THE MOROCCAN IMBROGLIO.
THERE seems no reason to feel any special, or at any rate immediate, anxiety about the Moroccan im- broglio. In all probability a pacific solution will be found. While, however, the conversations among the Powers are going on, it is wiser for the Press to avoid the discussion of details. Such discussion is apt to spoil the hands of diplo- matists. But though it would be inept, if not actually dangerous, to intrude on the conversations, there are certain general aspects of the situation which may be noted without risk of impeding the work of our Foreign Office. In the first place we may be allowed to express, and to express very strongly, the hope that whatever settlement is arrived at will not be a mere temporary smoothing-over of difficulties, but that something approaching a per- manent settlement--or if that is not possible a definitive settlement of the principles which are to govern the THERE seems no reason to feel any special, or at any rate immediate, anxiety about the Moroccan im- broglio. In all probability a pacific solution will be found. While, however, the conversations among the Powers are going on, it is wiser for the Press to avoid the discussion of details. Such discussion is apt to spoil the hands of diplo- matists. But though it would be inept, if not actually dangerous, to intrude on the conversations, there are certain general aspects of the situation which may be noted without risk of impeding the work of our Foreign Office. In the first place we may be allowed to express, and to express very strongly, the hope that whatever settlement is arrived at will not be a mere temporary smoothing-over of difficulties, but that something approaching a per- manent settlement--or if that is not possible a definitive settlement of the principles which are to govern the solution of the problem—will be reached. It is highly dangerous to leave the Morocco problem as vague as it has been left during the last few years. We began with some- thing like a definition of spheres of influence in Morocco— spheres of influence not to operate at once, no doubt, but to come into existence if the native regime became impossible. Then came the Algeciras Conference and the recognition of what was in fact a totally different principle— the principle of maintaining the integrity and independence of Morocco. The idea of partition or anything of the sort was abandoned. France and Spain were made the mandatories of Europe, and charged to keep order and to help the Sherifian Empire to a further lease of life. Now, however, this principle has been found impracticable. Not because she so desired, but because she was obliged to. France has been gradually forced to assume a position very different from that assigned to her at Algeciras, and one approaching much nearer to our position in Egypt or to her own position in Tunis. This has naturally excited Spain, because she has seen that if this change is persisted in it must mean what an Irishman might call a partition by one Power. The force of circumstances is, as it were, ousting Spain from what she considers to be, not only her legitimate rights in Morocco, but rights which before the Algeciras Conference were publicly recognized as belonging to her both by France and Britain. We are thus perforce brought back to the status quo ants Algeciras.
But if the status quo ante Algeciras is admittedly re-established, Germany's claims, which were unsatisfied under the tripartite e of France, Spain, and Britain, revive. In effect the Germans say: "We were not parties to that agreement, and therefore are not bound by it. We consented to a perfectly different arrangement at Algeciras, but if we are now told that this arrangement has broken down the whole question must be discussed de novo. Spain has taken action which can best be de- scribed as exacting material guarantees that her claims shall not be forgotten. We have done the same. Our action at Agadir is merely a physical reminder to the Powers con- cerned in the tripartite agreement that we must be con- sidered." Germany is further strengthened in this line by the fact that before the Moms Ministry went out of office there appear to have been negotiations with a view to allowing France a freer hand at Fez on the understanding that compensation should be found for Germany either in South-western Morocco or in the Cameroons-Congo district, or in both. How these difficulties are to be got over it is not for us to say, but we cannot help thinking that in the end it will be found necessary to do something which will very nearly approach partition. We shall not of course desert France, even by a hair's breadth ; but if it should be found possible to give France a free hand in the greater part of Morocco, while Spanish rights were secured in the territory marked out by the agreement of seven years ago, and if at the same time compensation could be found for 'Germany, the result would, we believe, not be injurious either to France or to us. What is clear is that the idea of main- taining much longer the integrity and independence of the Sherifian Empire is a dream, or rather that the only practical outcome would in effect be the absorption of the whole of Morocco by France. For ourselves we need hardly say that we should have no 'objection to that result. It is, how- ever, as we have pointed out, quite incompatible with the claims of Spain—claims which, even if she- could in honour ignore, France could not ignore with safety to herself. She cannot afford to make a deadly enemy of Spain, but unquestionably she would do this if the Spanish claims are not considered. The one thing which unites every class and section of Spaniards is their historic claims in Morocco. We may, and in fact we do, think it unwise of Spain to dissipate her economic energies in a Moroccan adventure, but it is, we know, idle to preach to her on that score. For good or ill we must face the fact that Spanish claims will have to be considered, and that the agreement of 1904 must be carried out.
Before we leave the subject of Germany and Morocco we must take note of the feeling, which is undoubtedly very strong in this country, that Germany, if she so desires, ought to be given" an opportunity for further expansion." In this desire we acquiesce in principle to the full, even though we may demur to the dangerous and aggressive manner in which German diplomacy is used. But unfortunately it ie much easier to recognize Germany's claim to oppor- tunities for further oversee expansion in principle than it is to carry it out in practice. When one begins to search the map for places in which such expansion is to take 'place it is soon discovered that almost every corner of the globe has already been partitioned, though not without Germany herself having acquired large slices. The moment one tries to find a place where Germany is to have new territory in which to exercise her colonial ambitions, one is brought up by the fact that every corner is either already in the possession of some European Power or that handing it over to Germany would arouse fears and anxieties in other Powers of the gravest kind. For example, the whole of the South American Continent is ruled out by the Monroe doctrine —a doctrine which Germany may call a policy of dog in the manger, but which cannot be altered by such epithets. Germany may urge that a great part of Spanish and Portuguese South America is not made proper use of by its present owners, and that she should be allowed to try her hand there. But such arguments have always proved, and will always prove, entirely unconvincing at Washington. The idea of German expansion at the expense of China would raise quite as dangerous complications. Not only Russia and Japan, but also the United States, to mention only three Powers, are determined to cry "Hands off ! "
There remains only Africa. Here are difficulties almost as great. People have no doubt talked at large —we have done so ourselves—of Germany relieving Belgium of the burden, or of a portion of the burden, of the Congo Free State. We have, however, seen no desire expressed on the part of Belgium to meet these sugges- tions, but rather the very strongest resolve to withstand them. Again, foolish and uninstructed people have some- times urged the giving of Walfisch Bay to Germany. But the moment that suggestion is considered it will be found to be absolutely inadmissible. Even if the Mother Country desired it, it would be met with an uncompromising veto by the South African Union. Every- man in South Africa —Boer and Briton—would rise to negative the proposal. Portugal no doubt does not make any very great use of her African colonies, but it would be felt as an outrage on international comity to plunder Portugal for the benefit of Germany merely because Portugal is weak. There remains either a portion of Morocco or some adjustment by France of the boundaries of her own African colonies. Here no doubt a deal is possible. But we may remark that if anything is to come of this it must be by direct negotiation 'between France and Germany. It is not for us or for any other Power to give away what does not belong to us or it. Suggestions by A that B's ambitions should be satisfied by concessions from C are very bad diplomacy. We have set forth these considerations, not to show that a solution of the present difficulties is utterly impos- sible, but to show how very difficult the problem is and to remind the public that it is much easier to say in general that" Germany ought to be given a chance" than to carry that general proposition into practice. Still the resources of civilization are not altogether exhausted. What we must hope for most is a reasonable tone on the part of all the negotiators. And, further, we would beg people here not to run away with the idea that if France finds it possible to agree to Germany remaining at Agadir and obtaining a slice of the Sus country British naval interests will necessarily be imperilled. We believe that exactly the re- verse is the case. If Germany chooses to expend money and energy in creating a naval base at Agadir it is not for us to say her nay. To put the matter quite frankly, we would much rather that she spent her money on bricks and mortar than on floating iron, and should view without a qualm a centrifugal rather than a centripetal policy in regard to her naval force. If she decitzes to dissipate rather than concentrate her fleets we shout& be the last people to object.
Previous page
