.FRANKNESS.
WE heard the other day an amusing story of President Wilson. On being pressed by an importunate inter- viewer to give his views upon woman suffrage, he replied: "I cannot expose the public to my opinions." More than one serious consideration arises out of this witty answer. Where opinion is concerned have we all a right to keep our own counsel ? Is it our duty perhaps to spare the world the dia. telling effects of our confidence ? The office of President of the United States is a very great office, but the President, we
think, spoke (if there is any truth in the story) for little people when he defended himself from the importunity of the suffragette—for little people like most of us. It does not Matter one pin to the world what we think. Are we therefore exonerated from speaking? It is a very difficult question. Those of us who have been lately exasperated by some one who interrupts every reasonable discussion by pressing an individual, and as a rule wholly impractical, theory, who takes it for granted that the world will like to hear his peculiar little heresy and be impressed by his vaunted originality, will certainly decide for silence. "I may think strongly," a man will say to himself, "but I am not bound to bore and irritate the world at large with my impotent convic- tions. I could not bear to excite the amusement, or anger, or contempt which I, in company with the majority of his friends, feel when So-and-so seems impelled to air his views before all and sundry." Is frankness nevertheless a duty which we owe to the world at large—to the sum-total of our neighbours ? There is an immense deal to be said against it. For one thing, if we give vent to some opinion with which our hearers are completely ont of sympathy they will not understand us. Antagonism will render them stupid. Men's minds are hard of hearing when they do not like what is said, We all know that this is true in religion. Indeed, so generally is this fact recognized that few people think it becoming to express individual religious opinions in company at all. They may of course mention their own label, and say, "I am a Roman Catholic," or "I am a Quaker," should they see the conversation taking a turn which may lead some speaker to, regret his words. If we do burst out occasionally into strong religious disagreement with our company, we shall probably be regarded as secularists or Romans, or as owing adherence to what members of the larger bodies contemptuously term some fancy religion, according to whichever denomination our audience most dislike. We are almost sure to regret our words, and to feel that we have done harm by our vindication of what seems to us the truth. "Never again," we say to ourselves; and we smile grimly as we remember the Irishman who said he had a great deal too much regard for the truth to be dragging her out on every paltry occasion.
But there are many less controversial subjects upon which we may well wonder whether we ought to express our opinion. Suppose a man has a contempt and dislike for the ordinary exponents of a theory which nevertheless be believes in. Suppose he thinks that most mediums are humbugs and most spiritualistic stories rubbish, and yet it seems to him that there is enough evidence to give a reasonable man ground for believing that some communication is possible between this world and another. Is such a one bound in all com- panies to say what he thinks if he is drawn into conversation on the subject It is one to which most men will not give their best attention. They mention it that they may enjoy each other's contemptuous sallies of wit, but they do not truly consider it. Some of them think it wrong to do so, some futile, and some fanciful. A reasonable believer can hardly be expected to declare himself except in open- minded company. Ho may know that nine listeners out of ten will make almost unconsciously a lower estimate of his judgment than they made before. He cannot explain the grounds for his conviction without being an insuffer- able bore. He does not greatly care whether his hearers ever come to the knowledge of what seems to him the truth. Must he speak? May he not give, tacitly or by formal equivocation, a false impression ? Or take a question of conscience which just now comes before us more often. Need a convinced and fervent patriot defend the enemy against a charge which seems to him ill-supported by evidence, or even the next thing to impossible P To do so will lead him into a disagreeable argument, and if he speaks, for instance, in a railway carriage will lead some of those present to consider him a pro-German, possibly even to set him down as whatever is now commonly meant by "a. traitor." Had he not better murmur "Awful !" and "
speakable !" and there leave it. It matters to nobody what be thinks.
An immense number of women will never give a frank opinion upon any of what are called "women's questions," not because they accept old-fashioned views upon all these questions, but because they detest the methods and are anti- pathetic to the personalities of those who madly believe them to be of paramount importance. They would hate to be confounded with this sort of people. Are they .wrong in thus lying .low, iii appearing . even to agree with those whose opinions they do not share but whose attitude they do P It is, we think, vei•y• hardlo condemn them: What Compels them to speak P As individuals they are of no consequence, and they will only be misunderstood.
. There are certain things which many good people do because in their opinion it is right which they cannot defend logically, and as a rule never defend at all. A good many very reason- able people give to beggars—not only to mendicants in the street, but to those whose only claim is a chance demand. When they hear the absolutely convincing arguments of those who say that all giving should be regulated by proved necessity, and even, perhaps, worth, they say nothing, or they murmur some acquiescence. Are they bound to say that in their opinion it is right to do as they do? Need they enter into a dispute with the best and ablest people of their acquaintance to defend a position which they cannot defend by argument and out of which they cannot be driven P 'A man may be in as just possession of truth as of a city and yet be forced to surrender," said Sir Thomas Browne. Are they bound, when they bear it confidently asserted that only criminally careless people ad as they are acting, to say, "That is rubbish. I am as thoughtful as you, and as capable of just thinking "? Is it not, where what we think truth is concerned, "far better to enjoy her with peace than to hazard her on a battle "? Again, it is often very difficult for a man or a woman to divulge his true opinion of a person under discus- sion. If he or she appears to be alone in his or her opinion, it will be received as prejudice, do neither good nor harm to the person in dispute, but reaot to the detriment of the speaker. Is it wrong to refrain? In the ease of a friend no good person will by word or sign acquiesce in condemnation, but is it not permissible to keep silence ?
We think it is at least disputable whether in every one of these instances it is not better to be frank. We know that a vast number of very sincere people will disagree with us and uphold the right of reserve. It is a curious thing, but people the most open in practical life are often the most reserved about opinions, and vice-versd. We have known persons reserved almost to duplicity in everyday life who would tell, who could not help tell. big, what they thought upon any subject unconnected with the day's round. From a future life to the character of Mr. Smith or Mr. Jones, they will tell you every- thing that they have ever thought, but not what they are going to do on Wednesday, even though their reserve should make it necessary for you to tell them how you will be occupied every day for a week. Most people, however, 'nowadays admit that in the small practical affairs of life it is better to be frank—to make no secret of one's fortune, or origin, or ignorance, or age, or occupation, or anything else
• about oneself that the superficially curious might like to know. It is also usually accepted among the socially inclined that it is a great mistake to force these generally uninteresting facts upon one's acquaintance. Would it not be well if we could stand in the same attitude towards our opinions ? It may be very true that our personality lends them no weight ; but if
• we have come at them honestly by thinking our hardest we have a right to them, and it is a sort of duty not ' to be ashamed of them and not to hide them. It is good for a man to remember that he is very seldom singular. A number of people, even among his own acquaint- ance, agree with him. They do not speak for the same reason that he does not speak, but probably they would if he would. Now every man who respects the truth as he sees it must wish it to prevail, though lie may not be prepared to suffer for it. He eannot deny that union is strength, and 'that undue reserve is a source of disintegration. The majority may be intolerant and prejudiced, but, after all, whose fault is that ? It is largely the fault of the people who love to imagine
• themselves singular, or who genuinely do imagine themselves • of no account and who will not speak. • Every one admits that ' a system of representation by which minorities could be represented in the Legislature is desirable, though so far impracticable. In the world, in every • circle, it is both desirable and possible. But it can only be brought about by franknesIs.
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