ADMIRAL PERSANO'S DEFENCE.

_ADMIRAL PERSANO'S defence of his conduct at Lissa, carefully suppressed for months, has at length reached England, and we propose to lay before our readers a brief analysis of the facts which have convinced his personal friends and the chief naval officers of France that he has been most unjustly dealt with. When Count Persano was appointed to command the fleet, he enjoyed the thorough esteem and confidence of his countrymen. His character stood very high, both for courage and capacity; straightforward, hu.

petuous, strict with his officers, frank and plain-spoken, he is a man to have warm friends and bitter enemies, and he has both. Italy was resolved to have a Navy ; up-

wards of 12,000,000 of pounds sterling had been spent within five years, in forming a fleet far superior to that of

Austria in size and in guns. She had two plated steam

frigates of nearly 5,700 tons each, the IN d'Italia and the Re di Portogallo, built in America, each with two armstrong

guns of 3001b., 10 mortars of 801b., and 24 rifled cannon,

with conical steel balls of 901b. The Fonnidabile and Terribile, of 2,700 tons, were built in France ; the Monitor Afondatore, was a steam ram, which arrived from England the day before the battle of Lissa. The Italians were in a fever of enthusiasm, they counted on the most brilliant

successes by sea and by land ;_ perhaps they would even march to Vienna, but they would certainly take Rome ; and then came the disastrous battle of Custozza, the indecisive battle of Lissa, and the Italians broke forth into howls of rage and disappointment. The people and the troops had done all that men could do, — they had given their sons, their husbands, and brothers, their money and their blood, and after all they had gained nothing. What they won was won for them by Prussia, and it was necessary for the Ministry to find a victim to throw to the wolves, that they themselves might escape. Custozza would not bear inquiry,—the maladministration, the absence of preparation, the peculation, the want of necessaries, of cloth- ing, of arms for the troops, for the volunteers, for the sick, all these things, which were the real causes of their non-suc- cess, must be hushed up and slurred over,—and Persano was the most convenient victim.

This is the secret of the affair, but the history of it is as follows :- On the 21st May, 1866, Admiral Persano reported to the Minister of Marine that " the fleet was not fit to go to war," that " it would take three months to make it tolerably ready,"

" that the ships on joining were short of men, especially of warrant officers, fourteen of the latter being wanting in the Castelfidardo alone, and, above all, without gunners." He added, " We are ready to die for our King and country, but

that won't give us victory, and victory is what we want." He suggested that if warrant officers could not be got otherwise that merchant captains should be pressed, and urgently represented the necessity for the most vigorous and immediate efforts to bring the fleet into fighting order. On the 21st of June the Admiral left Taranto, leaving two ships, which were not ready, behind, although he had just received a telegram

from head-quarters saying, " There appears no reason why you should hurry to Ancona ; it is better that you should have more

ships, and well found ; but do as you think best." In spite of

this, one of the charges afterwards brought against the Admiral was of having delayed at Taranto On the 26th the

fleet cast anchor at Ancona in the afternoon, and the next

morning the Austrian fleet, in ignorance of their arrival, appeared off that port. The IN d'Italia and Rg. di Portogallo

were throwing their coal overboard on account of its being in a state of combustion ; the latter signalled that she could not stir, owing to the ignorance of her chief engineer ; the engineers

of the Varese and Palestro refused to work, not being in the

Royal service, a fact of which the Government had been previously warned, and which was probably owing to their being British subjects, our Royal proclamation forbidding all such to take part in the war having been a severe blow to the Italian fleet, which had scarcely any other engineers. Two other ships were exchanging their guns, and all were

coaling. Tinder these unfavourable circumstances Admiral Persano went in person in a swift small vessel from ship to

ship, and got them into order of battle ; but the Austrians,

probably seeing no hope of a coup de main, retreated, and Admiral Persano did not think it expedient to give chase. A

week later the Minister Depretis congratulated the Admiral on his "indefatigable activity," recommended "caution," " a vigilant, a menacing defensive position," and conveyed to him Ricasoli's (the Prime Minister's) injunction "not to

engage without the certainty of victory," adding, "before you can pursue the enemy into his own waters the fleet must be completely fitted out." He hoped to send him six Armstrong guns in a week, the steam ram Afondatore was promised within a fortnight. The Minister sympathized with Persano's

extreme impatience, and promised to back his demands for naval requisites with all his power. Yet in the teeth of their own instructions, and in spite of their own knowledge of facts, the second charge subsequently brought by the Government

against Count Persano was for not having chased the Austrian fleet on the 27th. On the 5th of July the Moniteur announced the cession of Venetia to the French Emperor, the disastrous battle of Custozza, and the subsequent inaction of the Army roused the indignation of the Italians, and the Ministry sent repeated telegrams to the Admiral to get ready for sea. He telegraphed, " I am ready, mucus THE cams." Up to the 7th of July he had neither got guns nor order, and was so exasperated at the delay that he threatened to resign his command, while the Minister confessed that it was impossible to send him any plan of operations. On the 9th of July he received orders to go in search of the enemy, and to attack him ; to make himself master of the Adriatic, to blockade the enemy's fleet if it remained in Polo, but not to risk any of his own ships by attacking the forts which defend Polo ; not to go too near the coast, for fear of marine torpedoes or mines. The Admiral cruised up and down in the Adriatic (endeavouring by a well- planned manoeuvre to draw the Austrians toward the south), and the Minister complained of the consumption of coal I The third charge against Count Persano was for disobedience of these orders, but La Marmora (the Prime Minister) himself ordered him to wait for the Afondatore, and to blockade Polo was impossible. On the 15th of July the Minister of Marine arrived at Ancona, and vehemently urged the Admiral to go , and take the fortified island of Lissa. Persano replied that it was the very thing he wanted to do, but that he must have 5,000 men for disembarkation, with engineer and artil- lery officers. The Minister could only let him have 500 marines, which, with the sailors who could be spared, gave him a landing force of 1,500 men. While they were disputing about it a letter arrived from La Marmora, who wrote to the Admiral in the name of the King and Ministry lamenting the inaction of the fleet, and ordering him to put to sea and attack either the enemy's fleet, or forts, or coasts, the moment the steam ram Afondatore should have joined, under pain of being superseded in his command. Now, if the inaction of the fleet was owing to the non-arrival of the Afondatore, it was clearly not the fault of Persano if he was ordered to wait for it, he could not be blamed for not going without it, and the childishness of requiring him to attack the enemy's coasts,—he had pointed out a week previously that this' was impossible without haying a sufficient force to take possession of any locality,—when they knew he had no force to dis- embark, will probably astonish, even those who are aware by how little wisdom nations are governed.

Nevertheless, stung by this unreasonable letter, Persano determined to attempt a coup de main. Neither he nor the Government had any positive knowledge about the island, not even a map of it. He sailed on the afternoon of the 16th of July, and the next day, at sunset, received informa- tion from D'Amico, the chief of his Staff, who had gone to Lissa under English colours, that the three forts on the island were defended by about 2,500 men. Vice-Admiral Albini came on board to dissuade the Commander-in-Chief from attacking, declaring that Lissa was the Gibraltar of the Adriatic, but Persano was not to be turned from his purpose. He himself, with eight plated steam frigates, undertook the attack on the principal fort of San Giorgio, and ordered his Vice-Admiral, Albini, with four wooden ships, to silence a battery, and effect a landing at Porto Manego, on the south- east of the island, while Rear-Admiral Vacca, with three plated frigates, was to shell the batteries of Porto Carniso, on the north-west. The action was fixed for daybreak, but "owing to the difficulties of communicating orders at night " it did not begin till eleven a.m. After a hot engagement (during which the Ire d'Italia fired 1,300 shot), Fort San Giorgio lowered its colours at half-past three p.m., when Vacca, finding the batteries at Porto Carniso too high to attack, returned without orders, and at five o'clock the news came that Albini had done nothing whatever. At six both divisions rejoined, Albini, as a French Admiral garcastically remarked, "pure from any stain of powder.' Persano determined to renew the attack next day, in spite of the representations of two of the Captains that if even 1,200 men were landed, the remainder of the crews would not suffice to work the guns. Count Persano received information that the Austrian Admiral Tegethof had telegraphed to the garrison to " bold out until his arrival." He had some suspicion that this was only a stratagem, and on the arrival of the steam ram Aron- datore, with two frigates bringing 1,100 troops, he ordered Albini, with the nen-plated ships, to disembark them at Porto Canrobert, on the west of San Giorgio. The iron-plated steam sloop Formidabile, of 20 guns, went into the long narrow harbour of San Giorgio, and came out again an hour after, hav- ing failed in silencing the battery of the Madonna, and having lost 55 men, her masts and funnel being almost demolished; but her cuirass had remained invulnerable, and not a shell had penetrated her battery. The attack began at half-past three p.m., but Albini failed to effect a landing, owing, as he reported, to the surf, though the wind was off shore, and there was no swell perceptible to the other ships,—a very remarkable fact. It is also stated that the garrison was lying in wait on the shore, and repulsed the vanguard.

At daybreak on the 20th July a transport brought a bat- talion of. Marines. Persano had two courses open to him,—im- mediate action, or a return to Ancona for coal, of which they hail only two days' supply left, and for ammunition. Like an obstinate, tough Piedmontese, he gave orders for renewing the attack again, confiding the disembarkation to Albini, when at eight in the morning news came that the enemy was in sight. It is evident that up to this point all that had been done was done by Persano. Had. either Albini or Vacca been equally successful, or had Persano had the 5,000 men he had demanded, the island would have been in possession of the Italians before the Austrian fleet arrived. The failure was evidently not due to the Commander-in-Chief, and the attack with insufficient force had been insisted on by Govern- ment, so that of this fourth charge he must be acquitted.

Orders were issued for the formation of a sufficient landing force on the 21st and 22nd of July I He now ordered the fleet to form in two lines, nine plated ships in the first rank, under his own command, with Vacca under him, and the non-plated in the second rank, under Vice-Admiral Albini. The Formiclabile asked leave to go to Ancona for repairs, and departed without orders. The Admiral shifted his flag into the steam ram Afondatore, and this forms one of the principal charges against him. The French Admiral Page, author of a by no means friendly article on the subject in the Revue des Deux Mondes, declares that no sailor can blame him for so doing, though he considers that he ought to have chosen one of the sister ships, the Formi- dabile or the Terribile. But that the misfortunes of the Italian fleet were not due to this step is evident, for not only had the Afondatore been appointed the Commander-in-Chief's tender the night before, but her captain expected him on board. It is quite impossible that the other ships could have been unaware of where the Admiral was when they saw his flag hauled down on the Re d'Italia, when they saw the Afondatore leave the latter instead of remaining to defend her, when they could distinguish a slight mistake in the flag which was hoisted on board the steam ram, and above all, when his first signals from the latter were repeated and obeyed by every ship. Albini must have well known that the Commander-in-Chief was on board the Affondatore, or why did he not assume the command, when, as he says, he supposed him to have gone down in the Re d'Italia? As to the charge of cowardice because he remained in the turret of the steam ram, another French naval officer declares that he cannot understand it, there being no other place where a commander could stay. The letters of the unfortunate Deputy Boggio, who went down in the Re d'Italia, bear ample testimony to Persano's gallantry and pluck. His own actions, his whole demeanour, leave not a shadow of doubt on the subject.

Persano is accused of having formed in line presenting his flank to the enemy. Tegethof advanced in three divisions, seven armour ships, with the flag-ship Max at their head, the wooden Kaiser, of 92 guns, leading the iron-plated wooden ships, and the smaller vessels bringing up the rear, all disposed chevron fashion. He gave the word, " Run down the enemy and sink him." It was a coup dessal of a battle with plated ships and steam rams. Vacca's fire did no damage, and Tegethof passed through the enemy's line with- out doing him any harm, but fell upon the Re d'Italia with four plated ships, and he himself ran into her, then backed, and the ill-fated ship went down. Her rudder, which was exposed, is said to have been broken by a shot. The two ships were of equal horse-power (800), but the Max was 1,200 tons less, and had only sixteen guns to the Italia's thirty-six. The Re di Portogallo, sister ship of the Re d'Italia, evaded the shock of the stout old Kaiser (a 92-gun wooden screw frigate). They grazed each other from stem to stern, and the Kaiser received the whole broadside of the enemy without being able to return a shot. She lost 105 killed and wounded, her funnel was crushed by the fall of the mizen-mast, and she was obliged to retreat towards Lissa. The Afondatore attempted to run her spur into her, but failed, owing to the rudder-chain breaking. A second attack of the Afondatore was met by a storm of vertical balls, which pierced the decks of the steam ram, and by a withering fire of musketry against the crew, who were getting in the anchor, which was dashing itself against the sides.

Albini, instead of joining immediately, delayed, to gather up the boats and planks he was beginning to use for the disem- barkation. He then, with his eight frigates, formed line upwards of a mile and a half from the scene of action, and remained a tranquil spectator thereof, with nearly 400 guns !

The Terribile remained with him. In vain the Commander- in-Chief signalled for him to join and press the enemy. In his opinion, as he had the effrontery to avow before the Court of Inquiry, " uncuirassed frigates are more bother than use." " This scientific opinion," as Admiral Page truly writes; " makes one's blood freeze when one thinks of the noble old. Kaiser adopting modern manoeuvres, and nearly running down the finest of the Italian armoured ships."

The Ancona and the Varese fell foul of each other, the Palestro was set on fire, being only partially plated, and finally blew up. In vain did the Commander-in-Chief, seeing his re- iterated signals disobeyed, go in person towards the second division to make sure that they were perceived. In vain did he rush after the laggards among the cuirassed ships, and endeavour to bring them into action. The Principe Umberto, a wooden frigate (just returned from a long cruise in the Pacific, and therefore in good order), under Captain Acton, and the Re di Portogallo, were the only ships which obeyed his orders to close with and chase the enemy. Rear-Admiral Vacca confessed to seeing the signal, and to having disobeyed it, because he thought the fleet should form in line first What could Persano do with such officers, to whom the very first principle of military obedience was unknown ? The battle lasted little more than an hour. The French Admiral declares that both fleets were at that moment perfectly fit to 'resume the battle ; but not only did most of Persano's fleet refuse to fight, but the Italian gun practice was so bad that 1,450 shots of their magnificent artillery made scarcely a mark on the Austrian fleet.

We are not upholding Admiral Persano as having made no mistakes as a naval tactician, but we consider that his cha- racter for honesty and courage remains unblemished, and that the most skilful manoeuvres would have been frustrated by, such disobedience as were manifested by many under his com- mand, Vice-Admiral Albini being the foremost culprit.

After the battle Persano resigned his command, sent in charges against Albini and Vacca, and demanded a Court of Inquiry.

This was certainly the act of an innocent and honourable man. The Government would not publish his report of the battle of Lissa, and it was semi-officially stated by the Nazione that they did so on account of the accusations it brought against almost all his officers. For publishing the same narra- tive in a pamphlet, entitled "I Fatti di Lissa," the Admiral was placed under close arrest for about two months, and not allowed any communication even with his wife and son ; yet the official narrative, drawn up by Rear-Admiral Brochetti, and finally published by Government, agrees with that of Persano in every respect, excepting only the omission of all notice of the fact that it was the Ministry who forced him to immediate action in the middle of July, before he had received any troops. Admiral Persano's pamphlet was written with re- markable reserve and caution ; he brought no charges against any one, though the facts told strongly against them. His trial was delayed for months ; at first the Government intended to accuse him of treason, but they were obliged to give it up, there not being even a shadow of foundation for it. It is worthy of note that his advocate based his defence of the Admiral on the report of the Court of Inquiry, which is a sufficient proof of the accuracy of the facts we have stated, and of Persano's narrative of them. His own defence was considered triumphant, and even a paper which had strongly opposed him acknowledged it was a noble one. Every charge against him was disproved, and his advocates strongly insisted on the illegality of allowing his two Admirals, Albini and Vacca, whom he had reported for disobedience of orders, to be the chief witnesses against him.

When the defence was concluded every one anticipated an honourable acquittal, when just as he had explained the failure of his attack on the Kaiser, a paper was slipped into his hand, saying, " If you will say no more, you will gain several additional votes." This was too much for his patience.

He lost his self-control, and striking the table with a force that resounded throughout the house, he cried," I am here not to beg for votes, but to demand justice,"—threw back every lie in their teeth, and defied the whole Senate.

All the leading men in the Senate voted for him, but he is a Piedmontese, and the Genoese, Neapolitans, and Venetians confess that they had made up their minds beforehand to condemn him. And so he was condemned to lose his rank, to be dismissed the service, and to pay the expenses of the prosecution, while his subordinates go scot free.

So much for the justice of an elective Upper House !