MINERS AND CONCENTRATION
By D. N. CHESTER
IN 1944 259 tons of coal were produced by each worker in the mining industry. This national average concealed a wide range of conditions. A sixth of the labour force was working in coal- fields in which the individual average annual output was below zoo tons. At the other extreme, half this number of workers was in coal- fields in which the individual average output exceeded 350 tons. Even these district figures concealed quite wide variations. No published figures are available for individual pits, but it is probable that the most productive pit showed an annual output of some 600 tons per worker, whilst the least productive showed not much above roo tons. In other words, one man employed in the former could produce the same annual tonnage as five workers in the latter.
These remarkable dilerences are not due to variations in the energy and effort of inaividual miners. Indeed, the miner in the low-yield pit will generally work harder and for lower weekly earnings than his fellow-worker in the high-yield pit. Nor is management a major consideration. Given the same natural con- ditions, good management and a high degree of mechanisation will give the highest yields. But some of the areas with quite low yields have a very high degree of mechanisation. The basic reason, BS everyone knows, is that the natural conditions vary considerably between different coalfields and even within the same field. Thick- ness of seam, depth of shaft and age of mine are all important considerations. Since Britain is an old producing country, these factors have been working against us for many years. In 1913, for example, nearly 30 per cent, of the coal was extracted from seams five feet or more thick. In 1924 the figure was still 27 per cent., whereas by 1944 it had fallen to a little over zo per cent.
Facts such as these underlie the proposals for concentration of production which have been discussed for many years now. The Coal Mines Act of 1930 probably slowed up the rate of decline of the poorest coalfields by restricting the competitive force of the - new, high-productivity areas. In 1942 a White Paper put the concentration of the available men and machinery-on the more pro- ductive pits and seams as the first of four measures designed to increase output. A year later the Minister of Fuel and Power could Mate that concentration schemes involving some fifty pits were under way. But the movement did not proceed very far. The Reid Report also gave some consideration to this point. After surveying the economic organisation of the British mining industry, it pointed out that: "The grouping of a number of mines under the same ownership on the Continent has facilitated the closing down, or merging, of uneconomic mines, and the concentration of operations to the remaining shafts. In Britain, ownership is widely dispersed, and this avenue to greater efficiency has never been explored on any adequate scale." The Committee were clearly 'much impressed by the remarkable results achieved in the Ruhr, one of the two European coalfields where natural conditions are similar to ours. In the seven years 1925-1932, output per man-shift in the Ruhr rose by 72 per cent., an average of to per cent, per annum. In an analysis of these figures, the Report said : "There is nothing very tangible in the way of new machinery installed, to which one can point in explanation . . . the explanation of the large increase seems rather to lie in concentration." The close economic integration of the Ruhr coal industry had enabled the least productive mines to be closed and the labour force to be concentrated on those pits giving the highest natural yield.
The nationalisation of the coal industry should facilitate a con- centration policy. No longer are there individual owners who must be persuaded or threatened. If certain pits are closed down the apparent loss will easily be made good by the gains at other pits administered by the National Coal Board. Clearly this is one of the advantages which should accrue from the unification of ownership. Moreover, it is not a policy which requires large output of capital. In the long run these fundamental natural conditions will play a very large part in the success or failure of the Coal Board. But What about the short run? How can we take advantage of these i;liff erences in productivity to raise output per head quickly? There are four main ways in which a policy of concentrating on the high-productivity pits could give early help. I propose to deal with these in the order of ease with which the policy can be carried out. First, new recruits should, as far as possible, be guided to employment in the naturally high-yield pits. There should be some economic inducement here, because earnings in these pits will be materially higher. It is noticeable, for example, that the small Leicestershire coalfield has actually increased its labour force at a time when other areas are losing labour steadily. It cannot be merely a coincidence that Leicestershire shows the highest average earnings, some £2 a week higher than earnings in South Wales. Certainly, so far as foreign labour is concerned, these men cannot be said to favour any particular district, and it should be easy to direct them to the appropriate pits. Lack of houses may be a limiting factor, but it is to be hoped that the Government are not proposing to distribute the aluminium houses on a haphazard basis. A housing policy which gave special preference to the areas show- ing the highest natural yield could clearly make an important con- tribution to the coal problem. There may be other ways in which facilities in such areas ought to have priority.
Second, within the limits set by daily travel, the existing labour force in particular districts should be concentrated on the best pits. Not every district will lend itself to this policy, but a sufficient number of districts show wide variations in output between nearby pits to make the policy worth while. Here again, the public services will need to be integrated with this policy. Special bus-services and other facilities must be provided to reduce the burden of travelling the extra two to four miles made necessary by the policy. It may be that some financial incentive will also be required, though, generally speaking, the earnings at the new pit should be greater than at the old. It is popular these days to talk about treating a matter as a military operation. Pethaps it IS pardonable to use it in this case to convey the idea that all aspects of the transfer must be considered and the arrangements made before the scheme is launched in any area. And clearly it will be important to get the understanding and advice of the miners and their leaders in these areas. Indeed, the whole concentration policy will require careful handling by the Coal Board's officers.
Third, the limited new machinery available and the first schemes of capital development should be concentrated on the areas and pits that will give the highest yield. In so far as much of the new Machinery, particularly of the American type, works best under the best natural conditions—e.g., thick seams--one would expect such a concentration to happen automatically. But there will be many oases in which there is a choice of pits, and it is common sense to see that first priority for machinery should be given to the best pits. An alternative and more obvious way of making the same statement would be to say that the new capital expenditure should be made where it will yield the highest number of tons. Another aspeOt of this same question is the pushing ahead of development work in particular areas. One obstacle to additional employment in the high-yield pits may be shortage of room at the coal face. It will be worth while in many cases to undertake development extend- ing the capacity of such pits instead of accepting the limitations and so missing the opportunity of putting more men to work.
Fourth, it should be possible to arrange for transfers of miners from the low- to the high-yield coalfields. This is the most diffi- cult of the four aspects mentioned. People do not readily uproot themselves and go to fresh areas, particularly when there is work for them in their own area. The policy is, however, well worth trying. Many of the younger miners might welcome an opportunity of moving to another coalfield, where prospects were better and current earnings higher. And now they will still be working for the same firm. Furthermore, if preference is given to housing schemes in the areas to which labour needs to be attracted, this in itself should be a powerful inducement. Even if only a com- paratively small number of miners transfer, the added yield will be a welcome contribution to our present difficulties.
Sufficient has been said to show that in various ways immediate gains could be obtained from a general policy of concentration of production. It is noticeable that the recent Economic Survey men- tioned re-deployment of labour as a policy which could increase
the coal output per head during the present year. What contribu- tion the policy can make will depend upon the vigour with which it is administered. The Ministry of Fuel and Power handled the subject very gingerly during the war years. But the National Coal Board, being free from the trouble of individual ownership, should be able to adopt an energetic campaign. If 200 tons per annum can be gained from the transfer of each worker, an extra million tons per annum could be obtained from the re-deployment of each 5,000 workers. In many cases, of course, the gain should be much greater. The White Paper estimates that the mining labour force will be increased by 35,000 during 5947. If the majority of these additional workers could be concentrated on the high-yield pits and not scattered haphazard, their output might well be four to five million tons greater. Altogether, then, there are grounds for antici- pating that a vigorous policy along the lines indicated might give an extra yield of some to,000,000 tons per annum, most of which could be obtained comparatively quickly, certainly much more quickly than by any other expedient. It would be interesting, to say the least, to have an early statement from the Coal Board as to their policy in these matters.
[In next week's "Spectator" E. Stanley Tucker will write on "Alternatives to Coal."1
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