BOOKS.

ARMAMENTS AND ARBITRATION.*

ADMIRAL MAHAN has collected here papers which have already appeared in print treating of the place of force in the relations of States. He argues that so long as the world is what it is, and human nature- what it is, war is in the majority of cases the only means of a satisfactory settlement. A judgment from which there is no appeal except by force is a very composing thing. Admiral Mahan does not say this in any cynical or wanton sense. He is a grave thinker and, what is more, an avowed Christian, but he has come to the conclusion that arbitration is nothing more than a vision except as between nations which are contented with their portion in the world and therefore sincerely desire to maintain things as they are. We have come to the same conclusion ourselves, and have often stated it, though we do not profess to have done so with the minute reason- ing of Admiral Mahan. Of course, there is a certain number of people who will reject Admiral Mahan's opinions at sight, but those who are open to reason will find it very well worth while to read these chapters carefully. We speak from the point of view of those who would infinitely

prefer arbitration to war as a means of settling disputes if they thought the universal substitution of the one for the other' were possible. Admiral Mahan has written no sham biological. treatise on the evolutionary necessity of international strife.'

Armaments and Arbitration or, the Place of Force in the International Relations of States. By A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D. London; Harper awl' Brothers. [Cs. net.]

His appeal is to history, and very largely to political events which will be within the memory of his readers.

In his introduction he indicates a resemblance between Socialism and arbitration. Logically, he says, arbitration should undertake not merely to settle disputes which threaten war, but also to rectify the inequalities among nations, for it is in the inequalities that the motives of war—jealousy and antagonism—reside. The aim of Socialism is the creation of an artificial equality. He foresees, on this analogy, that the Hague tribunal might possibly become a central power resembling a national government clothed with executive authority. But for some time to come, at all events, arbitration will be confined to purely judicial functions. The unfortunate fact is—and here we come to the heart of the matter—that the facile summary of the objects of arbitration, " Law instead of War," is too agreeably antithetical to be true. It has elements of truth, of course, but, as Admiral Mahan says, law is artificial and is frequently out of date, and therefore inapplicable to a present dispute. It may be that the decisions of law are unimpeachable as such and yet are incompatible with existing conditions. They may provide a settlement on thoroughly insecure foundations, which is therefore no settle- ment. On the other band, though we may well wish it were otherwise, the play of natural forces does reach an adjust- ment corresponding to the fundamental facts of the case.

Admiral Mahan shows by many historical instances that arbi- tration would not therefore produce, as is commonly assumed, a more settled state of things in the world. Take, for example, the case of the Monroe Doctrine. So long as it is recognized. and deferred to it unquestionably makes for peace, because it rules out the whole of the North and South American Con- tinent from the jealousies of the Old World. But suppose a dispute arising out of the Monroe Doctrine were submitted to arbitration. What then ? Imagine, as Sir H. H. Johnston has imagined in an article, that Denmark, a sovereign and independent State, wishes to sell a piece of national property to the equally sovereign and independent Empire of Germany. What stands in the way ? The Monroe Doctrine, if the piece of property is an island in the Caribbean Sea. Admiral Mahan says of this imaginary case that if it were submitted to arbitration, judgment would go against the United States. We think so too. And the sequel would be a heavily fortified German base in the New World and an anxiety imported there that at present does not exist.

Take another example. In 1898 the United States inter- vened in Cuba and, as the result of the war with Spain, annexed the Philippines and Porto Rico. The Cubans were set free. There is no doubt that the native populations have profited by the change wherever American influence has succeeded that of Spain. But if the dispute which caused the war of 1898 had been sent to arbitration it is certain that Spain would not have been dispossessed in anything like the drastic manner which was effected by the war.

Similarly Admiral Mahan writes :-

" Of the Mexican War I have no competent knowledge ; but I am familiar with the war of 1812, with the conflict of views and interests which led to the War of Secession, and to a somewhat less degree with the causes of the war with Spain. If it is meant that an arbitral court could have settled these disputes upon legal grounds, the reply is that, in one of the two principal causes which led to the war of 1812, Great Britain, while maintaining the necessity and consequent pro- priety of its action, admitted it to be without sanction in law. An arbitral court could have affirmed no more. In 1861 a like arbi- tration, whatever its result in conceding or denying the right of secession, would have maintained slavery in existence for generations longer, for the United States Government did not allege slavery as a justification of the war ; a course which alienated many warm foreign sympathizers. Abolition was a war measure pure and simple. It could never have been a result of legal arbitration."

If Admiral Mahan were writing his book to-day he would, of course, add a still more cogent illustration—the war between Turkey and the Balkan Allies. It is now certain that no Christian peoples in Europe will be ruled by a Mohammedan Power. This most satisfactory conclusion would never have been brought about by arbitration. We do not forget that argument along this line may he carried too far. Admiral Mahan does not, however, let his reasoning take the bit between its teeth and run away with him. It is obvious that his thesis, pressed too logically, would end in a complete sanction of doing harm that good might come. It might be said, if one depended on mere logic, that the massacre of all Germans by Great Britain, or the massacre of all Englishmen by Germany, would vastly improve the world by removing the chief standing conflict of will in the modern world. The corrective of logic is, of course, the fact that a benefit falsely achieved is quite overbalanced by the voluntary demoralization of a nation. The repudiation of justice by any great nation

is itself a material fact in the world of the most sinister importance, and no apparent gain can compensate for such a repudiation. Admiral Mahan implies all this by his elaborate defence of the moral character of the dealings of the United States with Columbia in connexion with the Panama zone.

Among the articles which deal but indirectly with arbitra- tion one is a review of Mr. Norman Angell's book, The Great Illusion. Admiral Mahan denies the universal truth of Mr. Angell's thesis that successful war does not bring financial gain, and for the rest very truly points out that after all only a small proportion of wars are fought with the avowed object of financial gain. In the American Civil War, for example, one of the bloodiest in history, neither side ever gave a thought to financial expectations; the political principle of union and the ethical question of slavery were the only points at issue.

Self-interest, thank goodness! is by no means the only motive that stirs the passions of man.

In other articles Admiral Mahan discusses the probable effects of the Panama Canal, and explains why it ought to he fortified. The author's argument on the advisability of fortifying the canal is of particular interest. He says :-

"In discussing the question of the advisability of fortifying the Zone, and especially the two entrances, or exits, it is to be said at once that I represent only myself. I speak for the opinions of no one else. I am entirely aware that there is a school of naval opinion, respectable in numbers as in other qualities, though I believe a minority, which so subordinates the question of fortifi- cation to that of the numbers of the fleet as to assert practically the needlessness of fortification. I myself have been taxed by a prominent exponent of this school in Great Britain with derelic- tion from my own position as an advocate of sea power, because of my strong insistence upon the general necessity for fortified seaports, as essential to the fleet's freedom of movement. What- ever dereliction there may seem to have been was coincident with the first formulation of my views upon sea power. Full twenty years ago I wrote, and I repeat with the conviction of the years since past : ` Navies do not dispense with fortifications nor with armies; but, when wisely handled, they may save their country the strain which comes when these have to be called into play.' Upon the general question of sea-coast fortification, as distinct from the special question of fortifying the Panama Canal, the reasons why fortification is an essential complement of a navy are twofold. Sea-coast fortification supplies a navy with fortified bases, strictly analogous to the fortresses which are the home bases, or to the temporarily fortified positions which are the advanced bases of an army in campaign. To argue the advan- tage—nay, the need—of these would be to discuss military art from its foundation. It is sufficient to say that all military history testifies to it. One of the most distinguished of the opponents of the first Napoleon said, An army which has to ensure the protection of unfortified bases is crippled in all its movements." In a naval campaign the navy is the mobile army— in the field. It, too, requires bases concerning the security of which it need feel no apprehension. The second office of sea- coast fortification is that of simple protection."

The book contains no article on the Canal tolls. Tho author's general argument, as we understand it, does not by any means deny the propriety of arbitration in such a case as this. The United States and Great Britain are satisfied nations, neither desiring further territorial expansion. They can resort to arbitration with confidence and safety, and this is particu- larly true when the issue between them is the interpretation of a treaty. The Panama dispute seems, as it were, made for arbitration.