15 FEBRUARY 1946, Page 12

.SIR,—In his "U.N.O. Diary" a Diplomatic Correspondent affirms that the

Russian use of voting procedure in the Security Council to prevent the adoption of a resolution to the effect that the presence of British forces In Greece does not endanger peace has brought the whole organisation to the brink of disaster. "If the United Nations survives this blow .. . it will be a miracle." This is an appalling verdict ; but it must be taken seriously, coming from an author so well-informed as to be able to carry us for the first time behind the scenes of Dumbarton Oaks. Yet how else could the voting system have been applied, on the assumption (which the 'Diplomatic Correspondent does not question) that Russia was not "a party to the dispute" in the sense of Article 27, Section 3 of the Charter? He claims that the " veto " was meant to be used only as a last resort in cases of vital importance. But such an interpretation is quite inconsistent twith the Charter, which states (in substance) that decisions other than those of procedure require the affirmative vote of all permanent members. Thus the desired decision could have been reached only if the Russian representative had actually voted for a declaration that the presence of British forces did not endanger peace. Could this ever have been expected?

What would have happened if the debate had shown that the general view in the Council supported the Russian thesis? Is it conceivable that the British representative would have actually voted for a resolution to the effect that our action was endangering peace? Surely not ; yet without this no decision would have been possible—in theory. But he might in that case have said, "Since the rest of the Council thinks thus, we will withdraw the troops." Thus the action of the Council would have been effective, in practice. Is not this, in reverse, fairly close to what has actually happened? It is indeed regrettable that the first operations of the voting rule should have been (a) to prevent a majority vote in appointing the Secretary-General, and (b) to prevent the Council (in theory at least) from arriving at a conclusion on the Greek question which we and almost all the other members considered just. But there is nothing in this which could not have been foreseen at Yalta or which was not in fact foreseen at San Francisco. In spite of it, the representatives of all the United Nations have declared that it can work, and that they are resolved that it shall work. If the lack of a unanimous resolution on Greece is really going to destroy the Organisation unless a miracle inter- venes or if this assertion is anything but a terrible exaggeration their declarations were the hollowest of shams.

The Security Council has not yet developed its own procedures to the point where the best use can be made, under the rules laid down in the Charter, of the joint and several powers of its members. It is feeling its way under difficulties which might well have been spared it at this stage. Formal amendment is not at present possible. Those who really wish it to become an effective working instrument must show both calm and patience—essential virtues in international business.—Yours truly, Gorse Cottage, Terminus Avenue, Bexhill.

FRANK WALTERS.