on all who knew him, even on Napoleon, who had little reason to love him. To be on one's guard against this fascination, as M. Madelin claims to be in his introduction, is not enough. Understanding needs something more, and to the end of M. Madelin's book Talleyrand retains intact both the charm and the poker-face which were the greatest assets
of this prince of political adventurers. ALAN BULLOCK.
Previous page
