THE BALTIC QUESTION.
THE old British idea of the Balance of Power .which some well-meaning theorists now try wholly to discountenance, must be keenly appreciated in Scandinavia to-day. For the equilibrium of forces which kept the Baltic free has been rudely upset, and the prospects for Scandinavian liberties seem very dubious. Russia's complete disappearance from the scene has left Germany in sole command of the Baltic. The infant Scandinavian Navies cannot challenge her Fleet, or hinder the progress of her transports to any place that she may covet. The whole of the eastern shores of the Baltic are under her direct control, with the possible exception of Kronstadt, the port of Petrograd. Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia have become German provinces, and Finland, as an independent State, has entered into a close alliance with Germany and admitted large numbers of German troops. The Aaland Islands, midway between Finland and Sweden, at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, have been occupied by Germany, with the avowed approval of Finland. The Finns, many of whom are of Swedish origin and have never ceased to lament their forced exchange of Russian for Swedish rule in 1809, have surprised Western Europe, and even their Swedish neighbours, by their whole-hearted adherence to the German cause. The Allies are fighting for the right of little nations to exist, yet the small Finnish nation had no sooner gained its independence than it attached itself to the enemy whose triumph would mean the destruction of all the little nations bordering on Germany. We may regret such political short-sightedness, but we cannot ignore the fact. Not content with their own territories, the Finns are credited with the desire to annex Norwegian Lapland for the sake of obtaining a port on the North Sea, and also Russian Lapland so as to secure a footing on the White Sea and the Kola Peninsula. Russia has an ice-free port at Kola, con- nected by the Murman Railway with the interior, and it is this which the Finns are said to covet, at the instigation of their German friends, who would use it as a submarine base in the Arctic. At the western end of the Baltic the narrow Sound, between Sweden and Denmark, is nominally an international channel, but since the war began it has been mined and patrolled by German warships to exclude our ships. Sir Eric Geddes has publicly stated the reasons why the British Navy will not attempt any operations in the Baltic, as if to make the enemy feel perfectly secure. The Scandinavian countries are left to await the next German move.
It must be said frankly that the attitude of Sweden and Denmark, if not of Norway, during the war has inspired the British public with misgiving. The Conservatives in Sweden and the Socialists in Denmark have been openly pro-German. Both countries, like Holland, have lent themselves to the profitable task of evading the British blockade on German account. Moreover, the Danish and Swedish Socialists have co-operated with the German Majority Socialists in the dangerous intrigues for an International Conference which were designed by the German Government to break up the solidarity of the Allies. But greed and fear are powerful human motives, and it would be unwise and unfair to over- look the fact that we have many good friends both in Sweden and in Denmark who have been neither tempted by German gold nor terrified by German threats. We have been very patient in our dealings with Scandinavia, and it would be profoundly unstatesmanlike to change our tone now that the Scandinavians are being compelled by the logic of events to turn to us for moral support in their isolation. It may be safely assumed that neither the Danes, nor the Swedes, nor the Norwegians wish to become subjects of Germany. Though they have their Bolsheviks in small numbers, the three nations are determined to maintain their iniependence. It may be assumed, too, that they will act in concert. The war taught them the necessity of united action in defence of their neutrality, and it may be inferred that they would act together if one of them were threatened with German aggression. What form their action would take must depend upon circumstances, but it is improbable that the pro-German Court at Stockholm or the pro-German Socialists now in power at Copenhagen would delay or prevent resistance to an invader. If these assumptions are correct, the problem of dominating the Scandinavian kingdoms will not be so easy as it seems at first sight. The Scandinavian peoples are small. Sweden with her five and a half millions is as populous as Denmark and Norway combined. But these extensive countries with ten or eleven million people between them could not be conquered very quickly by Germany, even if her hands were entirely free, and she had not to devote her main strength to combating the Allies on the Western Front, in Italy, and in the Near East. Moreover, while we could not send help to the peoples of the Eastern Baltic, we could at any time assist Sweden or Denmark or Norway, if we chose and if we were asked to do so. Probably this simple geo- graphical fact accounts for Germany's present unwillingness to attack her Scandinavian neighbours. She seizes or sinks their ships, it is true, just as she sinks the ships of her humble Spanish friends; but Scandinavia,. like Spain, has agreed to accept German piracy as in the nature of things. Gerrr any, however, clearly does not want to give the Allies any excuse for intervention in Scandinavia, which would be far more to our advantage than it would be to hers. We have only to imagine a British naval base established in the Great Belt or the Cattegat to realize how dangerous it might be for Germany to give the Allies such an opening. We may conclude, then, that for the present Germany will pursue a waiting policy towards Scandinavia, despite the outcries of the Pan-Germans.
The future of Scandinavia and the Baltic must depend on the outcome of the war. If indeed Germany were to emerge victorious, then all the evils on which the pessimists delight to ponder would come to pass. A triumphant Ger- many would not only keep the Baltic provinces of Russia and Finland, but would reduce Sweden, Denmark, and Norway to tributary provinces. That must be as clear as the sun at noon to them as to us. The Baltic would be a German lake, and its commerce would be a German monopoly. Swedes and Danes and Norwegians would gradually be converted by Prussian schoolmasters and Prussian police into docile Germans, and their distinctive civilizations and literatures would disappear. Such is the prospect if the Allies were to fail in their task. But, fortunately for Scan- dinavia and for the rest of the world, the Allies will not fail. We have a long and arduous war before us, but, provided always that we maintain our courage and our resolution, we shall certainly end the war with victory. It is important in discussing the future of the Baltic or any other part of Europe to make this point clear. If we defeat Germany, we can impose our own terms in the West, in the Baltic or elsewhere. If we were defeated by Germany, we should have to submit to her terms everywhere. All depends on the military result of the war. All speculations as to the future are conditioned by that alone. Thus we need not take too seriously the German incursions into this or that neighbour State. Napoleon stretched his hands out much farther than the German Emperor has done, but his first defeat compelled him to drop all his booty. It will be the same at the end of this war if, as we believe will be the case, it is fought to a finish. The Germans have spent much time and labour in pegging out claims for the future in Eastern and Western Europe, but when they are beaten in the field their claims will be disregarded. The Allies will certainly never tolerate anything like German control of the Baltic.
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