FRANCE AND GERMANY.
THE discussion which has been raging this week upon the Continent as to the alleged Tripartite Treaty between Germany, Austria, and Italy, has thrown a flood of light upon Prince Bismarck's present policy, and on the situation of France. In the first place, it is clear that he has succeeded in binding the three States together in a defensive league against any attack from France, or France at the head of a coalition. It was from the beginning certain that Renter's telegram of last week, with its official form and simple directness of statement, either emanated from the Italian Ministry, or was sanctioned by them, as otherwise it would never have got over the Italian wires. Continental Governments, fortunately, do not allow semi-official cor- porations like "Reuter's" and the " Agence Havas" to publish statements of that kind, statements which might produce a breach of international relations, at their own discretion. If they did, the fortunes of all fundholders, and perhaps the peace of the world, would lie at the mercy of a cosmopolitan group of acute speculators, whose agents know exactly how news will affect the markets. The denials instantly made signified little, the governing theory of foreign diplomatists being that if you have a right to keep a Treaty secret, you have ex necessitate a right to deny its existence ; and now the
form of denial has been given up. The Foreign Minister of Italy, S. Mancini, has admitted in Parliament, while employ- ing all forms of politeness towards France, that there is an agreement which, in his judgment, will tend to. make Italy more secure; and an " eminent Italian " in Paris, obviously not an independent personage, has explained to the Daily News the object for which it has been made. The Government of Vienna has suddenly stopped some costly preparations it was making for the additional defence of its southern frontier, and is slowly moving garrisons from the south to the east ; while in Berlin, Prince Bismarck has spoken for himself, in the North-German Gazette. In an article admitted to be directly inspired, that journal points out that the interests of the three Powers compel an alliance, inasmuch as all must be endangered if one were defeated, and allows that the three Courts have simul- taneously perceived wherein their interest lies. In fact, though a formal reticence is still preserved, in order to avoid international questioning, the fact of an agreement is conceded, and whether it is in the form of a Treaty or of an accepted memorandum matters little. That it is unwritten we do not believe, for there are no facts more constantly pre- sent to Prince Bismarck than his master's age and his own broken health, and he would not leave either Rome or Vienna the chance of denying hereafter that she was bound in honour to support Germany. As to the precise nature of the agreement little is said, but Reuter's original account was plainly either an official lie or an official V-ith, and was most probably the latter. At all events, t drift of the agreement may safely be taken to be that, if France at- tacks either Germany, or Austria, or Italy, the remaining two Powers shall defend the attacked one ; and that if Russia alone attacks either, the other two shall either assist or remain benevolently neutral. Prince Bismarck has, in fact, bound Central Europe, from Koenigsberg to Naples, into a single defensive league, so strong in men and organisation that attack on it would be almost an act of madness. The combined German and Austrian armies, two millions strong, are set absolutely free, without dread even of a diversion from the Italian side. No Power not carried away by a Revolutionary mania would risk so dangerous an enterprise. So long as this agreement continues, and is not transmuted into an offen- sive league, Europe is safe from war, except under one contin- gency. A Revolutionary party may master either France or Russia and pour over the frontier, carrying an idea before its armies, as happened in 1793. Such an occurrence might dissolve all combinations, but though possible, it is out- side the range of practical politics, and for the present there is peace,—armed, burdensome, and costly peace, but still peace.
The state of affairs now admitted, and commented on in France with extreme though natural acrimony, has been for some time suspected, and we turn with fresher interest to the arguments which have produced it. These are not, as might have been supposed, fears of a Revolution in France, but fears of a Restoration. Prince Bismarck has a low idea of popular forces; he thinks, like a true Prussian, that they are always weak for war, and he avows in the North-German Gazette, for the twentieth time, that he has no dread of France while she is still Republican. Her institutions bind her, he says, to keep the peace. He does not believe, in fact, that she will be able to go to war, and he says so with a crude frankness which has almost put the Republican journalists of Paris beside them- selves. They cannot bear to be told that Republicanism means weakness abroad, and they would like to march to Berlin, just to show Monarchists that Republics can fight, if they please. Their anger is a little unreasonable, as Prince Bismarck has expressed the same opinion before ; but it is accentuated by his avowal of another and a new belief. He thinks the French Republic in danger, and that not from the Extremists, but from the Royalists. He expects, he hints, to see a King in France who must rely upon the Army and the Clericals, and who will, if it is humanly possible, declare war either upon Germany or Italy. The claim of the new monarch to his throne will be the revival of French ascendancy in Europe. The Italians are under the same apprehension. Their statesmen think the Republic has failed because its Ministers change so rapidly, and expect its successor to be a King. Indeed, the " eminent Italian " who instructs the Daily News, and who is plainly acquainted with the arguments which move his own Court and Berlin, affirms that the leading Generals of the French Army have an understanding among themselves that the Monarchy shall be restored. In this event, he says Italy would at once have to dread invasion for the restoration of Rome to the Papal Chair, and of course Europe would be in flames. No date for this action of the Generals is mentioned, but a remark made by M. Ferry, during the debate on the Expulsion Bill, that the Comte de Paris would be a " formidable personage " when the Comte de Chambord died, suggests that this is the contingency that the Generals are supposed in France, as well as in Italy, to await.
All this seems to us rather dreamy, but the dream is one of a kind which may weigh heavily both with Prince Bismarck and King Humbert. The latter probably inherits his father's dread of the Roman Question as the one serious danger of the new Monarchy, while the former has been consistent all through. He cannot conceive that a Republic can be strong, or that "an Army " can mean anything but its General Officers. He, therefore, though expecting peace while the Republic lasts, disbelieves in its lasting, and he may very well think he knows
that the General Officers in France are both discontented and in- clined to Monarchy. His two data—that the Republic will not last, and that Generals are the Army—being granted, his policy is clear enough ; and it is as to his data, if anywhere, that he is making mistakes. We believe he is making them. We ques- tion the grounds for his belief that the Republic will fall, and deny entirely that the French General Officers are equivalent to the Army of France. The latter assumption was disposed of when Marshal MacMahon resigned, for, but that he knew that a coup d'e'tat would produce "war in the barracks,", he would have retained the Presidency. The French Generals will not face that danger, and if they will not, they must wait till the peasants and artisans who fill the ranks weary of the Republic. Where is the sign of that ? The peasantry are so content that they hardly care to go to the polls, and scarcely know the names of the Ministers whom the National Assembly chooses to set up. So far from their sympathising in the rage at the loss of prestige which is supposed to influence the Army, they notorionsly abandoned Gambetta for fear he should go to war, and would turn out any Chamber which embarked on a policy of enter- prise. They refused even to permit action in Egypt. Their feeling may change, of course, but till it changes it must sway the private soldiery ; and if it did change, why should they turn to a Piing? Because, Prince Bismarck will say, he alone could give them the needful military strength. That is his view, and it may be a true one—we do not think so—but it is the exact opposite of the view of French Republicans. Their belief, certainly justified by their history and by the example of 1870, is that a Republic has more energy than a Monarchy, that the People can find a better General than a King can, and that if they are to fight, they had better fight under a Dictatorship. Had Gambetta lived, it is to him they would have turned, and French capacity did not die with Gambetta. We see nothing even plausible in Prince Bismarck's view, while its expression will undoubtedly produce two grand results. The peasantry will be more convinced than ever that the Republic means peace and the Monarchy war, while the Republicans will be more angrily zealous than ever to place men of their own opinions at the head of the great military divisions. The Prince has made the Monarchy and its adherents alike " suspect," and has so far done all he could to prevent the realisation of his own dream. He may, of course, retort that this is what he wishes, but he must not complain if increased belief in his patriotism is accompanied by decreased belief in his sagacity.
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