If these islands, lying adjacent to the mainland and under
Communist guns, were attacked, President Eisenhower would then have to make up his mind and decide, at once, what to do. Is America committed to their defence or is it not? It is this question, concerning two groups of small islands which certainly belong to China and which are at the moment garrisoned by Nationalist troops, that lies at the centre of the present confusion, and it is the lack of a clear answer which feeds the growing fear that a major war in the Far East might be allowed to flare up out of nothing (or next to nothing). Like a cracked record, Mr. Dulles goes on giving the answer which is worse than no answer: 'We are not committed to the defence of Quemoy and the Matsus except under the con- ditions which Congress has prescribed, namely, that their defence is required or appropriate in assuring the-defence of Formosa itself.' But, leaving aside China's perpetual bellicose propaganda about the coming 'liberation' of Formosa, how is it to be decided soberly at a moment's notice whether 'their defence is required or appropriate'? Mr. Stevenson forestalled Mr. Dulles's stock answer the day before when he said : 'While our President has great military experience, perhaps it is not improper to ask whether any man can read the mind of an enemy within a few hours of such an attack, and determine whether at some later date the enemy plans to go further and invade Formosa. Is it wise to allow the dread question of modern war to hinge upon such a guess?'
Whether or not the United Nations will in time be able to bring about a de jure cease-fire in the Formosa Straits between the Communists and the Nationalists is for the moment aca- demic. The facts at the moment are that Chiang Kai-shek has been brought under restraint by the Americans and can be kept under restraint; that there is every possibility that a Communist assault on Formosa—if the Communists were insane enough to launch one—could be dealt with locally; and, most important, that if Quemoy and the Matsus were evacuated, a de facto cease-fire would be created which might conceivably survive until the time came when it would be feasible to consider the 'final settlement' of Formosa's status.
The present confusion began when President Eisenhower, three months ago, in his special message to Congress on Formosa, clarified much but also enveloped the dangerous area of the inshore islands in a Log of obscurity. It has been a constant source of irritation to America's allies and of bewilderment to many Americans. It has shown America to Asians in a strangely belligerent guise. All of this is especially deplorable when it is considered that America's desire for peace in the East is beyond a doubt genuine; that America probably wishes for nothing more than for the effective neutra- lisation of Formosa; and that it is highly likely that when Sir Anthony Eden in the House of Commons advocated the abandonment of the inshore islands, he was probably speaking by proxy for President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State. The Republican Administration has to contend with that highly vocal section of American opinion which would scream 'appeasement' at any move to disengage from the present ludicrous position; but it is more important that the China Firsters should be outraged and a truce (in all but name) secured in the Formosa Straits than that they should be mollified and the menace of war remain.
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