PROGRESSIVE PROHIBITION ON CONSTRUCTIVE LINES.
[To THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR."] • SIR,—It is clear that between the advocates of State Purchase and its opponents there is a great gulf fixed. Instead of empha- tizing the perils of State Purchase on the one hand, or bemoan- ing the probability of a lengthy time-limit before Local Veto could operate on the other, we propose to show how the existing gulf can be bridged without surrender of any vital principle on either side. The present Liquor Traffic possesses large indi- v:dual assets, but as far as the nation is concerned it is a liability—a costly burden of woe and waste. There are those who would rid the nation of the liability, irrespective of what happened to the individual assets. There are others who, in a professed desire to reduce the national liability, want the State to purchase the assets, even at the risk of increasing the liability.
The real solution is that the State should require the present Liquor Traffic to change its character, and to use its assets for beneficent instead of baneful purposes. Can it be done? As easily as it has been done during the last year by hundreds of great industrial concerns. They have scrapped or adapted their plant to the constructive purposes of peace instead of the destructive purposes of war. They have paid dividends to the shareholders during the process, and that is what the Liquor Traffic could do equally as well.
During the war we had a most remarkable improvement in national sobriety. It was accomplished without either State Purchase or the reduction of licences—the rival remedies of pre-war days. Then how was it secured? In the main, by limiting the output and strength of liquor through the whole- saler, and the hours of sale through the retailer. Is there any reason why this real key to the solution of the problem cannot be used in the future? None, provided that the principle receives general sanction, without which, indeed, no proposal— whether satisfactory or not—can secure real acceptance. It WM largely under the pressure of the Strength of Britain Movement that during the war the beer barrelage was reduced to about one-third and the spirit output to one-half of its former pro portions, and the truth is manifest to all who have eyes to see, that it is more important to prevent unrestricted output of intoxicants than to reduce the number of channels of sale. The first secures decreased consumption by the law of mathematics; but the second may not secure diminution of sale at all. Licences were reduced by 13 per cent, in the ten years suc- ceeding 1904, but the output of beer—from various causes—was greater at the end of the ten years.
A new organization, the Strength of Britain Movement, Ltd., has been formed—not only to retain the " publicity " spirit but to crystallize the experience of the war into a peace-time policy. Here, in brief, are our proposals, which will be sent in extenso to any one interested :—
(1) The immediate prohibition of spirits.
(2) The limitation of brewing to one half of the pre-war barrelage, followed by progressive restriction of the output of both intoxicating beer and wine until it entirely ceases.
(3) Submission of one or both of these issues to a National Referendum.
(4) In lieu of selling intoxicants, all suitable public-houses to be transformed to people's cafeis, social clubs, or other centres of real recreation and refreshment.
(5) If either of the options for prohibition of spirits or beer is carried, "the Trade" would receive equitable compensa- tion in the following ways :— (a) Distillers to receive five- or seven-year monopoly licences for the production of industrial alcohol.
(b) Brewers to receive similar monopoly licences for the production of pure and wholesome non-intoxicating beer.
(c) Licensees to receive similar monopoly licences for retail sale of such non-intoxicating beers and special licences for the sale of denatured power alcohol for the use of motorists, &c.
(d) If during three years after the adoption of Prohibi- tion, any distillery producing industrial alcohol, and any brewery producing non-intoxicating beer or other products, is unable from the profits to pay a dividend equal to the average dividend for the three years prior to the war, the State, upon proof of same, to make up the difference.
We believe this policy of Progressive Prohibition on construc- tive lines is one upon which all can combine—even "the Trade" itself. It does not stand in the way of ultimate Prohi- bition (as some believe State Purchase would), and it makes partial prohibition an immediate possibility. It automatically secures the main advantage claimed for State Purchase—viz., the removal of the incentive "to push the sale of drink."
By dealing with liquor instead of with licences it escapes the long time-limit of the Licensing Bill of 1908. The conversion of the plant and other assets of "the Trade" meets the plea of the Spectator (August 30th) regarding vested interests, because there would be no "ruined shareholders" any more than under nationalization. Like Local Option, which it supplements wherever it is in force, Progressive Prohibition depends absolutely upon public opinion for its adoption. It deals drastically with the trade in spirits, but does not propose immediate prohibition of beer. It recognizes we are not ripe for a " dry " country, but it encourages us to tread the path towards it. Unlike State Purchase, it is not "a counsel of despair," winning so often a merely reluctant aseent, but it appeals to fair minds as a practical business proposition which is just to all concerned.
This policy, if accepted, will close the desolating controversies on " management " and " compensation " which have paralysed temperance reform for so long. Progressive Prohibition merits, with far more truth, the claim so often lightly made for State Purchase and repeated by Mr. Batty—viz., "it is the one open and only way of escape from the present tragic deadlock."—We are, Sir, &c.,
P. G. CREED, Acting Chairman.
H. STEPHENS RICHARDSON, HOD. Treasurer. G. ERNEST WINTERTON, Secretary.