TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE EXCLUSION PROBLEM.
IN writing last week we purposely made no mention of the rumour that Mr. Asquith's scheme for Exclusion was to be for a limited period, followed by automatic Inclusion. The notion seemed to us so unfair, so ill calcu- lated to produce that solution which we were convinced Mr. Asquith desired, so preposterous, in short, that we felt that it would be something in the nature of an insult to the Premier to discuss it. Such a device could, in our view, hardly be inserted in his proposals except with a desire to court a rejection which might later be denounced as utterly unreasonable, and thus construed as the true cause of civil war. Unfortunately, what we deemed incredible has happened. Mr. Asquith, in order to meet the views, we can only assume, of the extremer section of the Irish Nationalists, but we dill feel sure without the sanction of his better judgment, actually proposes that Exclusion by a poll of the voters shall only be for six years from the meeting of the Irish Parliament, and that after the lapse of that time the counties which had solemnly and by a popular-vote signified their deter- mination not to be included shall be forced by the automatic operation of the Act, no matter what may then be the state of public opinion in that area, under the Dublin Parliament ! Here, in fact, is a proposal for automatic civil war six years hence. If the objection of the Protestant counties had been to going under a Dublin Parliament prematurely, or in the existing state of feeling, there might have been some sense in this arrangement. If, again, there had been any indications that the people who objected to being driven out of the Union were "an old gang," who were gradually dying out, and who in six years would be sure to show a largely depleted force, there might have been a case for postponed Inclusion. If, in fine, there were signs of a gradual growth of Nationalist feeling in Ulster which only wanted a few years to mature, there might have been an excuse for Mr. Asquith's scheme. Again, if Mr. Asquith's object in accepting the principle that those counties in Ireland in which the majority of the people wish to be under a Dublin Parliament should go under such a Parliament, and those counties in Ireland which loathe the notion and passionately desire to remain under the Westminster Parliament should be allowed to have their way, had not been the avoidance of civil war, but merely administrative convenience, and the obtaining of Home Rule for the whole of Ireland gradually, some defence might have been set up for his action. He, however, divested himself of all such excuses by admitting that the sole object for which he took a step which he otherwise disliked, and which, he said in effect, was disliked by everyone, was the avoidance of civil war. But that once admitted, the case for automatic Inclusion after a short period of respite became utterly indefensible. To put it with perfect frank- ness, what Mr. Asquith told the House of Commons was this : "Inclusion now would be a terrible evil because it would produce civil war. Automatic Inclusion in six years' time, though we have no reason to think that it would at that date have any different result, is a proceeding which we can contemplate with perfect equanimity." The only way to reconcile such a proposal with anything approaching sense is the Micawberish thought that "some- thing, though we don't quite know what, may have turned up in those six years to make it all different, and, anyway, the present Cabinet will be well out of it by that time." Mr. Asquith's proposal, as it left him, is a piece of the most undiluted and reckless political opportunism imagin- able. The only possible explanation for it is to suppose that he was very hard pressed by the Nationalists, and also very strongly determined to produce a settlement, and thought that the beet way was to put in a time. limit and then trust to the common-sense of the nation insisting on its being cut out. It is not our business, however, to dive into Mr. Asquith's motives. All we can say is that he has proposed not merely a scheme which it was clear the people of North-East Ulster would not accept, but one which was wholly indefensible per se. He was asked for bread, and in reply offered a bomb in the shape of a loaf with a time-fuse set for six years hence I Happily Mr. Asquith had to deal with a statesman and a leader of men of a rare temper of mind—a man of pene- trating intellectual force, and, beat of all, of sound common-sense. Sir Edward Carson might have been excused if he had shown disgust and indignation at the offer of the Prime Minister, and had denounced his apparent attempt to play with the feelings of Ulster. Instead, however, of being put off by Mr. Asquith's weakness and opportunism, he showed to the nation his wide-mindedness and his capacity for instantly realizing the essentials of a situation—the highest gift which can belong to a political leader. With perfect clearness in word and thought, he told Mr. Asquith that he could not ask the people of Ulster whether they would accept an offer so unreasonable. If, however, Mr. Asquith would make it reasonable by withdrawing the time-limit and making Exclusion, once decided on by Referendum, last "until Parliament should order otherwise," he would at once go over to Ulster and lay the matter before the Ulster Council. Sir Edward Carson, indeed, put his offer so plainly, so shortly, and so vigorously that the public has hardly yet realized how tremendously far the Ulster leader has gone in the direction of peace, and how very far- reaching are the concessions which he has made. No one could have accused him of being unreasonable if he had couched his offer in a way which would have been much more difficult for Mr. Asquith to accept. He might, for example, have said that if Exclusion was to be by a popular vote. Inclusion must also be by a. popular vote.—If the [Referendum was the proper way of deciding whether certain counties should remain under the Parliament at Westminster, the Referendum must be the proper method of deciding whether they should cease to be under that Parliament and should transfer their allegiance to Dublin.—There may be good abstract arguments for not consulting the people, for not ascertaining what their 'views are, but to ascertain the actual wishes of the majority, and then to tell them that six years hence their duly expressed decision shall be negatived without a fresh consultation, is a piece of political topsy-turvydom which is utterly impossible. Again, Sir Edward Carson might very well have declared that, though he accepted the principle of the Referendum, the unit in which the vote ought to be taken must not be single counties, but that well- defined homogeneous area which we have always described as the six Plantation counties, but which historically, no doubt, would be more accurately described as the six Protestant counties—the six counties which, from the geographical, political, and religious point of view, form a distinct and definite community. That Sir Edward Carson did not insist that there should be a Referendum before Inclusion, or that the six counties should be the Refer- endum area, offers extraordinarily strong proof of how willing he was to meet Mr. Asquith half-way, and how determined to keep his eye upon the object—the avoid- ance ' of civil war—even though it might cost Ulster concessions which it would be very bitter for her to make.
Let no one say that we are exaggerating, because Sir Edward Carson did not offer to close with the Prime Minister then and there, if the time-limit were aban- doned, but merely offered to put the Government's proposals before the Ulster Council, which might, of course, reject them even with the time-limit gone. People who argue in this way do not realize how great is the hold of Sir Edward Carson on the Covenanters. No doubt it is true that lie is not a despot, and that the ultimate decision is not with him. Still, the fact that he is willing to summon the Council is proof that he does not mean to prejudice the decisions of that Council if it meets or to advise rejection_ He is no political intriguer ; he is not the sort of man who would call a Council in order to free h imseIf fromthe responsi- bility of rejection or acceptan «and to put the onus upon the shoulders of his followers. We may feel sure that, if Sir Edward Carson meant to advise the Council to reject the Government's proposal even when minus the time-limit, he would have rejected the scheme out of hand and refused to submit it. That he was willing to submit it is proof that he will not advise rejection if the Council meets, and that it will have the weight, not only of his acquiescence, but of his support as something in all the circumstances better than civil war.
Yet another proof of Sir lIdwardearson'astatesmanship
is to be found in the fact, noted by us already, that he did not haggle over the question of forbidding Inclusion, except by another direct vote in the counties which may exclude themselves. He might with a very good show of reason have said that no county which excluded itself by a popular vote could ever be included except by a popular vote, for that, prima' facie, is the reasonable deduc- tion from Mr. Asquith's promisees. Sir Edward Carson, how- ever, is too good a Constitutional lawyer not to remember that under our political system such a provision, even if made, could not be binding. The Imperial Parliament is supreme, and by reason of that supremacy every right enjoyed by the population of these islands and every agreement made are legally, though not, of course, morally, subject to the provision—" unless Parliament shall otherwise direct." We have only the right to our lives, our property, and our liberty "until Parliament shall otherwise direct." Sir Edward Carson saw at once that there was, therefore, no substantial gain in insisting that what was done by a Referendum could only be undone by a Referendum, because Parliament two, three, or four years hence might, if it liked, take away what it had given—might, that is, alter its mind. We must all run that risk, whether Nationalists or Loyalists. The South and West of Ireland will only be able to keep their Parliament at Dublin "unless Parliament shall otherwise direct," and in the same way the most that can be said from the purely legal standpoint in regard to Exclusion is that the counties shall exclude themselves till Parliament shall otherwise direct.
But it may be said here, If this is so, why should Sir Edward Carson and theUlstermen make so great a fuss about Mr. Asquith's period ending in automatic Inclusion ? It is clear from Sir Edward Carson's speech that the point of immediate debate between him and the Prime Minister is as follows. Mr. Asquith offered Exclusion by Referendum for six years, followed by automatic Inclusion, unless Parlia- ment should otherwise direct. Sir Edward Carson demanded Exclusion by Referendum, followed by automatic Exclusion, unless Parliament should otherwise direct. Therefore the difference between them was narrowed down to whether the automatic action of the compromise should be on the side of Exclusion or Inclusion. Having reached this point, each side, in effect, says to the other : "Surely you are not going to fight upon so small a matter as that." Here we enter the region, not of theoretical rights and wrongs in Constitu- tional law, but of practical politics. There is a whole world of difference between automatic Exclusion and automatic Inclusion, and, in our belief, the Ulstermen are perfectly right in holding that to them, as the weaker party, the party whose interests are likely to be forgotten and to go to the wall, automatic Exclusion is absolutely vital. If they get automatic Exclusion, it is true that Parliament could at any time intervene once more and turn them out of the Union, but every practical politician knows that it is exceedingly unlikely ever to do this. Not only will the via inertias be on their side, but also the trustee's maxim, Quieta non movers. Whatever is settled now, we may be sure that no party in the State will want to touch the Irish question again for many years. Everyone's desire will be to leave the political porcupine severely alone. Can we wonder, then, that the Uletermen feel that the security which they are offered by Mr. Asquith will be a mockery unless it shall last "until Parliament shall other- wise direct " ? Inclusion at the end of six years, unless Parliament orders otherwise, means, in their case, that they have no security, but rather a certainty of being forced under a Dublin Parliament, unless the Unionists within the six years, or say eight years, from the present day come into power, or rather return in sufficient strength to tackle the Irish question again and to re-exclude the Protestant counties. But who can be sure that a Unionist Government will be in power in six, or even in eight, years? It is likely, no doubt, but likelihoods are not certainties. When we look back at history we get no assurance that the swing of the pendulum will always
operate to produce a neat chequer-board of Ministries. But for the fact that the Unionist Party was broken up by the Tariff Reform movement, the Liberals might quite possibly have remained out of office after 1900 for ten or twelve years. Can we wonder, then, that the men of
the North-Eastern counties are not going to risk their all upon the chance of the Unionist Party being able to
take office in sufficient strength to pass an Act repealing automatic Inclusion?
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