Whitehall and White House
WHEN Mr. MacDonald lands in America next week he will find the scene has altered greatly since he talked to Mr. Hoover in 1929. American ()Onion has changed with American experience, and the new President can speak with an authority . which Mr. Hoover never enjoyed. The factors which have trans- formed the international situation have been drastically at work in America ; and it may be said without exag- geration that, if the whole economic problem is now over-ripe for treatment, the public mind, both in England and in America, is also riper and readier to accept realistic leadership. Among the many novel phenomena produced by the crisis in America none is more remark- able than the alacrity with which Congress has sur- rendered some of its more cherished, prerogatives into the hands of the new President. In so departing from their traditional jealousy of the executive power, legis- lators have obeyed the will of the American people, who sought leadership bold enough to cut the Gordian knot of depression. The response which greeted each of President Roosevelt's swift and bold acts during the month of March was due in part, no doubt, to an almost universal recognition that what he did, or proposed to do, was necessary and rieit, but it owed its convincing zest to the more important conviction that the man who could thus act swiftly was the fitting leader for a nation waiting, nay, thirsting to be led. Mr. Roosevelt has struck while the iron is hot, and while all America is ringing with his strokes on the domestic anvil, onlookers abroad must see in his telegram to the Prime Minister the determination to use his almost unique opportunity for fruitful action in foreign as well as home affairs. Therefore, despite the feeling which prevails in some quarters in England that an official visit to America is still premature, the Prime Minister's acceptance of the White House invitation will be rightly interpreted as assuring British co-opera- tion to the American President at a moment when new policies are in the making and the omens for their acceptance in America are favourable.
The omens are as important as the policies themselves. In describing them as favourable we do not imply that, on War Debts, for instance, there is no difference between the probable British maximum and the probable American minimum. We have already been warned by one distinguished British journalist in Washington that "the gap between these two is disquietingly wide," but in the same sentence he attributes to Mr. Roosevelt the belief that it "can be bridged if goodwill cement the structure." That belief, if the • President really holds it, is due to the same reasons which prompt independent observers to judge, that the omens in America to-day —witness Mr. Cordell Hull on tariffs—are not unpro- pitious for American co-operation in a constructive international endeavour to dispel the depression. 1933, be it remembered, is not 1929. The water which has flowed in such volume under so many bridges in these four years has dissolved some prejudices and swept away many illusions ; to-day, in the opinion of so sound an observer as Mr. Walter Lippmann, " the change in American sentiment is unmistakable." It is not that America is now prepared to cancel the debts uncon- ditionally, but that she is now prepared to discuss a matter which till recently was regarded as finally and irrevocably settled. In appearance, Congress is still committed to the policy of refusing to cancel or reduce the debts, but in fact America has already been carried far from that Congressional resolution which tied Mr. • Hoover's hands.. The arguments which have accelerated this process are cogently presented by Mr. Frank Si/oonds in his new and most timely book Why America .11u,t Cancel ; but, though Mr. Simonds .declares flatly that cancellation " must prove the longest step towards recovery within the power of the Roosevelt- Administra- tion to take," we shall not assume that therefore caneelia. tion is in sight. What we can assume is that we have a new America on the other side of the table in the person of President Roosevelt and that he is preparing " a new .deal " both at home and abroad.
In this situation Mr. Roosevelt's general purpose and his tactics are equally clear. That is not to saw that he has shaped his plan of world reform in all its details in advance, for he is not a Woodrow Wilson descending from the mount of inspiration with Fourteen Tables of Stone to save the sons of men. He is a tactician with something more than a mere politician's ends to serve. Knowing that . America is changing her mind, he will . do nothing to .check the_ process : and he approaches his problem by. the road on which he expects to encounter the least resistance and to disturb American susceptibilities as little as possible. . The Prime Minister is the appointed chairman of the . Economic Conference. America has reason to hope that some measure of world recovery will there be achieved and that she will play no small part in the achievement. What, therefore, could be more appropriate than that some of the principal participants should take counsel together in advance ? And with whom could the consultation more auspiciously begin than with Mr. MacDonald in his dual capacity as British Prime Minister and Chairman of the Conference?
The field of counsel is wide and full of pitfalls. The agenda of the Conference includes some subjects. such as tariffs, on which American opinion used to be adamant, is still sensitive, but has manifestly moved far, as Mr. Cordell Hull's remarkable foreshadowing of American tariff policy last Saturday would seem to prove. It excludes the subject of War Debts, on which American feeling is not so easy to gauge, but is probably ready for what our Washington correspondent calls " a major adjustment." And, on the other hand, it includes the gold standard on which the facts of to-day— and even of a fairly distant to-morrow—compel -Britain to stay where she is., All these, and much else, with dis- armament specifically and tactically mentioned by the President in his telegram, will be on the table of the White House after Easter. It is Mr. Roosevelt's purpose to find the highest common factor of agreement in these apparent causes of offence—for in certain aspects, each is an offence to someone—and thus to do what he humanly (and Presidentially) can to guarantee for the world, and therefore for America, a gain of substance from the World Economic Conference. We wish him well and congratulate him on his prompt and courageous action. But our part in this enterprise, which we recognize as being as delicate as it is hopeful, may begin with goodwill, but does not end there. We have. of course, to maintain our vital national interests ; but in so defending ourselves, we must also remember. that, even on the best showing, President Roosevelt will be taking risks with his, own public in accepting sound measures of world economic reform—greater risks than the British Government will be taking—and that there- fore, in the final reckoning, he must be in a position to demonstrate to Congress that America has gained as much as she has given at. .the Conference. The United States is not the only country with tariffs to reduce.
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