An American and Mr. Wilmot
By A. L. GOODHART *
" The increasingly heavy international burdens which the American people have accepted since the war (involving the New World yet more closely in the fortunes of the Old) have devolved upon them largely as a result of the political and military mistakes of their war-time leaders, and especially Roosevelt, Marshall and Eisen- hower, but these mistakes had to be made. The Americans had to find out for themselves that to strive forvictory alone is not enough, and that the balance of power must be the basis of peace." THIS is the conclusion which Mr. Chester Wilmot reaches in his valuable book The Struggle for Europe. I hope to show that there is something to be said on the other side. After the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour in December, 1944, it was feared in England that the main American effort would be concentrated on the defeat of Japan. It was there- fore with relief that Mr. Churchill received a memorandum from General Marshall, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, which said: " Notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the war, our view is that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory."
This did not mean, however, that the Americans regarded the war against Japan as of secondary importance. The more rapid the victory over Germany, the sooner would the ultimate defeat of Japan be achieved. They therefore refusEd to accept at any time the view that the defeat of Germany could be delayed in any circumstances or for any ulterior purpose. The first serious mistake made by Roosevelt, according to Mr. Wilmot, was his declaration at the Casablanca Conference in January, 1943, that the Allies were determined to demand the " unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy and Japan." Throughout his book the author returns to this point, suggest- ing that if it had not been for this declaration then the German people might have risen in revolt against Hitler. It must be remembered that in 1941, after the Germans had attacked Russia, Churchill delivered a broadcast in which he said : " We have but one aim and one single irrevocable purpose. We will never parley, we will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his gang...."
Both Churchill's declaration in June and Roosevelt's in January were an assurance to Russia that the Western Allies would support her whatever happened, and would not make a separate peace. Mr. Wilmot says (p. 123): " The effect upon post-war Europe of a fight to the finish seems to have been overlooked," but in 1942 the danger that Russia might come to some arrangement with the Nazis was a far more imminent one. Perhaps in making his pronouncement President Roosevelt had not forgotten that European statesmen had frequently blamed President Wilson for his famous Declaration of the Fourteen Points. It was said that if, in 1918, the Allied Armies had continued the war until the Germans had surrendered uncon- ditionally, then Hitler would not have been able to advance
* Professor Goodhart, Master of University College, Oxford, and a Knight Commander of the British Empire, was born, and remains, an American citizen.
the false theory that the German Army had not been defeated in the field. Apparently an American President is wrong if he recommends either a negotiated peace or an unconditional surrender.
Nor is there any evidence to support the view that this declaration prolonged the war. It is true, of course, that Goebbels used it for propaganda purposes, but all the facts which Mr. Wilmot states suggest that in any case the war would have been fought to a finish. In this connection it is interesting to note that when Mussolini was driven from office in July, 1943, it was hoped that Marshal Badoglio would sue for peace. His failure to do so was attributed at the time to the demand for unconditional surrender, but, as Mr. Wilmot says (p. 133). " it is now clear . . . that tlk consideration weighed little with Badoglio. The decisive factor was lack of power to make a capitulation effective." Is it not reasonable to assume that this consideration weighed equally little with the Germans, because as Mr. Wilmot himself says (p. 382):, " The will of one man, and one man alone, maintained a continent at war."
The second error which Mr. Wilmot ascribes to the Americans is that they failed to give sufficient support to the war in Italy. It is doubtful, however, whether the freeing of Italy from German troops would have been of material advantage to the Allies. Here again Mr. Wilmot is scrupulously fair when he says (p. 135): " The Italian front proved to be a far greater drain on Germany than on the Allies. In October Eisenhower's eleven divisions were holding down a German force double that size in Italy alone."
Mr. Wilmot suggests that, if the Italian campaign had been carried on with greater vigour, it would have been possible for the Allies to take a more active part in the Balkans. This course was advocated by Mr. Churchill, but it was opposed not only by the Americans but also by the British Chiefs of Staff who, as the author says (at p. 141), " had never been enthusiastic about the Prime Minister's Balkan and Aegean projects." It is obvious that no major operation could have been undertaken in the Balkans without seriously handicapping the invasion of France. It might perhaps have been possible to give more aid to Tito in Yugoslavia, but this could hardly have halted the spread af Communism in the Balkans as he himself was a Communist.
The third mistake which Mr. Wilmot ascribes to Marshall and Eisenhower is their decision to invade Southern France shortly after the attack in Normandy had begun. He suggests that this invasion was of little value, and that the forces involved could have been better employed in Italy and else- where. But at that time Eisenhower was afraid that the Normandy bridgehead might be sealed off, and he felt that the danger of such a stalemate could be avoided if the Germans were threatened from the flank and the rear.
The fourth error which the Americans arc said to have made is that they did not accept in sufficient time Montgomery's plan to make a major thrust across the lower Rhino. Eisenhower rejected this suggestion on the ground that such a " pencil-like thrust " into the heart of Germany while the Germans still had considerable reserves would lead to certain destruction. The fact that the Germans were still able to stage a major offensive in December, 1944, suggests that he may have been wise in refusing to take too great a risk.
The fifth and greatest mistake, according to the author, was made at Yalta in January, 1945. He describes this con- ference as " Stalin's greatest victory." Undoubtedly the President made every effort to gain Stalin's friendship, but this was the only course he could adopt. There were three reasons which made it essential for the Western Allies to reach a good understanding with Russia. In the first place Hitler was still hoping that there might be a break between the Allies through which he could escape at the last minute. The second reason was that the war against Japan had not as yet been won. No one knew whether the atom bomb would work. If it had not done so, the best American estimates suggested that it might require another million American casualties before final victory could be obtained in the East. It was essential therefore that the Russians should be persuaded to help. The third reason is in direct conflict with Mr. Wilmot's main thesis that the Americans concen- trated entirely on victory and failed to recognise the political problems which would arise after the war. It is clear that Roosevelt was straining every effort to persuade the Russians to join the United Nations. He realised that, with the defeat of Germany, it was inevitable that the U.S.S.R. would be by far the *strongest Power in Europe. It was essential therefore that the Russians should, if possible, become part of a world organisation whose primary object was the maintenance of peace.
With these three purposes in mind, it is difficult to see what steps could have bell taken by President Roosevelt at Yalta which would have proved more favourable to the West. The major point in dispute was Poland, but the major fact which had to be recognised was that the whole of Polish territory was then occupied by Russian troops. The best that could be obtained from the Russians was an agreement to hold an election in that country. It is true, of course, that this promise turned out to be of no practical value, but it is impossible to see what could have been gained by refusing the Soviet offer. In return for the Soviet promise to enter- the war against Japan, it was agreed that the rights which Russia had lost after her defeat by Japan in 1904 were to be restored. Mr. Wilmot says (p. 653) that " by this agreement Russia was to become with Anglo-American consent the political heir of Japan in Manchuria and thereby in North China." But there was nothing to prevent the Russians from advancing into Manchuria without Anglo-American consent. It was of advan- tage to the United States to have Russia do so as an ally, prepared to fight the powerful Japanese Army in Manchuria, rather than for her to wait until after the American forces had been forced to fight the Japanese practically alone. On one point of importance the Russians gave way. They finally agreed that France should be allowed a share in the administration of Germany and a place on the Allied Control Commission. This obviously strengthened the Western Powers against Russia.
The final error with which Mr. Wilmot charges the Americans concerns the last weeks of the war. It is probable that, if Eisenhower had wished to do so, he could have sent the Western Armies into Berlin and Prague before the Russians had got there. There are two reasons why this step was not taken. The first was based on the belief that if the German armies still in the field were given an opportunity to escape they might take shelter in " the Redoubt " in Southern Germany, where they would be able to continue a defensive war almost indefi- nitely. The second was that the Russians would have regarded such an occupation as a breach of faith. As they had played a major part in the defeat of Germany in the East, they felt that they should not be deprived of the token of victory at the last moment. Nor is there any evidence that the power now exer- cised by the U.S.S.R. in Central Europe and in the Balkans can be ascribed to this cause. In a footnote (p. 711) Mr. Wilmot says that: " It was nearly three years before Stalin was able to exploit this last advantage, but the triumph of the Czech Com- munists in the coup of February, 1948, had its origin in the fact that Prague was liberated by the Russians, not the Americans."
There is nothing to support this. Unless the American Army had remained indefinitely in Czechoslovakia it could have played no part in preventing the Communist coup. This book cannot be interpreted as being anti-American, because the author makes it clear that in his view the virtues of the American leaders far outweighed their faults. Neverthe- less, it is important to consider whether he is justified in blaming the present situation on their mistakes. The answer, I believe, is that nothing which the Western Allies could have done would have prevented Russia from being the dominant Power on the Continent today, because she was the only country willing to maintain a large army there after the end of the war. If this Russian threat is not to lead us into a Third World War, there are only two steps which we can take. The first is to create a sufficiently strong force to make it,clear to the U.S.S.R. that qty attack made by her will suffer defeat. The second is to persuade the Russians that we have no aggressive intentions against them. It is to be hoped. therefore, that they will read Mr. Wilmot's book, because it refers again and again to General Eisenhower's scrupulous regard for good faith. If he becomes the next American President, the recognition of this fact may prove to be of incalculable, value.
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