UNIONIST FOREIGN POLICY.
1 T would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole -I= world awaits the development of the new British Government's foreign policy with anxious attention. We discussed last week the important question of the future attitude of this country to the Geneva Protocol. But the Protocol is only one of the important matters which Mr. Austen Chamberlain will have to take up. There are at least three other problems of first-class importance which are already knocking at the doors of the Foreign Office. By the way in which these three are handled the world will be able to judge the trend of the new Govern- ment's policy.
The more foreign affairs are studied• the more certain it seems that the only wise thing that has ever been said about them was that old remark of Richelieu's that a Foreign Minister must always strive to do something every day to improve his country's relations with some foreign State. " Good relations "—the creation of that " atmos- phere " of amity of which Mr. MacDonald spoke so much last spring—always sounds a little vague. And yet h. w often in the last five years has a Conference just failed or just succeeded, a settlement been just reached or just missed, not because of any impossibility of reconciling the views of the participants, but simply because of the atmosphere either of liking or of dislike that surrounded the delegates ? Too often these breakdowns have started long sequences of misunderstanding and misrepresen- tation which gradually led Europe back to the disastrous position she was in before.
There are three questions other than that of the Protocol which, as we have said, face Mr•. Austen Chamberlain at the outset of his stewardship. To take first the least obvious but the most immediate. Next Monday at Geneva there will meet a Convention at which, we believe, the world, except Russia, is to be represented. The object of this Convention is to draw up a new set of international rules and regulations on the production and distribution of dangerous drugs which are at present governed by the resolutions of The Hague Conference of 1912. It might well be thought that this is essentially a question for experts with little or no relation to the great affairs of the world. As a matter of fact, however, one of the key principles on which any future world pacification must rest is involved. We refer to Anglo-American friendship. As everyone knows, philanthropy in America is taken very seriously, and on no humanitarian topic does the great American people feel more strongly than on this question of the control of the drug traffic. The strength of this feeling was enough to overcome the antipathy of Mr_ Coolidge's Republican administration for the activities of the League. America has taken a leading and official part in the work done by the League Commissions on the subject, and she has now sent Mr. Porter, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, to be her delegate at the Convention next Monday. The view he will put forward is a simple one : that the only effective way to stop the harmful use of drugs is to control their production throughout the world and restrict it to the amount required for medical and scientific use. With this view the British Govern- ment is known to concur in principle. Unfortunately, there is a strong belief in the United States that the British Empire is in fact, if not in name, the chief obstacle to the achievement of this end. This is the situation which the Government will be called upon to handle. The drug traffic is, of course, a question of great com- plexity, and there are special difficulties in the way of this country before she can satisfy wholly the American point of view. India is the greatest producer of opium in the world, and it is more than doubtful whether the Indian Government could accede to the total prohibition of the export of opium from India. Again, opium is a State monopoly in many of our Eastern Crown Colonies, and a very large percentage of their revenue is derived from that source. Thus, the burden of all restrictions on opium traffic will fall upon the taxpayers of India and other British Eastern possessions.
Nevertheless, we believe that there is a considerable prospect of agreement on a policy for the gradual abolition of the traffic, such as that proposed by Sir John Jordan. His plan was to reduce the export of opium from India by 10 per cent. per annum until in ten years it was totally prohibited. We do not here wish, however, to enter into the technicalities of the problem, but only to put in a strong plea that the British Government should bear in mind . the world repercussions that may arise from this Convention at Geneva. For the British Empire to incur in America the odium of having stood in the way of effective action to limit the drug traffic would be indeed disastrous. This would be a loss for which no gain such as the preservation intact of the revenues of the Indian Government could compensate. That the question is not altogether a minor one may be judged from the fact that one American observer of high authority has given it as his considered opinion that a successful settlement of the drug question would do as much to improve Anglo- American relations as Mr. Baldwin's settlement of the Debt question did two years ago.
The second great question that faces the Government is that of the future relations between this country and Russia. Here the Government are certainly left with a most difficult legacy. The position could scarcely be less clear or less satisfactory. The late Cabinet wrote a Note to Russia complaining of a document, the authen- ticity of which they collectively assumed but now severally question. The Russian Government has replied with a Note denying its authenticity and demanding an apology for our Note. It is safe to assume that whatever course Mr. Chamberlain may take the Russian Government will give him no assistance in his efforts to find a peaceful solution. The old Russian Treaty is dead and buried deep in the grave of the Labour Government. But unless we are to break off relations again, some sort of treaty we must have with Russia. It will now be extremely difficult to achieve a settlement, but the necessity of such a settlement and the benefits, commercial and political, which it can bring us are just as great as ever. Therefore we urge most strongly on the Government that they should persevere steadily and with infinite patience in an attempt to regularize the relations between this country and Russia.
The third great issue of foreign affairs is, of course, the question of what attitude the British Government will take up in the eternal Reparations triangle of this country, France and Germany. Germany is just entering upon the regime created by the. Dawes Report. France is still governed by M. Herriot's Liberal Cabinet. The relation!' between the two countries have improved, and are stir improving, but the progress is precarious, and might ver5 easily be checked. M. Herriot might be upset ; the German Nationalists might secure a victory at the coming Elections. Thus, it is most important that the Britisl Government should make clear their policy openly, dis- tinctly, and promptly. Already the most absurd rumours are current in Europe. For instance, Mr. Robert Dell, writing in the New Statesman, tells us that a certain German paper has gravely printed the information that Mr. Baldwin has presented M. Herriot with an ultimatum which amounts to a notice to quit. Therefore we particularly welcome the wise and temperate words which Mr. Baldwin used in his Guildhall speech on Monday :- "This very satisfactory result, which encourages such good hopes for the future, would not have been attained but for the statesman- like attitude of the French Government. (Cheers.) M. Herriot has earned the gratitude of Europe for his moderation, and he may rest assured that his Majesty's Government will continue to furnish him with the most friendly and consistent support in the execution of the policy which he himself has so largely facilitated. (Cheers.) His Majesty's Government aro fully confident that the London Agreement will enable Germany to become a factor for peace and stability in Europe. The realization of that hope, however, rests with the German people. A new opportunity is opening before them if they will scrupulously observe their obligations and resist all attempts at evading the peace they have secured."
This is exactly the tone which is needed, and if Mr. Baldwin's Government will maintain it all may yet be well between this country, France and Germany. We must remember, however, that there are sonic nasty corners still to be turned. For instance, next January the period of our occupation of the Cologne area will come to an end. If we simply withdraw and allow the Germans to come in, the French position in the Ruhr will be un- tenable. On the other hand, we cannot legally prolong our occupation under our own interpretation of the Versailles Treaty ; while Germany will be most unwilling to see our troops replaced by the French. With reason- able Governments in both France and Germany this difficulty can surely be overcome ; without them, it may prove fatal to the present prospect of the reconciliation of Europe.
If Mr. Austen Chamberlain can deal successfully with these three problems—the relations between the Empire and America, and between this country and Russia, and the part that we should play in Franco-German relations— he will have done well indeed. It would be safe to assume that if these problems could be settled the world would go naturally forward to a general pacification, whether based on the present Geneva Protocol or on some subse- quent arrangement. This country would earn the gratitude of the democracies of the world, and we should be confirmed in that leadership of enlightened opinion which we were undoubtedly gaining during the past year. If, on the other hand, evil counsellors should prevail. and the foreign policy of the new Government should prove a narrowly nationalistic or even a narrowly Im- perialistic one—if America should be alienated, if a rupture with Russia should take place, if Western Europe should be thrown back to the disruption of a renewed Franco-German conflict—then indeed the outlook for this country would be gloomy. As a first fruit we should see our slowly recovering markets once more destroyed, and ultimately we should see a Europe coalescing and consoli- dating itself not with us, but against us. For already it is becoming clear that the inexorable force of circumstance will drive Europe towards consolidation. Already the old scheme of a Continental bloc finds considerable favour. British policy should not discourage the forma- tion of such a bloc, but should strive to broaden, to univer- salize, the conception ; otherwise we may find ourselves in a position commercially precarious and politically isolated.
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