RHODESIAN REALITIES
"The present situation," said Sir Alec Douglas-Home of Rhodesia on Tuesday, "benefits no one, least of all the Africans . . . I do not underestimate the difficulty of the task but if there is a will to succeed on both sides there are grounds for hope. If a suitable basis for agreement can be found, it will be consistent with the five principles, to all of which Her Majesty's Government attach importance." Few will grudge Sir Alec — or the Government — the opportunity to make this last attempt to achieve a settlement on the basis of the five principles which he himself laid down. It is clear from Sir Alec's replies to questions in the House that he and his negotiating team will have a full opportunity of discussing the current situation with African leaders, including those in prison because of their opposition to the Smith regime. This last step is an essential preliminary to discovering whether any settlement reached between Mr Smith and Sir Alec is — as the fifth principle requires — acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
How likely is it that a settlement will be achieved which is consistent with the five principles? The principles themselves are much less hard and fast than has often been supposed. There is room for argument about the nature of the guarantee against retrogressive amendment of a new majority rule constitution; about how any immediate improvement in the political status of the African population would be achieved; and about the nature of the consultation of African opinion that must take place. It is also now clear that, on these three points, Lord Goodman believes he made considerable progress during his exploratory talks; and that Sir Alec is satisfied that this is the case. But it is hard to see how there can be any compromise on unimpeded progress towards majority rule, which would require amendment of the 1969 Rhodesian constitution; and it is unlikely that Mr Smith will be able to give Sir Alec satisfactory assurances on the fourth principle, which requires progress to be made towards the ending of racial discrimination.
Consequently, as Sir Alec has said, the prospects for a settlement are remote. If this attempt fails, it will be necessary for the British Government to face up to the reality of its relations with Rhodesia. There is nothing dishonourable in acepting that, without a settlement, this country can do little to affect the course of developments in Rhodesia. Sanctions have damaged the Rhodesian economy, but their limited effectiveness is continually decreasing; and their maintenance will do nothing whatever to help the African population. Without a settlement, it is likely that Rhodesia will be drawn more and more into the ambit of South Africa : but there is nothing we can do about that either. If the present round of talks fail ,therefore, the British government will have to accept that Rhodesia is no longer a British responsibility, but a foreign country, to be treated as such.
This need not involve accepting or condoning the putative system of apartheid which Mr Smith has introduced. Mr Powell, for example, has always followed the perfectly consistent line that, while Britain should acknowledge her helplessness, and withdraw from the pretence of future responsibility for her former colony, he could not imagine himself voting for any Rhodesian independence bill — even one based on the 1961 constitution — because such a bill would be unlikely to contain satisfactory assurances about the ending of racial discrimination. A British government which, like the present one, has shown itself on a number of matters sensibly impervious to some of the more illogical and silly manifestations of 'world opinion ' should, therefore, have no great difficulty in making its moral position perfectly clear, while at the same time acknowledging the facts in regard to its political power.
If, then, the present talks fail, and if realism rather than hope is to mark future British policy, the manner of Britain's disentanglement must be considered. One method — which was considered by Mr Heath some time ago — would be to declare to the United Nations that Britain no longer regarded itself as having specific or unique responsibilities in Rhodesia, and that, in such further discussions as the world body might have on the problem, we would take our place as an ordinary member, in no more special a position than the United States or Afghanistan. Such a course of action would, in the opinion of the Law Officers, require legislation at Westminster, the passage of which would certainly be the occasion for a Labour furore. That, however, is to be expected in any case; and legislative action would give ample opportunity for such declaratory judgements on the moral character of the Rhodesian government as the occasion, or sensitive consciences, might require.
The one remaining — and potentially difficult — question would be that of mandatory sanctions, that is, the sanctions already imposed by the will of the United Nations and, theoretically, enforced by all member nations. Mandatory sanctions, or any similar provisions, which recognise not merely the individual legal identity of the United Nations, but the possession by that body of a coercive authority as well, are highly undesirable. Mr Heath's government is not one generally thought to repose much confidence or trust in the potentialities of the UN, and Sir Alec is certainly no enthusiast, but, if Britain was in the process of disengaging from Rhodesia, the government might feel tempted to provide evidence of good faith at Turtle Bay by continuing to support the mandatory principle.
Such temptation is to be resisted. Once the decision to get out of the Rhodesian imbroglio is taken, it must be unremittingly enforced. If that decision is taken as part of a general pursuit of realism in foreign policy, it is necessary, both in the interests of this country and in the interests of sensible international relations generally, to see it through. It is regrettable that Britain cannot order things in a humane way 10 Central Africa, and it is distressing that part of our heritage to Africa is so tin" tidy and potentially explosive. But no useful purpose is to be served by fretfl!,1 regret and the continuance of moralistic pretentiousness. In a hard and dangerous world this country must face the realities of the future with deter' mination and common sense.
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