MR. BALFOUR'S LATEST SPEECH. m . R. w B e A ea L n FO r ITh il li n as on m e ad st e ra m n a g n e y r s t t a an ti ge th ef t ee w cts ch b; i i e t addressed to his
Devonport audience on Monday. MO. Balfour began by the declaration that no mad ithb witnessed the greeting which had been given him, and saw "the vast sea of faces all animated by one belief and all determined to further one great cause," could suppose that the Unionist Party was divided, "nor do I believe that as a matter of fact that charge can any longer be brought against us." Fiscal Reform was no longer, "or in a few months will no longer be," he was well convinced, "a subject of division in any section of the party, but will rather be an animating motive, a deep-rooted patriotic and national conviction which, inspiring alike leaders and followers, is predestined to make the next Unionist Administration memorable in the history of this country." As if this were not enough, Mr. Balfour went on to declare his belief that "all in that room" were unanimous in thinking that a change was required in our fiscal system. "I welcome that unanimity, not merely because it is obviously the necessary prelude to any success of Fiscal Reform, not merely because it is manifest that if our party is not prepared unanimously to further that cause it will. not be furthered. That is not the only reason I welcome• unanimity. I welcome unanimity because without unanimity not one of the great causes committed to our charge as a party- can be faithfully or adequately safeguarded, because without unanimity we are helpless as social reformers, we are helpless as fiscal reformers; nay, we are even help-, - less as critics of a Government than whom no Government ever required to be more faithfully dealt with." So much- for Mr. Balfour's exordium. He returned to the point of unanimity in his peroration.. It was time, he declared, for the party, "now that they were of one mind with regard to the great constructive policy which lies before them," to turn their eyes away from these things—i.e., internal differences—and to devote themselves heart and soul to criticism of the Government. A meeting such - as that be had addressed was, he declared, conclusive proof of the enthusiasm" which now animates our common party."
It would be difficult for an impartial outsider not conversant with the actual situation to read this speech without arriving at the conclusion that Mr. Balfour must have been in communication with the Duke of Devonshire and those other leaders of the Unionist Free-traders who were once Mr. Balfour's colleagues, and that he had come to an agreement which henceforth would secure their complete support, and with it the reunion of the party. "What other meaning," the impartial outsider might ask, "is it possible for any one to attribute to Mr. Balfotir's emphatic words about the unanimity which had. been obtained, and which is predestined to make the next Unionist Administration memorable in the country ? Mr. Balfour is a man singularly cautious in his use of words, and one cannot suppose that he could speak of the next Unionist Government in such terms if it were likely to exclude the Unionist Free-traders: Mr. Balfour may no doubt have had difficulties with some of his extreme Tariff Reformers, but they are difficulties which have never been visible to the public. Even when their discontent with him has been greatest, there has always been a public profession of absolute loyalty to the man whom they elected as head of the party after the General Election of 1906. If, then, words are given their ordinary meaning, reunion and unanimity must refer to the Unionist Free-traders as having come into line."
Yet as far as we know—and we feel sure we should have known had so momentous an event taken place—there has been no scheme of reunion arranged between Mr. Balfour and the Duke of Devonshire and his followers. That such a reunion might be arranged. on the basis of a truce which would prejudice neither side pending the appoint- ment and investigation of a Royal Commission, we have always believed ; but Mr. Balfour makes no sort of suggestion that any such arrangement has been come to, and there have been no indications elsewhere of a movement in that direction. The situation as regards reunion is, we believe, very much what it has been ever since the General ElectiOn. We are forced, then, to the conclusion that Mr. Balfour when he spoke of unanimity was speaking in some metaphysical sense which, though it may have a meaning for his subtle mind, has none for the brains of ordinary plain-thinking men. We must, we suppose, presume that, having come to the conclusion that unanimity initga to be pot3si1i1e On the lines -which he laid down at Birmingham, he now assumes that the possible has become the actual. What ought to be done is as good as done, and therefore is done. Or to put it in another way : Sensible men must agree to the Balfour policy. The Unionist Party is composed of sensible men. Therefore the Unionist Party is agreed. So, apparently, runs the Balfourian syllogism. If this is the explanation of Mr. Balfour's speech—and we can think of no other—all we can say is that Mr. Balfour is living in a fool's paradise, and doing very ill service to that policy• of reunion which we do not doubt he has at heart as earnestly as we have. He has forgotten that there is no greater danger than to cry peace when there is no peace.
Let us for the moment put aside Mr. Balfour's enigmas and try to look at the situation as a whole, and from the standpoint of those who ardently desire that the Unionist Party should be once more united and rendered capable of playing the part which it ought to play in the government of the country. The first question to ask is:. How is the Unionist Party to do what all parties rightly desire to do,— that is, get back into power? This question can only be answered by first asking another. What caused the defeat of the Unionists at the polls in 1906? The plain answer, stripped of all sophisms, is that a very large number of men who in the years 1895 and 1900 voted for Unionist candidates in 1906 voted for their opponents. Clearly, then, the way, and the only way, in which the Unionists can regain power is to induce those who left the party in 1906 to return to the flag. To find out how this can best be done, yet another question must be asked: What induced those voters to transfer their allegiance and to vote for Liberal candidates in 1906? Many answers have been given to this question ; but those who do not bemuse their minds with chitneras know at heart that the answer is : The unwillingness of a large section of Unionists to abandon the policy of Free-trade. From the moment the Unionist Cabinet and the party were split on the question of Free-trade the party began to lose at by-elections, and to lose not as Governments in power generally lose, but with a far greater celerity. No doubt the swing of the pendulum and the question of Chinese labour may have bad. something to do with the un- popularity of Mr. Balfour's reconstituted Administra- tion; but no man who is prepared to face the facts can doubt that what really determined men's choice at the polls in 1906 was the question of Free-trade and Pro- tection. That the importance of the Chinese labour question has been very greatly exaggerated can be shown by asking this simple question : Is it possible to produce any appreciable number of voters who, but for Chinese labour, would have voted for Tariff Reform? If such voters cannot be produced—and we say without fear of contra- diction that they cannot—then it is idle to pretend that the Election was won on Chinese labour, and not on Free-trade.
If our statement of the facts is correct, and the dread of Protection was what sent Unionist voters in thousands over to the Liberals, the only sure way of restoring the Unionist Party to power is for that party, to abandon the policy of Tariff Reform. We do not suppose that the most fanatical Tariff Reformers would deny that if a magician could suddenly banish the whole Fiscal question to Saturn, the Unionist Party would be certain to win at the next elections. We admit, of course, that this does not settle the question, for the more zealous Tariff Reformers will say that they regard Tariff Reform as so important to the welfare of the country that it must be preached even at the risk of keeping the Unionist Party out of office for another ten years. That is what the extreme men will say, and we do not suppose that it is worth while to attempt to argue the matter with them. There is, however, a section of Tariff Reformers, far more important in numbers and influence, who take another line,—a line which we venture to think can be shown to be erroneous. They would probably admit that if the abandonment of Tariff Reform can be proved to be absolutely essential to the reinstatement of the Unionist Party in power, they ought to abandon it, even though they would dislike the process very greatly. At present, however, they argue that there is not the least need to drop Tariff Reform. The dread of the Government, and of its policy as regards Ireland, and such matters as old-age pensions and the virtual abolition of the House of Lords, felt by us and other advocates of a moderate and conservative policy, is, thej. contend, so great that it is bound to compel us, when the next Election conies, to vote for Tariff Reformers as the lesser of two evils. To put the matter plainly, they say :—" We have got the Unionist Free-traders without having had the expense of buying them at a sacrifice of our favourite policy. They must vote with us at the next Election because they dread Home-rule, Irish disorder, old-age pensions, Socialism, an unjust education policy, and a revolution in the Cinistittition even worsts than they dread Protection." We venture to say that those who argue thus —argue, in fact, that they have got the Unionist Free- traders in a cleft stick, and therefore need show them no mercy—are making a very great mistake, and are leaving out certain very important factors in the situation.
If Mr. Balfour, as we reluctantly infer, has been con- verted to the view that the Unionist Free-traders will be obliged to fall into line whether they like it or not, and that the unanimity of the party has been accomplished by physical pressure, if not by conviction, he is in danger of a very rude awakening. He forgets that there is a course of action which, though it would be most damaging to the Unionist Party, and therefore very greatly dreaded and disliked except as a last resource by the Unionist Free-traders who hold our views, is still open to them. We are willing to admit that as things now are, Unionists like ourselves would at the next General Election, except in very rare cases, find it impossible to support Liberal candidates, while at the same time finding it also impossible to vote for Tariff Reformers. Again, we are willing to admit that Lord .Rosebery's alternative of abstention might to many of us seem too dangerous. But given the dilemma just stated, it would always be possible for Unionist Free-traders to start candidates of their own in a very considerable number of constituencies, and especially in those constituencies in which the Liberal candidate, though nominally a Liberal, was really a Socialist or a member of the Labour Party. In con- stituencies where a Liberal extremist or Socialist is confronted by an unbending Tariff Reformer, we believe that a Unionist Free-trader would not only get a great deal of Unionist support, but what is more would draw a great deal of support from, moderate Liberals who, dis- gusted as they are with recent developments in their party's policy, are only prevented from taking the natural course of going over to the Unionists by the Unionist advocacy of Protection. Already, we do not hesitate to say, there are thousands of Liberals throughout the constituencies who are kept in their party solely by fear of Protection. The appearance of such third, or in some cases fourth, candi- dates, invoking the aid of all moderate men—all, that is, who desire the triumph of a "Left-Centre " policy—is, then, in our opinion, by no means impossible if Mr. Balfour is not able to give more satisfaction than he has yet given to the claims of the Unionist Free-traders.
Another possibility, or rather another form of the possibility we have just dealt with, deserves discussion. It is by no means inconceivable that the Government's advocacy of a harsh education measure, extreme licensing proposals, an unworkable and costly plan of old-age pensions, coupled with an agitation against the House of Lords, may next Session end in a very considerable insurrection in the Liberal Party, and may even cause a split comparable to that among the Unionists. If such a split were to take place, there would be a real danger of the Unionist Free-traders being tempted to join forces with such Liberal dissentients in order to create a Centre party. If that were to happen, the new party thus formed would become from many points of view the true Conservative Party, and a most serious, perhaps an irreparable, injury would have been done to the Unionist Party. Frankly, we are not ourselves in favour of the formation of such a third party. We would infinitely rather see reunion among the Unionists, and we therefore sincerely hope that the necessity for its construction will not arise. if, however, the Unionist leader persistently rejects all reasonable and just schemes for reunion, it is very difficult to see how it can be avoided.
Of one thing we are certain. The great conservative and moderate forces in the country, which are now apparently impotent and without proper representation in either party, will not remain indefinitely without power and inflowa in the state. In some way or ether they will obtain recognition, even if obtaining such recognition involves the destruction of both the great 'political parties as we know them to-day. Our earnest hope is that these " Left-Centre" influences may still find recognition through the reunion of the Unionist Party. That is the natural course of events, and will only be prevented, if it is prevented, by the recklessness of the Tariff Reformers and the weakness of Mr. Balfour.
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