Labour's new programme:
inchoate and unworkable
Not long ago we argued in these columns that a strong opposition was as essential for the solution of the nation's problems as a strong government. We then lamented the public performance of the Labour Party thus far in the life of the present Parliament. "The present Government," we added, "beset with troubles and without any clear purpose, ought to be on the edge of disastrous humiliation and defeat. That it is not is because the Labour Party, at this moment, does not look like being able to supply an alternative government." In an attempt to remedy that state of affairs, and to deny the unfavourable judgements cast upon its performance in opposition, the Labour Party has now produced a new policy document, Labour's Programme for Britain, which seeks both to delineate a radical programme of national reform and reconstruction, and to convince people that Labour is capable of carrying such a programme through. For all its deficiencies, which have already been dilated upon elsewhere, this document deserves the most careful consideration, and the most constructive criticism, not only because of its inherent virtues and vices, but because the national need for a strong opposition dictates an attempt to assist the Labour Party in its task of preparing for government.
The first thing to observe about the document is the evidence it offers for the character of the Party itself. A remarkable passage contrasts the business of policymaking as tackled by Labour and the Tories respectively: Tory policy is developed in private, and handed down from the top . . . The Labour Party does not work like this, and has no wish to do so. We are the only political party which grew from the constituencies into parliament — instead of vice versa — . . . Policy in the Labour Party is made by the membeis.
Thus—as Mr Callaghan and Mr Wedgwood Benn have already trumpeted — the present document reflects the aims, aspirations and criticisms of the movement as a whole, rather than of its leadership. It was preceded by an extensive programme of democratic consultation — remarkably similar, in spite of claims to the contrary, to the Tories" Two Way Contact Programme.' Mr Wedgwood Benn is proud that most of the ideas in the programme came from below. This matters more to such ' democrats ' as he, than the cohesion and originality such ideas may possess. But mass parties cannot make policies. Consequently, the Labour Party is forced to regard its new programme as a basis for discussion, though this contrasts oddly with the definiteness of its language. It will be debated at the party conference this year, proceed to a further draft, and then have certain elements selected from that draft by members of the Shadow Cabinet for inclusion in the manifesto. Although skilled teams of economists and others will draft detailed plans for the implementation of certain points in the programme, it is nonetheless clear that the• role of the Shadow Cabinet is intended to be minimal. There is every reason for the Labour Party to be proud of its origins and proud of its character as a mass movement: but the reflection of that pride in the new policy document cannot conceal the fact that this is not the way to devise a policy for the government of a nation a majority of whose citizens are not part of that movement. Nor is there any evidence to suppose that the party leadership of the future — or the next Labour Cabinet for that matter — will in fact adhere to the procedure visualised in the document (though a great deal of harm may be done to the party's prospects if the pretence is continually made over the next year or so that they will). The fact of the matter is that Labour has been compelled into this disingenuous shift by the extreme disappointment of its followers with the performance Of the last Labour government, and by the impossibility of reconciling conflicting views on present policy to such a degree as would make the publication of a strong policy document possible. Labour's Programme for Britain, is thus an excellent example of an attempt to make a virtue out of necessity, and it would have been even more so had Mr Wedgwood Benn's scheme to publish each successive draft of the document — a hare-brained idea, if there ever was one — had been adopted. The incapacity of this supposed mass consultation to define, let alone resolve, policy difficulties can' be seen in the section on the trade unions. Here the Labour Party undertakes to repeal the Industrial Relations Act, but the drafters add that they will "recreate the legal protection needed for trade unions to properly exercise their functions." It may well be that the new Act is a mess, but that provides no reason to suppose that our powerful monopolistic unions need protection; and public opinion as a whole will certainly refuse to believe that they do.
The saddest example of the muddle in the character of the document as a whole is the description of it on the one hand as "a basis for discussion" and, in the next breath, as "more ambitious than a manifesto." A manifesto is what a party intends to do; a basis for discussion is something it is brooding on; there can be no comparison of their importance. It seems clear, therefore, that lack of unity, lack of will and of conviction to impose views, and awareness of the distrust of the rank and file, have influenced the Labour leadership in both the style and the substance of the document.
Their lack of confidence in themselves is demonstrated by the extraordinary commitment to bureaucracy which is one of the most significant features of the new policy, and it is accompanied by a renewed commitment to extensive nationalisation. The docks are to become publicly owned, there is to be stricter control of — and taxation of — advertising, there will be a vast apparatus to police the new price control policy, and an even more elaborate one to select firms which will be entitled to public subsidy (because they need to, but cannot, raise their prices). The Industrial Reorganisation Corporation is to be restored; another new body will control consumer protection; a non-government Public Arbitration Agency will assess industrial relations problems; the pharmaceutical • industry will be nationalised; and there are many other such schemes in the pipeline. Now the Labour Party is, at least in theory, a socialist party, and it is not unreasonable that they should propose to create a socialised economy, though they clearly plan to do so to a much greater extent than ever before. The difficulty is this: the bureaucratic structures created by the last Labour government were dismally inefficient, and were for this, quite apart from any other reason, abysmal failures. There is no indication from the new document that any lessons have been learned from that experience. It is the end rather than the means that the new policy wills; and when the document says, of economic planning, "Although it is too early to specify the precise shape of the planning machinery required, it is possible to spell out the various functions it will need to fulfil ", the drafters transport themselves into cloud-cuckoo land. Aside altogether from the question of whether a socialised and bureaucratised economy can be made to work at all or not, it is vital to make its machinery efficient if it is to have a chance; and on this question the Labour Party has nothing whatever to say, or, we cannot but presume, to think.
All massive and unselective intervention in economic management is highly inflationary. It converts private spending into public spending. It greatly increases the money supply (and this, growing as it is at the moment at about 23 per cent a year, is one of the most important influences on the current inflation). We can see the aim Labour has in mind when a commitment is made to introduce price controls — which are being experimented with in other countries — but we cannot see the.logic behind the aim. Nothing whatever is to be done about wages. Attacking prices through controls at the very moment when it is envisaged that a Labour government sets in motion a massively inflationary re-structuring of the national economic system is an absurdity. This absurdity is particularly Well symbolised in the scheme to recompense from public funds firms who need cash for capital investment but which are not to be allowed to raise their prices to get it. When, on top of all this, we read that public spending, arid welfare Spending in particular, is intended to rise at a more rapid rate than economic growth as a whole, we can only stand aghast. "If public spending," the document goes on to say, with for once impeccable if superfluous logic, "is to grow faster than the economy as a whole, then consumer spending must grdw less fast." The document proposes increased taxation to serve that end. The Barber reforms of the taxation system are, in Practice, to disappear; estate duty is to reach such a level that the handing on of large private fortunes will by design be made impossible; industrial profits are to be squeezed; and the whole punitive, initiative-denying apparatus of 1964-70 is to be restored. Even this is not the whole story. If the drafters have their way, the Labour Party will deliberately avoid a decision to repeal the value added tax which it will expect to find installed on its return to power. if the Party were to keep it — as, inside the EEC it would, of course, have to — in company with the rest of the package, then a great many words about the inflationary effect of VAT would have to be eaten.
This massive complex of proposals is a prescription for national disaster. 4t is of scant use to point to the section of the document where, admitting that not all can be done at once, priorities for action are laid down. It is of even scantier use to Praise Labour's sensible decision not in future to become committed to fixed international exchange rates. All the reasonable proposals which are made are drowned in the huge and unwieldy complications of collectivism which dominate the Proposals. That sane and intelligent men and women who compose the Labour leadership can have come to endorse, and even to propound, this farrago can be put down only to the nature of the composition of the document itself. It is impossible to accept so many demands, from such disparate sources, and then endeavour, through the unbalanced power structure of the Labour Party, to try to transmit them into a policy for an alternative government. Naturally no Labour government would go very far in acting on plans such as these. But, when a Labour government did not do so, there would be yet another erosion of credibility throughout the movement. It is still an open question whether it is in fact possible to plan for government comprehensively and in great detail when one's party is in opposition: it may well make more sense to stick to general strategy and broad outlines. The general strategy of the Labour Party consists of a greater and more overt commitment to social justice, within a socialised framework, than its main rival. But the extent to which that strategy can be implemented is conditioned by the facts of political life, and the success of a government in running the kind of economy we have in this country. If the economy is run into failure, as it was last time Labour was in power, or into disaster, as it would be if the new policies were to be brought into force; then no great measure of social reform could be achieved. If the next Labour government fails in the social objectives imposed on it by the character of the Labour movement, then the Party will be destroyed for all time, and the great contribution it can make to the life of the nation will be lost.
This is a particularly tragic possibility for the Labour Party and for the country because of the present position and possible future of the Heath government. The Prime Minister is willing to sacrifice every other policy, if necessary, to get Britain into Europe. It is still a matter of doubt how the economic situation will look, from within the EEC, when the moment comes for the next general election. But, with an apparent willingness to sacrifice the national interest to the exchange and monetary demands of European union; with the already perpetrated reversal of its own policies for re-invigorating British industry; and with the incalculable but probably deleterious effects of membership of the Common Market on employment, regional policy, industrial investment, competitive trading advantage, nationalised industries such as British steel, and inflation — even if the worst happens only in the short term — the prospects can hardly be said to look good. At such a juncture Labour's proposals to attempt re-negotiation of the Brussels Treaty, its determination to play the Market game in a hard, nationalistic and gaullist way, its commitment to refer the results of its policy in this field to the people, and the private, if not yet wholly public, decision of such influential Labour leaders as Mr Foot and Mr Healey to dpt for a floating pound, would all offer the Labour Party its first chance in this century to become a truly national party, fighting the British cause'if necessary within, but preferably without, a continental alliance; What folly to throw all this away for such an inchoate and unworkable domestic economic system as the Labour Party now visualises!
The tragedy for the country which is foreshadowed by Labour's Programme for Britain, if possible, is an even more important consideration. As we wrote when we last addressed ourselves to the question of government and opposition, if the Conservative government fails, and if a successor Labour administration fails as well, then there will be no alternative for a distracted and stricken nation to turn to. The consequences of such a collapse at the centre of national life can hardly be foreseen with any clarity, but they would be appalling. More than anything else, therefore, we must regard this new 'basis for discussion' as irresponsible in a national sense, offering neither hope nor prospect to the country. If the Labour Party really means it when the drafters of its lamentable document say the Party proposes to spend the next year or so examining the proposals with open minds then they must inject into the discussion some of the broader considerations which, on this occasion, they have wholly ignored. Labour is a movement, is a party: its leaders must now turn their followers into a national movement, and themselves into the men of a national party.
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