GREAT BRITAIN" AND MOROCCO
WTE have lately dealt with the French and the Spanish/ position in Morocco, but it is important to realize the British position there also as it has developed/ in the last twenty years. By the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 Great Britain resigned all political ambitions there( in return for a similar surrender by France in Egypt. In' the secret articles of the same Agreement (the divulgation of which precipitated the Agadir crisis of 1907) the two Powers agreed that, should it prove impossible to main4 taro the integrity of Morocco under her Sultan, Spain should be given a protectorate over the zone stretching on an average fifty miles inland from the Mediterranean/ coast ; France should have similar rights to the south of the Spanish zone, and the little enclave of Tangier, with its special privileges as the seat of the diplomatic corps,( should become international under a special regime.
In 1912, after disorders at Fez, treaties were madc giving to France this protectorate over the southern ter- ritory, and to Spain similar rights over the northern part of the old Moorish Empire. The Sultan abdicated and was succeeded by his brother, the present Sultan. Nego-,1 tiations were begun for establishing an international administration at Tangier ; but the War came before', Spain had assented to the proposed scheme. Up to thii point Great Britain had reason to be satisfied. Germank was kept out of Northern Africa ; France and Spain were gratified by our support ; no one was likely to wish to' close the Straits against us ; and Tangier, the strategic key of the Straits, was to -be international. Thanks to the genius of Marshal Lyautey, liberally sup- ported with money even during the War, the French zone was pacified and accepted the authority of the French- protected Sultan, and the ben.efits:of European civilization, except education, were showered upon the somewhat un- appreciative population. In the northern zone, however, the Spaniards met the determined opposition of the mountain tribes (Jebala) and the Berber tribes of the Rif, of whom the Rifi had never owned more than nominal allegiance to the Sultans. Spain suffered a severe reverse at Anual in 1921, and when the Directory came into power General Primo de Rivera proceeded to withdraw from the advanced positions held by Spanish troops, and lost large quantities of military stores in the process. The French in their zone had looked on with amused contempt ; at any rate they had not been too- active in preventing supplies reaching the opponents of Spain by the frontier of their zone before the Spanish withdrawal began. Then they realized that large forces of native levies, fired with the spirit of independence, would be free to threaten them on the north and to endanger their communications with Algeria, and upset the pacified natives of their own zone. They found that Abd-el-Krim was able to chastise those natives in the north who formally submitted to the French protectorate. France could not save them, but found herself at war with a well-armed and skilful enemy. This is her difficult position about a hundred miles from Tangier. Meanwhile the Spaniards have been holding the tribes behind the " Primo de Rivera line " and seeking to prevent supplies from reaching them from, among other places, Tangier. This is the point of contact between Great Britain and the strife.
The little international zone had waited long for the Powers to endow it with its new regime. It was the prey of intrigues and corrupt administration, and the British and Spanish Governments and their resident communities were resentful of what they considered to be French administrative encroachment. In 1923 a Conference was summoned to complete the work left unfinished in 1914, and after long delays a convention was signed. By this the Sultan, who can only act on the suggestion of the French Resident General, has control of native affairs. Extended municipal powers are entrusted to an Assembly of the mixed nationalities, of which three administrative members are British. The first Chief Administrator is a Frenchman. Finance is entrusted to an Englishman, and Hygiene to a Spaniard. There is to be a body of 250 gendarmerie under a Belgian officer, but this is not yet formed. This is the Government while, after long delays and no provision for the period of tran- sition, is struggling to get to work. It is not ideal, but, given good will on all sides, there is no reason why it should not succeed. Already Great Britain has had to defend it from a threatened danger. Spain suggested that we should land troops to assure the security of the zone and to prevent the contraband trade alleged to be based on Tangier. It would certainly be wise to have a company of infantry ready at Gibraltar to cross over in an emergency, because we are after all responsible for some seven hundred fellow-subjects who are resident there and. who have played the part of British subjects through those difficult times : and if unfortunately Tangier ceased to be regarded as neutral by France, Spain or Abd-el-Krim and Great Britain stood aloof, the natives would conclude that the one Power which they respect cared no longer about them. But no need to land troops ought to arise, and His Majesty's Govern- ment did right in rejecting the Spanish suggestion and confining their activity to patrolling the coastal waters off the port. So far Abd-el-Krim has respected the -neutrality of Tangier, but how could he do so if French, Spanish and British troops " protected " it against him ? Already the action of Spanish troops on the frontier has been unwise and has tempted the Rift to think that there is a good deal of humbug in the neutrality. It is doubtful whether they receive any serious quantity of arms from that source, since they obtain them with far greater ease elsewhere. In any case Spain ought to understand clearly that all measures for establishing a blockade there must be taken entirely on the Spanish side of the frontier.
At the moment this is the most important point to insist upon in our determination to keep Tangier's neutrality intact. But within the neutral sphere more is needed. We share the responsibility for making Tangier a success in the future under the convention which has been dogged by ill-fortune so far. Great Britain could help by showing a more active and continued interest in the experiment. To lend some more trained officials to help in starting the municipal services and police force on proper lines would cost little but would secure stability against the risks of anarchy or acquisition by a " strong " Power from nearby. Besides the constant danger of incursions from outside there are plenty of active elements inside who will not like to pay taxes to cleanse the city morally or sanitarily. Whatever demands the British Representative there puts forward for men or for money cannot be heavy ones unless we neglect them at first. If we do, they will inevitably grow. It is our duty and our interest to foster this small community, and it is Great Britain whose standing in the eyes of all concerned enables her to attain the best effects with the least effort. Let not that effort be lacking.
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