TOPICS OF THE DAY.
TERMS OF PEACE.
DOES any one suppose that this war is going to end in ordinary peace negotiations, say like those which preceded the Treaty of Frankfort in 1871, or the Treaty of Ports- mouth between the Russians and the Japanese in 1905 1 On those occasions there were regular bargaining conferences, de- mands for give and take, and concessions, first on one side and then on the other, to prevent a rupture. This war cannot end like that, because it is absolutely necessary for the Allies to insist on a settlement which the ruling powers in Germany cannot accept unless they are beaten so completely that it will not be a case of bargaining—for bargaining implies that each side has the power of continuing the war if it likes—but of the conquerors dictating terms. The Conference and the balancing of claims will be the affair of the Allies, not of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria. The neces- sity for the war ending in this way will not be due to any arrogance on the part of the Allies, or to any desire for aggran- disement, or, again, to the desire for revenge. It will be duo to the circumstances in which the war arose and the manner in which it has been carried on by Germany. Let any one consider the objects with which the war has been waged and he will soon realize this. The object with which the Allies have carried on the war has been and is security. We are each and all making sacrifices so terrible that they have 310 equal in the world's history in order that we for the rest of our lives, and our children after us, may be freed from the risk of war, and from the menace of an armed peace almost as intolerable. As the man in the street might say, " The Allies are not going to give the Germans a chance to come at us a second time. Never again ! is our motto." And if this is the object of the war, it will also be the object of the peace. We shall not dictate peace terms which will lead to the de- struction of the German people or any section of them, or to any annexations of true German provinces ; but we shall, as far as lies in our power, sec to it that such a structure of govern- ment as that presented by militarist Germany is an impossi- bility for the future. If it takes us another year, or two years, or even another three years to complete the work, we shall not like it, but we—i.e., France, Russia, Britain, Italy, Belgium, and Serbia—shall continue the work. The Germans have issued a Book of Hell of which there must be no second edition. We are not going to end the war by leaving Germany in a position which will enable her first to recuperate, and then to strike a second blow for the damnation of mankind. That is why German feelers after and talk about peace, and the German Chancellor's public assurances that Germany does not want any acquisition of territory, leave us perfectly cold. It does not matter what are Germany's wants or intentions. They do not come into the picture. We realize that the German Emperor and the German military caste will not consent to negotiations which will end their power until they have utterly exhausted every possibility of retaining it. We do not want to press the analogy of other wars too far, but there is one which will help people to under- stand the situation. Abraham Lincoln, in the last year of the war with the South, would never listen to overtures for peace, however great the concessions which appeared to be offered to him. Lover of peace and hater of war as he was, he knew that the only way to end the war which would justify the -nation for having waged it was by dictating terms and not by negotiations. He was not going to leave the Confederates in a position to make a second war when they had recovered sufficiently, and to spring once again at the throat of the North. He acted not out of any feeling of revenge, but because he knew that the South must fight on till it could fight no longer.
Let those who are inclined to deny our proposition that there is no room for negotiations with Germany and her subject allies, and that they must fight to the death rather than yield even to the best terms we can offer them, consider for a moment what is the minimum that must be asked from Germany. In the first place, in order to gain that security for which we are fighting, Germany must be forced to make restitution in respect not only of the territories she has seized since July, 1914, but of those which she laid hands on and which she has oppressed during the last fifty or sixty years. First and foremost, she must give back every inch of territory which she took from France in 1871. When peace comes the " lost provinces " must be lost no more. And here we may say a word to the French people, or rather to a section of them, for we are sure it is not required by the majority or by the French Government. There has been at times, it is rumoured, a certain uneasiness in France as to whether the English people realize the absolute necessity of the restoration of the lost provinces intact—whether they realize fully that the French people will die to the last man rather than end the war witl.out the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine. We can assure our French brothers-in-arms that the British people understand this abso- lutely and entirely, and that there is nothing further from their thoughts than to suggest that France in any circumstances shall forgo her just and legitimate claim to the restoration of the soil that was hers up till 1871. We understand, and, what is more, we greatly admire and honour the French for, their feelings in this matter. The British people may seem business- like and unsentimental, but in truth sentiment influences them very strongly, and they also greatly respect it in their friends. France is not less but far better liked in this country because she is so whole-heartedly determined not to yield on the question of the provinces, even if that should mean, which it never can mean, standing alone. If the demand for the restoration of the provinces were to delay the settlement by a year, our people would accept that necessity without a murmur. The notion of any British Ministry trying to per- suade France to agree to any other terms is unthinkable. Such an attempt would be received here, as in France, with a roar of indignation. But it really is not fair to our Govern- ment even to canvass such a hypothetical proposition. There is no possibility of anything of the kind occurring.
The full restitution of the soil of Belgium and of Serbia is just as necessary an item as the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine, and so also is the restitution of the whole of Poland —i.e., not only that part of Poland which is temporarily occupied by Germans and Austrians, but Posen and Galicia as well. No Polish soil must be left under German or Austrian sway. Into the question of Schleswig-Holstein we had better not enter in detail just now, but we may be sure that any parts of the Duchies in which there is a local majority hostile to Prussian rule will not be kept under the heel of the oppressor. Italy will, of course, deliver the Italians in the Trentino and Italian-speaking Tirol from Austrian rule. Garda will become a wholly Italian lake, and none of the Italian- speaking peoples of the Italian Alps will remain in Austrian possession. Trieste will come into Italian hands. Again, Austria and Hungary will no longer be allowed to oppress the Southern Slays, whether in Bohemia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, or any other portion of what was once the dominion of the Hapsburgs. Further, Germany and Austria will have to pay the fullest indemnity to Belgium and Serbia for the ruin they have wrought in those two kingdoms. Here no plea of German or Austrian bankruptcy will be allowed to hold good. They must make reparation for their deeds of hell in those two countries, even before they feed their own people. Again, even though Germany and Austria will be too utterly exhausted when the war ends for the payment of a general indemnity, they must restore the nun they have wrought in the Northern provinces of France. As for Turkey, the rule of the Ottoman Empire must cease, and this quite as much in the interests of its Mohammedan as of its Christian subjects. We cannot now discuss the future configuration of Turkey in detail, but Constantinople will of course go to Russia, and not merely Constantinople but the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles. To give Russia the city on the Straits and to leave the possibility of the door being slammed in her face would be an absurdity. That is one of the things which the Allies must fight for at all costs. Happily, however, there is now no more question as to this than there is about the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France.
Theoretically, we have no desire to antex Germany's colonies, but as a matter of fact they will have to be taken from her. Our South African fellow-subjects are not going to allow—small blame to them !—the restoration of South- West Africa or of East Africa to the hands of such bad neigh- bours as the Germans. The French, again, are not likely to want to give back the Cameroon. In a word, the German flag will cease to fly in Africa. The Australians will see to it that it ceases to fly also in New Guinea and in the Pacific gener- ally. Again, if any one imagines that Japan is going to assent to Kiao-chau being returned he is labouring under a very strange delusion. Finally, though the British people want no territory for themselves, Germany must hand over such portions of her Fleet as remain intact after the war, and with that Fleet the island of Heligoland.
Who can say that in the terms we have sketched, as the very least to which the Allies could consent, we have put matters too high ? On the contrary, it is obvious that we have tended to understate rather than overstate the settlement which must be imposed on Germany if we are to have due security. Next, we must ask : Can any one expect that the Germans would agree to such terms through negotiation ? That the German people, sick of the war as they are, might agree to them, we admit ; but the German people at present have no say in the war. They do what their rulers tell them, and that is all. But the Emperor, the Junkers, and the military caste, while they have a leg to stand upon, will never consent to terms of this kind. Why should they ? As far as their power and influence are concerned, it wculd mean entire extinction. They will therefore fight till the bitter end. They have no alternative, and we can offer them none.
Here, then, is the foundation for our belief that there are going to be no peace negotiations, but a settirment granted or dictated by the Allies. If we are told that this means another year of- the war, our answer is : " Better ten years and more of war than a patched-up peace which will only be preparatory to knew outbreak." We showed the world that we had not the sense to prepare for war. At least we can show it that we know how to prepare for a stable peace.
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