THE WORLD'S BEST AMBASSADOR
Dean Godson on an Iraqi capable
of winning over American Jews to Saddam
THE TASK of pleading Iraq's case before the bar of world opinion might daunt even a Carson or a Marshall-Hall — but not if you are Nizar Hamdoon. For Hamdoon, Who has served as Iraq's chief of mission to the UN since 1992 (and previously to the United States) is thought by many to be the best ambassador in the world. He has been compared to Saudi Arabia's supreme- lY well-connected emissary in Washington, Prince Bandar; but then Bandar represents a crucial ally of the United States. Perhaps a better comparison would be with Ana- toly Dobrynin, the long-time Soviet ambas- sador to America.
Hamdoon, however, has achieved some- thing which even Dobrynin did not man- age: in the mid-1980s he convinced much of America's policy-making elite that Iraq Could be a strategic partner of the United States, notably in containing Iranian expansion. He was one of the first Arab ambassadors to master the American sys- tem, deliberately not confining himself to the formalities of traditional diplomatic intercourse with the State Department. Instead, he forged links with Congress, the media and the business community.
This past weekend Hamdoon was at it again: in his excellent English, he explained to CNN that there would be no Iraqi missile attack on Israel. Only days before, his government had offered the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, the opportunity to inspect those Iraqi sites that are barred to UN Inspectors. Although it stood no chance of being taken up, this gambit had Ham- doon's fingerprints all over it: make Iraq look reasonable, divide the legislative branch from the executive, flatter the nation's most prominent Republican office-holder and play upon the hostile feelings which many American conserva- tives feel towards the UN. While he cannot replicate his performance of the 1980s in Washington, it does not really matter. His role now is as a spoiler, to encourage opposition to Allied military action on the Security Council. Unsurprisingly, he is in very frequent contact with the Russian and Chinese ambassadors.
How does Hamdoon do it? Some believe that he first developed some kind of feel for the United States at Baghdad College, the elite school founded in 1933 by Irish-American Jesuits from Boston College. Like so many apparatchiks in totalitarian societies, much of his back- ground is shadowy, but he was born in 1944 to an army officer who is reported to have been in charge of the royal hunt: foxes and boars were then regularly hunt- ed in the groves near the river Tigris.
Hamdoon joined the Ba'ath party in the late 1960s, whilst still a student of archi- tecture at Baghdad University; even today, architecture remains his only real extra- curricular enthusiasm. With the assistance of a number of powerful patrons — the best known of whom was Tariq Aziz, now deputy prime minister — he rose in the murky demi-monde of Ba'ath politics. He served under Aziz at the Ministry of Cul- ture and Information, where his responsi- bilities included 'overseeing the Culture and Art sector'.
When Hamdoon first arrived in the United States in 1983, some felt he cut an unprepossessing figure: not only was his English less than perfect, but with his dowdy, dark clothes and greased-back hair he looked more like a Soviet bloc func- tionary of the Stalin era than the sharp- suited apologists of the Gorbachev era (Brylcreem is said to be much favoured in the macho world of Ba'athism). Hamdoon, however, soon corrected that. Within six months he was fielding questions from anchormen with consummate ease, and had established an advisory panel of experts, including prominent Washington journalists, lawyers, lobbyists and policy analysts, to counsel him on how to pro- mote Iraq's image. One observer credits him with subsequently organising the deal which allowed CNN to remain in Baghdad throughout the Gulf war.
Hamdoon was assisted by having virtual- ly unlimited resources to do his job. Not only did the Iraqi embassy entertain lav- ishly in Washington, but it also liberally distributed first-class air tickets to Bagh- dad. He was immensely popular with high- ranking US officials, and when he fell seriously ill some years ago those Ameri- cans helped to find him the best cancer specialists in New York. But his list of con- tacts was virtually endless: he sought dra- matically to increase American agricultural sales to Iraq, knowing that this would cre- ate a large constituency for trade. Many farm state legislators were only too glad to swallow Hamdoon's line that Iraq had moderated and was now a force for stabili- ty in the Gulf.
What was more surprising, however, was his success with the Jewish lobby, and even with some of the most hardened of pro- Zionist lobbying organisations such as the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee. Most memorably, Hamdoon sent Jewish groups a map, supposedly captured from Iranian soldiers, which showed Jerusalem to be the Islamist regime's true goal. In so doing, he sought to convey the impression (but never explicitly to state the point) that in fighting Khomeini, Iraq was also in effect looking after Israeli interests.
Although Hamdoon returned home to a senior foreign ministry position in 1987, his legacy was such that even when the Iranian threat receded, American policy-makers did not resile from their pro-Iraqi tilt. Meanwhile, Hamdoon continued to reas- sure the West that Iraq wished to concen- trate on its internal development following the end of the war with Iran in 1988.
Friends of Hamdoon believe that he ceased to be a true believer in Ba'athist ideology after the invasion of Kuwait, and that he knew that America would respond decisively; they even cite a Los Angeles Times interview in 1994, when Hamdoon appeared to criticise Saddam for ordering another build-up on the Kuwaiti border without consulting his foreign policy advis- ers such as Tariq Aziz. Sceptics, however, say that Hamdoon would be well aware of the Western tendency to categorise their interlocutors as either 'doves' or 'hawks' and would seek to highlight such bogus splits to achieve the desired message that is, lift sanctions and you will strength- en 'moderate' elements within Iraq.
Whatever Hamdoon's real influence on Saddam (and some analysts think he has very little) or his own innermost delibera- tions, he has nonetheless survived. That is because he remains immensely useful to the regime; and it explains why Saddam sent him to New York. Although the Iraqi state, like so many totalitarian regimes, has first call upon human resources and talent, Hamdoon's skills are still unmatched: his predecessor, Abdul Amir Anbari, too often presented a blustering, even aggressive image. This, Baghdad concluded, would not do. 'Inadvertently, Anbari presented the true Iraq,' observes Arnatzia Baram of Haifa University, one of the world's leading authorities on Mesopotamian affairs. 'But when Hamdoon talks, he represents a non- existent country.'
The author is chief leader writer of the Daily Telegraph.
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