TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NEW FRENCH DISASTER.
THIS week has been one of 'heavy trial for France and the friends of France,—of disaster which multitudes in this country will feel like a personal calamity, and which they must try to bear as they would bear a great personal calamity, with fortitude and faith. It would seem that the time is not yet come when it can be said of France that "her warfare is accomplished, her iniquity is pardoned, because she has received at the Lord's hand double for all her sins." That she has heavy sins to expiate,—if this kind of national suffering be, as wp must try to hope, a sort of expiation,—we, in this journal at least, have always admitted ; but we have undoubt- edly been too sanguine that the hour was approaching when her noble and tenacious struggle in a great cause would be rewarded with success. It is, too, with as much pain for Germany as for France that we recognize the increasing probability of her complete success in this unwise and unworthy attempt to conquer French pro- vinces. If France is expiating great crimes and great errors of the past, Germany is but too surely sowing the seeds of an equally terrible future expiation. The diversion of German energies from the region of commerce, science, art, literature, into the direction of barren ambitions and arrogant foreign policy, will be as great a calamity as the world has ever suffered. Yet a nation that screwirup its national feeling to the point of suffering and inflicting all this frightful mass of misery for the sake of what is called a better frontier,—really for the gratification of a vindictive historical sentiment and the power to retaliate on the insolent French threats of recent and former years,—is in the most imminent danger of exchanging its natural bent for one of conquest and spoliation. Whether in the interest of Germany or in that of France, it is indeed hard to accept in our hearts the belief that the final defeat of the French struggle against conquest will be immediately productive of anything but calamity to both these countries, as well as to Europe at large.
Still, it is impossible to deny that the situation of France is less hopeful than it has been at any moment since the first capture of Orleans by the Germans. In the North of France it is now evident that General Faidherbe had achieved a real success on the 3rd of January ; that the evacuation of Bapaume by General Von Goeben was already ordered, and that had Faidherbe pressed on, he would have relieved Peronne, and sent the electric thrill of a real victory through all the armies of France. We have from the German head-quarters the confession that Von Goeben was overmatched, that the order to retreat had been given, that Faidherbe with another two hours' persistency would have visibly won the day. He did not know his own success. He was alarmed at his heavy losses. He retired, and lost the chance of giving a moral stimulus to France such as would have borne fruit throughout that easily dispirited and easily encouraged land. This almost looks like a real interposition of Providence against France. For we cannot but believe that if Faidherbe had achieved a great and visible success, Chanzy would now be not beaten, but fighting an equal battle, if not absolutely victorious. As it is, however, it is impossible to doubt that the army on which rested almost the only hope of relieving Paris in time to save the capital from a surrender, is now so badly defeated, demo- ralized, and crippled, that that hope must be abandoned. General Chanzy's army, after being driven back on Le Mans in a series of outpost engagements, of which the worst feature for the French was the great number of prisoners captured, was attacked on Wednesday by the Grand Duke of Mecklen- burg from the North, and Prince Frederick Charles from the West; lost,—during that and the preceding day,—some 15,000 prisoners, if the German reports are to be trusted, and at least seven guns ; and was compelled to evacuate Le Mans itself during the night, for the Germans report that it was occupied on the 12th (Thursday), and that " the enemy was being pursued," which seems to indicate that General Chanzy had retreated towards the west.
From whatever point of view this news be considered, it is of the most calamitous character for France. General Chanzy is undoubtedly am able and undoubtedly a fighting General. His retreat from Orleans to Le Mans was conducted with con- summate skill. Within three days of the disaster at Orleans he gave battle again, and fought for four successive days with the Germans without yielding ground. Through the whole of his retreat he made frequent stands, and inflicted severe losses on the enemy. Whoever may be incapable, General Chanzy is certainly not incapable. He had, as far as we can judge, an army about as large as that opposed to him. And yet his troops. have evidently fought with no sort of heart,—nay, and this is the worst sign, with less heart than they fought a month. ago. Fifteen thousand prisoners in two days could not have been taken from an army fighting in good earnest, however much overmatched. This defeat appears to us to mean that the French armies are no longer gaining, as we had good" reason to think they were some five or six weeks ago, in mar- tial qualities or in confidence in their leaders. If M. Gambetta, marvellously as he has worked, cannot put heart and hope• into the French soldiers, their numbers will be of no service to- him. General Chanzy's defeat appears to us to imply that time is not working now, as it was some weeks ago, on the side of France, but rather against her. The almost unbroken history of defeat is beginning to tell on the spirits of the soldiers. And French soldiers do not fight, like English_ or German soldiers, as well in defeat as in victory. They respond far more quickly to the thrill of success, and they also. give way far more quickly under the paralysis of failure.
The great significance, however, of this collapse is in its too probable effect on Paris. Now that, for a second time,. the hope of relief is dashed aside, it is hardly to be hoped: that the spirit of Paris will again rally to the emergency. It is quite true that there are still two French armies in the field which have achieved a fair amount of success-- General Faidherbe has occupied Bapaume, but Bapaume is of far less importance since the fall of Peronne, which he might have saved and failed to save ; and Genpral von Goeben's army is at least a full match for him, and will' certainly prevent him from marching to the relief of Paris-. General Bourbaki has evidently achieved some measure of success against General Werder at Vesoul. The- German telegrams seem to admit that General Werder was compelled to leave Vesoul by a flank march through Viller- sexel, where he was attacked, and, without doubt, on the' whole worsted, by General Bourbaki ; but there is also very little doubt that the check was not of that serious kind which can be called a serious defeat ; and even if GeneraL Bourbaki can save Belfort, we should fear he is now too late to effect anything considerable on the line of German communications which could affect the fate of Paris. On the whole, then, we fear that the result of this calamitous defeat of the Army of Le Mans must be to put off indefinitely any chance of relief to Paris, and that the indefi- nite postponement of any relief to Paris will mean, under the existing circumstances of that city, the surrender of Paris.
Of course, everything may be changed by the sudden. appearance of one of those great commanders who sometimes manifest themselves in war, and suddenly turn calamity into, success. But for this we have no right to hope. As far- m we can judge the present situation in France, it is exceed- ingly gloomy. Paris, exhausted by long-deferred hope, can hardly be expected to hold out till another great army can be- raised to attempt its relief ; and that either Faidherbe's or Bourbaki's, and still less Chanzy's, can do anything effectual for Paris, we have very slender hope. Paris has given time- to the provinces, but the provinces have apparently failed to- make such use of it as would be 'necessary to overpower these hordes of hardy and disciplined Prussians. We fear it will turn out that the harvest is past, the reaping is ended, and that Paris is not saved. Of course, if France will fight on after the surrender of Paris, and fight on steadily, France must win in the end ; of that there is no doubt. But the symptoms in General Chanzy's army are hardly favourable to fighting on. Yet even so, the struggle will not have been in vain. France has gained self-respect, and knows whom to trust in her adversity. The country is not betrayed, helpless, and leaderless as it would have been had peace been made on the arrogant terms. demanded by Germany after the surrender of Sedan. France- will have shown what vast sacrifices she is ready to make to prevent the conquest of even part of her territory. Alsace and Lorraine will no longer have it to say that they have been deserted by France without any sincere struggle to save them. from their fate.
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