Disaster Command: a proposal
Patrick Cosgrave
Nothing evokes a readier or more heartfelt public response in Western countries than natural disaster abroad, be it flood and war in Pakistan, cyclone in India, famine in Biafra, or earthquake in Persia. Yet, by a cruel paradox, the efficacy of relief from the rich countries is in marked disproportion both to the depth of the public response and to the resources of the countries themselves. Too often this leads to despair, both at the immeasurable scale of the disasters of the Third World in particular, and at the apparent selfishness of the rich countries, unable or unwilling, as it seems, to transfer an effective fraction of their resources to the relief of human suffering.
On no occasion in the recent past has the tragic disproportion between relief and suffering been so great as in the case of the East Pakistani refugee situation. A Particular shock has been the ineffectiveness of the United Nations in organising relief, and this in spite of the devoted work of UN personnel on the spot. But there has been severe criticism of the scale of effort by individual countries — including Britain — as well; sharp attacks have been made on the slowness ' with Which the voluntary organisations have Put resources and task forces together: and a measure of bewilderment at the apparent lack of knowledge about and understanding of the requirements of the crisis, on the part of governments and international organisations alike. Natural1Y, a good deal of the consequent Indignation has spilled over into political judgement or political action. The problem of relief has become almost inextricably confused with the problem of an independent Bangla Desh; a gallant group Of young people have tried, though ineffectively, to carry supplies to the suffering over the Indo-Pakistan border: demands have been made — and in some cases responded to — for the cancellation of aid to Pakistan; and, inevitably, the cry has gone up that politicians are to blame for our lack of effort, either because the business of foreign policy and politics is assumed to be incompatible with a humane and moral response to suffering, or because the pursuit of political objectives is assumed to be in conflict with the Maximisation of relief effort. This last Point is particularly emphasised by Pointing to the British government's refusal, in some sense or other, to take Sides with India against Pakistan in the current crisis.
Certainly — and despite large provision nf resources on the part of this country — it seems clear that the British government does not see a substantial role for itself in handling the Indo-Pakistan refugee problem: this is indicated by the Foreign Secretary's clear statement that any hope of serious or substantial alleviation of the situation can only arise through United Nations effort. It is my contention that this is a profoundly wrong analysis of the situation; and that, while politics are, and will remain, intimately involved with the relief problem, political action on the part of governments offers the only hope of alleviation, if not solution.
I propose a policy and a machinery which will radically alter the future British approach to disaster.
It goes without saying that one can never hope for an elimination of natural disaster, nor of consequent human suffering. No utopian plan is therefore being put forward. Rather, the burden of my modest proposal is a scheme for improving as far as may be considered humanly and politically possible the efficiency of future relief efforts to which this country may wish to contribute.
It is reasonable to use the present situation in the Indian sub-continent as a current and dramatic illustration of the problems faced. The precise nature and shape of that crisis was dictated, not by the political history of East Pakistan - though that certainly had an influence — but by the initial flood disasters in the area occurring at a time of political upheaval in West Pakistan and the apparently unfeeling and inefficient re sponse of General Yahya Khan's govern ment to the situation. What was initially missing, as everyone will recall, was any really useful intelligence about the scale of the flood disaster itself. Both the Indian and Pakistani governments claimed, with reason, that they could not mobilise relief until they knew what was needed; as in the earlier case of Biafra, the wrong supplies came at the wrong time to the wrong places; British relief ships had to steam from South-East Asia to help; and the charity organisations in this country took several days to mobilise their joint resources. Of course there were diplomatic problems, sometimes serious, arising from friction between governments, organisations and individuals.
Yet the disaster was eminently predictable. This is true of most major disasters, as it is true of such domestic emergencies as oil tanker sinkings and winter floods. Though there is sometimes a political situation — as, perhaps, in the case of Nigeria — which inhibits the operation of relief from the outset, more often political crisis arises out of disaster, rather than precedes it. And the serious deterioration of the situation arises out of the initial lack of knowledge about the nature and scale of the crisis.
I therefore propose the creation of an Intelligence Secretariat, to be set up and financed by the British government, which will have the task of predicting disaster, and estimating the requirements needed to meet it. Almost certainly, such a secretariat will be military in character. In this way it can mobilise and utilise the remarkable and perhaps unique international experience of the British armed services, the outstanding and incomparable skill of the military in logistical and supply questions, and the transport and administrative facilities which only the defence forces possess.
For it should also be the task of the secretariat to keep a running list of the resources available for use by this country. Every unit of the British armed services is, if not luxuriously, at least more than adequately equipped: in the second world war, resources for an expanded army were found partly by cutting down on the scale of the equipment of the initial British Expeditionary Force. I propose, therefore, that each unit of the armed services should keep a register of the equipment and operational capacity it possesses over and above that strictly needed for combat, so that such spare transport and other capacity can be made available for use in disaster areas. Likewise, it should be the duty of the Intelligence Secretariat to keep a running register of supplies in this country of drugs, foodstuffs and other necessities for use in the event of disaster. To some extent, of course, such knowledge is already available: but if an effective Intelligence Secretariat was in being the knowledge would be not merely available, but immediately usable, a skeleton administrative and logistic infrastructure would be permanently in being, and any adequate or successful prediction ot disaster would be enough to bring preparations to a point of readiness. At the same time, the Secretariat would be in regular contact with, and thoroughly. familiar with, the charity organisations and their potential for raising money and supplies. A joint committee of the charity organisations and the Secretariat would meet regularly to concert measures and, on a confidential basis, the committee would be kept in touch with the intelligence and prediction operation.
Ideally, the Disaster Command, into which all these resources would be formed at the outset of crisis, would have available for use in situ a complete, fully equipped administrative organisation, ready to channel medical and other personnel and supplies in the most effective way. Obviously, this ideal will involve formidable political problems in the relationships between governments. It is therefore desirable for the British govern ment to take early steps, long in advance of the outbreak of crisis or the occurence of disaster, to concert measures with the government or governments involved. Sometimes it will be possible to do this on a basis of full intimacy, sometimes not.
But in any event the maximum resources and the most efficient intelligence will be continuously available; and whatever ad hoc plans are worked out in a given case they will at a minimum be the best that can be provided, and far more effective than the muddled efforts we have seen in recent years.
It would be better if such a structure could be created on an international basis: the resources immediately available would be much larger. But for unity of command and planning, knowledge of the resources available, and the potential contribution to be made by close co-operation between governments, a national basis offers by far the best hope of real success. While, too, idealistically, one may hope for international response to what are invariably seen as international human problems, realism demands the acknowledgment that national efforts are far more effective; and compassion insists that we search for what is effective, rather than for what is ideal.
The scheme will require a greater imagination, and a greater boldness than we have seen in these matters from any British government, as well as a much greater political effort in developing the necessary relations with governments about to be stricken. But the ordinary British interest of stability around the world will be well served by such an effort. And considerations of greater dimension and magnitude enter into the situation. From the point of view of our own public conscience and response, our government (of whatever party) will be seen to be leading our own fight against disaster and suffering, rather than responding, however generously, to the situation. Our foreign policy, without having its basic aims and purposes in any way damaged, or even impeded, will attain a new and greater place in world affairs. Finally, and this in an immeasurable and moral sense, the Disaster Command could be Britain's contribution, freely given, to the world, and particularly to that disasterprone area of the world with which we have the deepest historical, cultural and even family connections. However formidable the problems, however great the inertia that confronts such a change of emphasis in policy on these matters, the scale of the disasters we face in the future, and the requirement conscience dictates, of the most effective possible response to such disasters, demand an effort to fill out the possibilities which I have been able only to suggest.
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