INEFFECTIVE ARABS
IT has become axiomatic for British and American statesmen to assert that the salvation of the Middle East is to be sought . through ordered economic progress. So often has this belief been stated that it has even found an echo in the utterances of the princes and governors of the Arab States—who, for the most part, however, continue to treat politics as an endless adventure, in 'which personalities are of more concern than principles and the winning of power more important than what is done with it when it has been won. Unfortunately there is little evidence to show that the picture of the Middle East and its problems, as seen from outside, bears much resemblance to the picture as seen from within. An article by Lord Kinross on a later rage illustrates the painstaking care and tact with which the Western Powers are setting about their self-appointed task of buttressing the precarious stability of the Middle East. By way of contrast, the Council of the Arab League, which has just met in Cairo, succeeded in deliberating for a week without touching on any of the issues which appear, to non-Arab observers, to be most obviously in need of urgent attention. All that the politicians assembled at Cairo managed to agree on was a series of negative resolutions based on the unproved assumptions that King Abdullah is a potential traitor and the . State of Israel a figment .af the imagination. Nothing was done for the refugees except to offer them the citizenship of the countries in which they find themselves ; nothing was said to carry a stage further the constructive suggestions of the Clapp Commission ; nothing was done to heal the trade war which has broken out between two of the member States—Syria and Lebanon. It might reasonably be supposed that the final break-up of the Arab League awaits only the snapping of one of its many weak links ; but it is equally possible that the League will continue its nominal existence, each State being consoled by the knowledge that the League lacks both the power and the will to put its resolutions into effect; It would, happily, be wrong to assume that this negative attitude gives the same satisfaction to all Arabs that it presumably affords to the politicians. One generation—the generation represented at Cairo—has enjoyed a monopoly of political power everywhere in the Arab world since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Another generation is greedy for the power that has so far been denied it and—at least until their actions have proved them wrong—it would be fair to assume that these younger men could make better use of power than their elders. In two of the Arab League States the turn of events is now giving the critics a chance to show their capabilities. In Egypt the Wafd Government, headed by Nahas Pasha, has not yet been in office long enough to disappoint the hopes of the electorate which voted it into power, and it contains two or three Ministers who have shown commendable speed in translating their reforming theories into practice. There is, of course, the danger that this Government may like so many others, founder on the rock of personalities. Relations between the King and his Prime Minister have become more strained following the resignation of Sirry Pasha who, as Chief of the Royal Cabinet, had done much to smooth away the old antagonism between the two. There is also the risk of a split within the ranks of the Wafd party itself, brought on by rivalry between the candidates who aspire to succeed Nahas Pasha in the leadership. But if these pitfalls are avoided, Egypt may deserve the position of primacy among the States of the Middle East, which she has always claimed for herself, by demonstrating that a Government can be at the same time constitutionally elected, tolerant of criticism, reforming and strong.
The second State to show signs of moving out of the political doldrums is Jordan. Half of the seats in the new Assembly, for which elections have been held this week, were reserved for constituencies in what is left of Arab Palestine. These Arabs, whichever way they vote, may be expected to have a profound effect on the character of their new motherland. All of them, whether settled or refugees, have had direct experience of the catastrophe of war, and are unlikely to be satisfied with the old slogans of nationalism which still serve as substitutes for party programmes in most of the neighbouring countries. Moreover these Arabs can look back on twenty-five years' experience of British mandatory rule, which, whatever its short. comings may have been, provided a taste of the theory and practice of modern administration which the educated classes, at any rate, are determined not to abandon if it can be helped. Whether this new State on both sides of the Jordan will be able to fuse its inhabitants into a nation, and whether such a nation can survive without access to the Mediterranean, are legitimate subjects for debate. Although Abdullah's kingdom stood up exceptionally well two years ago to the first shock of war, its internal structure has suffered in the interim, as shown particularly in the growth of corruption and bureaucracy and in the growing tendency to identify all radical tendencies with Communism. King Abdullah has yet to reconcile his new subjects with his old, but the fact that such reconciliation is possible makes Jordan a potential cause for hope.
To his hidebound colleagues in the Arab League King Abdullah is still a cause for despair ; the reason being that he is believed to have been ready to negotiate with Israel. Whether the object of his negotiations was a full-blown peace treaty or simply a regularisation of the armistice which would relieve the tension on the frontier and allow for some trade exchanges, is immaterial. The odium which, in most Arab circles, attaches to the idea of negotiation with Israel can only be compared with the loathing, in occupied Europe, of collaboration with the Nazis. Unquestionably the passions aroused by the existence of Israel are the chief obstacle in the way of an effective dove- tailing of the resources of the West and the needs of the Middle East. In the recent foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons speakers of all parties exclaimed against the folly of Iraq's continued closing of the pipeline to Haifa, and against the unwisdom (probably even the illegality) of Egypt's refusal to allow Israel-bound cargoes through the Suez Canal. But, however exasperating the sight of people cutting off their noses to spite their faces may be, it is possible to claim that this is one of the traditional rights of man. Certainly, as Mr. Bevin patiently explained to the Commons, there is nothing further that can be done by way of rational argument about this particular foam of economic self-mutilation.
Does this mean that the West, in its approach to the Middle Eastern scene, must adapt itself to all the prejudices, unreason- able as well as reasonable, of the indigenous inhabitants ? Must Israel be excluded from the planners' calculations out of the same sense of tact that prompts the visitor to a mosque to remove his shoes ? All economic, political and strategic considerations are opposed to such a concession. Yet it is difficult to see how anything except time is going to reconcile the Arabs to Israel's existence, and time is a commodity which, in the West, is in short supply. It should. however, be possible for the Western Powers to act as intermediaries between Israel and her neighbours, to keep the ring against a fresh outbreak of violence and at the same time to encourage economic developments such as those outlined by the Clapp Commission. But the West must reconcile itself to the assumption, which will be universally made in the Middle East, that there is no boundary between economic aid and political interference. It will be no use protesting that this assumption is a calumny ; partly because the protests will not be believed and partly because total political detachment is, in fact, impossible. The rickety structures of more than one Arab State are as liable to collapse by the breath of a boom as by the gale of a slump. There would be no wisdom in perpetuating these outdated fabrics, nor would the best interests of the West or of the Arabs themselves be served if the impression gained ground that we were doing anything towards patching them up.
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