Colonial Prospect
COMMUNISM IN MALAYA
By SIR ERIC MACFADYEN
CHINESE Communism first put itself on the Malayan map' with the series of big dock strikes which paralysed the port of Singapore in the first phase of the war—when Moscow was in alliance with Germany. But its origins go much further back—to the time, in fact, of the beginnings of Communism in China. As early as the 192os the Malayan Government had become so concerned over the development of the movement that it agreed to permit the open establishment, in Malaya, of branches of the Kuomintang—the " national " party of Chiang Kai-shek. This departure from its traditional policy of impartiality in Chinese affairs hardly paid the dividends that were presumably hoped for. By identifying government with the party which, in China, has ever since been losing ground—the reactionary and pro-foreign party—it provided the Malayan Communists with a cause, and a cry—anti- foreign because anti-Kuomintang. The programme of the move- ment at that stage was economic subversion by way of labour unrest ; up to the war chiefly among the Singapore Chinese. It was signi- ficant of its Moscow inspiration that, when Hitler double-crossed Stalin and drove Russia into the arms of the Allies, the Malayan movement performed a complete right-about face and marched into the Government camp. Its young men clamoured to be assigned a part in the defence of Singapore, and a contingent armed at the last moment is said to have fought well during the invasion of the island.
During the Japanese occupation the Communists constituted them- selves the patriotic resistance throughout the Peninsula. They put themselves forward as all-Malayan, and no longer exclusively Chinese. Owing to the collapse of Japan after the atom-bomb attacks, they played no part in shortening the war. Nevertheless they emerged with greatly enhanced prestige. For three and a half years they had defied the invader ; and at the end they stood in occupation of the field. They stepped out of the jungle to distribute rewards and favours among their followers and to deal faithfully with those who had been lukewarm in their support. To an ignorant populace, insulated from world affairs for years, it was they who appeared to have vanquished the invader.
On reoccupation the post-war Malayan Government interpreted its task as one of political reorganisation and social progress. It abandoned the legal sanctions by virtue of which its predecessors had exercised control over the Chinese underworld. It disbanded the department through which these powers had been exercised and which for seventy years had functioned as the eyes of the Govern.
gnent in matters Chinese. Its reaction to the wave of Communist- Inspired strikes which broke out in 1946 and continued through the greater part of 1947 was to welcome them as wholesome manifesta- tions—the growing pains of democracy. Chinese, however, are realists, and the inference drawn by the movement was quite other— that they had the Government on the run. The All-Malayan anti- Japanese Army was resuscitated as the All-Malayan anti-British Army. It is now known that far-reaching plans were adopted for the undermining of the economy of the country by bringing to a standstill the production of rubber and tin. In the confusion which would follow, one at least of the larger towns was to be seized and a Malayan Soviet Republic to be proclaimed. For this step a target date was provisionally adopted in August, 1948.
In Malaya the rubber estates and to some extent the tin mines are often found in remote and isolated situations. In the past order and security could be taken for granted up-country, but in the circumstances of the outbreak of the murder campaign in June, 1948, 'police protection was completely inadequate. The planters might reasonably have withdrawn, with their families, to the security of the towns. In that event the Java situation would have been repro- duced in Malaya, with chaos prevailing over large areas and a self- styled Government claiming recognition and independence. The planters, however, found a better alternative to either quitting or being butchered in their tracks. Taking matters into their own hands they hurriedly improvised their own defence and stood their ground. The normal life of the country continued with but trifling interruption, labour forces were kept busy, wages and food supplies were maintained and the insurrection misfired. The Government was glad to regularise the steps taken without its authority.
Malay Guards were recruited. The population generally desire nothing so much as the restoration of law and order. Armed and now well-trained, these, to the number of some 31,000, have been given the status of Special Constables, with their employers in suit- able cases as honorary inspectors of police. This solution of the problem of static defence on a country-wide basis has set free the regular police, and the now largely reinforced military garrison, for the fundamental task of eliminating local and central revolutionary headquarters. The Government has stated that its extraordinary expenditure on defence measures is now 440,000 a day. Baulked of their sitting targets, the gunmen have been diverted to activities directed against communications. During sixteen weeks I recently spent in Malaya an average of more than one European and more than eight Chinese were murdered each week—mostly ambushed while proceeding upon their lawful occasions. The casualties, of course, are much higher proportionately among Europeans than Chinese. The planting community numbers perhaps 1,500 all told ; the Chinese population over a million. The victims are marked down not on racial grounds but as being keymen in industry and commerce. The actual gunmen are Chinese youths, but acting under orders as units in a coherent organisation. The moving spirits in the background are well covered by the age-long Chinese secret-society technique.
Very large sums are disposed of by The movement—certainly not less than 41,000 a day. Regular contributions are collected in large and small sums from all classes of the Chinese population. Collec- tion is farmed out from headquarters to State chiefs, sub-farmed by these to district chiefs and by these to smaller and smaller fry. Thus vested interests have grown up in the continuance of a big financial racket. The present administration has taken the measure of its problem and deserves confidence. There is already some ground for hope that it may before long, with growing support from the people as a whole, get on top of its difficulties. But progress will be slow and not without set-backs. Government in Malaya has suffered immense loss of face in the last decade ; and the Communist menace, in one form or another, will persist so long as Communism is a winning cause in China. The country is not the same country as before the war ; it is moving inevitably towards self-government. But the administrative task is fundamentally the same. Malaya up to the last war was a happy as well as a prosperous land. The secret of both its happiness and its prosperity was that those in authority knew their own mind, and that all elements in its very varied racial composition knew exactly how far they might go.
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