M. GAMBETTA'S POSITION.
W14 are not decided supporters of M. Gambetta, whom we suspect of certain designs which we cannot ap- prove, and of certain weaknesses—we mention one of them below—which may seriously impair his usefulness, but we are convinced that both his present objects and his present position are misunderstood in England. A great deal of quiet and, as it happens, unjust resentment is felt here at his failure to renew the Treaty of Commerce ; his Egyptian policy is suspected of selfishness, and he is supposed to have found office too much for his strength. There is, therefore, an inclination in England to disbelieve in him, which is fostered by, the very imperfect and often hostile information daily poured into London. No long letter is just now received from Paris by any morning journal except the Times, and the Times' correspondent either dislikes M. Gambetta, or, what is more probable, trusts informants who dislike him, and reports, therefore, not the facts, but the cynical gossip of "influential" Parisians about the facts. He might as well report the Carlton gossip about Mr. Gladstone, and take that for an account of the English situation. He mistakes the twittering of the birds in the branches for agita- tion in the tree. M. Gambetta, like Mr. Gladstone, is dis- liked by society in the capital, though supported by the popu- lation even of the capital, and is so suspected by the lounging classes that even Deputies who will vote for him repeat with gusto little stories which seem to foreshadow his fall. None the less is he the elect of the majority in the country. At the last election, M. Gambetta's overt opponents were simply crushed out, and a majority was sent up, with a mandate to support him. That mandate has not only not been withdrawn, but has been renewed this very week, for on Sunday, in the Senatorial elections—we give details elsewhere—the Gambettists were so completely victorious, that they have now an effective and permanent majority in the Upper House. The country, in fact, still intends, as it in- tended in 1881, that M. Gambetta should govern ; and until he has governed and failed, no rival will have any serious chances. The strongest among them, M. de Freycinet, fully recognises this, and has intimated that he intends heartily to support M. Gambetta's least popular proposition. Those being the facts, why does not M. Gambetta begin governing, instead of forcing on a revision of the Constitution? For three reasons, one of them personal, but two of them politically sound. We do not believe that M. Gambetta is seeking any personal position, far less any direct and formal dictatorship ; but we do believe that, like many other strong men, he desires to guide Parliament without so much waste of power in conciliating individuals and groups of representa- tives. He resents their interference, and despises their little intrigues. He wishes to be supported, as Lord Beaconsfield was and Mr. Gladstone is, by a majority pledged to steady support, and strong enough to bear down all internal dis- affectionovhethar produced by interested motives or differences of opinion. He desires this not only from conviction that this is the best mode of governing, but from a certain impatience of op- position, as well aefrom an indolence which is never quite absent from the Southern temperament, and which makes the work of jwnping, over Parliamentary hurdles almost intolerable to him. He does not want to coerce so much as to see his will, when accepted by the representatives of the nation, carried out with, out so much frintion, and he knows or believes that election bjt &rutin de Liste will secure this. He may be wrong, but hetistnot often wrong upon .such subjects, and upon this one he has, at all events, a constitutional right to his opinion. He expressed it in the last Parliament, and the Chamber passed his Bill, though by so feeble a majority that the Senate took courage to throw it out. He expressed it at the elections in the most explicit way, and the country, knowing it, sent him a majority. He has a clear right to ask that majority to obey their man- date, and to announce that if they refuse he shall resign, and so make their disobedience visible to their constituents. English Ministers have done the same thing a hundred times over, and the question whether he could not do something else has nothing to do with the matter. M. Gambetta does not think so. He told the country that he could not work freely without the Scrutin de Liste, and as the country, will- ing or unwilling, accepted his terms, he is in the right in insisting on them.
Whether he will carry his Revision, is a different matter. For ourselves, we have not a doubt upon the subject. France did not insist on Scrutin de Liste, but it voted permission for it as clearly as ever the United Kingdom voted permission for an Irish Land Act. If there is one fact visible in the history of the present French Republic, it is that the Deputies and, in a less degree, the Senators invariably give way to their con- stituents ; that they have no hope of keeping their seats, if they affront their electors ; and that on grave questions, such as the choice of the actual ruler, they are, as the first French Repub- licans, with their odd formalism, used to say, " The mandatories of the people." An immense majority of both Chambers were elected to support M. Gambetta, even if he asked for scrutin de liste ; and unless France has changed its opinions, of which there is no sign, the majority must keep its promises. It may be angry, under the apprehension that dissolution will follow revision ; but the effect of that anger will be to induce it to vote so carefully " straight," that the excuse for dissolution will never come. That this is personal government, rather than real Parliamentary government, may be true, and we dread scrutin de liste for that very reason ; but still, it is personal government terminable in a moment at the will of the electors. They have only to signify to their re- presentatives that they are tired of M. Gambetta, and his power comes at once to an end. That they are not in this mood at present is evident from the Senatorial elections, nor was any such mood to be expected. Democracy tires of its agents when they fail, or when they have done what was ex- pected, and M. Gambetta as yet has neither failed nor suc- ceeded, and has done nothing, crying aloud that he is ready, but his tools are not. Mr. Gladstone, with far stronger rea- sons, is doing precisely the same thing about Procedure, and in both countries both peoples will hold the cry just, and insist that the tools shall be forthcoming. Democracy is very often unjust, but when it demands bricks it gives straw, its error being not that it will give too little, but that it can be per- suaded, in its desire for results, to give things that are need- less. M. Gambetta will, we believe, carry his revision with unexpected ease, and then for the first time we shall see whether he is a great Administrator, as well as a great politician.
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