Political Commentary
The Strange Case of Mr. Brown
By DAVID WATT
There were, however, two passages of signifi- cance in the dreary proceedings. One was the speech of Sir Frank Markham, who in ten minutes' attack on the Bill struck a chord which undoubtedly vibrated in the minds of very many Tories who trooped obediently into the Govern- ment division lobby. For he not only accused Mr. Heath of political stupidity in 'rocking the party boat' at a delicate period but, far more important, he claimed that Mr. Heath had committed the one really unforgivable Tory sin—he had broken the party rules. There had 'been no consultation with any of the usual consultative bodies of the party.' Mr. Heath had not come down to the back-bench 1922 Committee or to a special meeting of the Trade and Industry Committee. These are very serious charges by an old and reasonably re- spected party retainer like Markham against a man whose background is not that of the traditional Tory and who, as a former Chief Whip, has no excuse for not knowing the ropes. But they are the kind of charges that stick because they crystal- lise in an acceptable Tory cliche the vague feel- ings of dissatisfaction and annoyance felt on all sides with Mr. Heath's performance. In spite of Tuesday's vote, the Government will get its Act even before the election; but Mr. Heath himself has been severely mauled.
The other significant event of the debate was the acutely embarrassing failure of Mr. George Brown in his winding-up speech for the Opposi- tion. As the Deputy Leader meandered helplessly on, stumbling over words and repeating phrases and arguments, Mr. Wilson sank deeper and deeper into the green leather beside him as if he wished he could submerge entirely. Those near him in the House on Tuesday night, or imme- diately opposite him on the Tory side, said after- wards that Mr. Brown seemed to be a man on the edge of nervous and physical exhaustion. It would not be at all surprising if he were.
There are few things more fascinating to the bystander in contemporary politics than the strange case of Mr. Brown; seen from Mr. Wil- son's point of view few things can be more troublesome. It is no longer a question of political rivalry. Mr. Wilson has complete control of his Party and his deputy accepts this situation. Of those who supported Mr. Brown in the fight for the leadership some are completely reconciled to Wilson because he is making intelligent use of their services or because he appears to be effec- We. Others simply shrug off their dislike of the leader as the best they can see this side of an elec- tion. Others, especially among the trade unionists,
are still deeply distrustful of Wilson, but have been put off by Brown's erratic behaviour and outbursts of temperament. One doubts, in short, whether, if Wilson was quietly pushed into the Thames one dark night, Brown would inherit the title at all.
Moreover, if Labour wins, Mr. Brown's poli- tical position becomes even weaker. There is, under party rules, no elected deputy to the Prime Minister when Labour is in office. In early 1945 Mr. Arthur Greenwood was the elected Deputy Leader. After the general election that position passed effectively to Mr. Morrison simply on Mr. Attlee's say-so. Mr. Brown will therefore become simply one of Mr. Wilson's Ministers, and his seat on the National Executive of the whole Labour Party, which belongs to him by virtue of his office as elected Deputy Leader of the Party in Parliament, will simply disappear. There is therefore a distinct possibility that Mr. Brown will be queuing up for a gallery ticket at the next party conference while Mr. Anthony Greenwood, Mr. Tom Driberg and other notable architects of victory bask in the plaudits of the populace at the front of the platform. One can argue, of course, that the NEC doesn't amount to a row of beans during a period of Labour office—neither Bevin nor Cripps was a member of it—but Brown has relied considerably and consistently, since he has no union behind him, on having a hand on the party apparatus and the loss of this position would in any case be a blow to his prestige.
Yet if Brown's political support is on the wane his pretensions • to indispensability on other grounds continue to grow. As Chairman of the Policy Committee of the NEC he has a kind of overlordship of home policy-making and in this capacity he has had, in the last six months, to speak at big occasions on such widely diverse subjects as agriculture, land use, social security, the Post Office, science and education and resale price maintenance. He is also chairman of a de- fence policy steering committee and has had to make two major defences of Labour's nuclear policy. He has been expected to keep up relations with the Common Market and the European Socialists and to visit Paris, Strasbourg and Bonn as well as Washington. He has been deeply in- volved in discussion at the heart of Mr. Wilson's New Deal—the organisation of planning. On top of all this he has had, as Deputy Leader, a vast programme of representation, public speaking and engagements all over the country.
This is a killing load of work and responsibility and Wilson may well have doubts about it. It has obviously affected Brown's health (witness his visit to hospital at Christmas) and may do so again. In any case it gives great authority to a man Wilson still cannot really hit it off with. Nevertheless, Wilson has little choice for the time being. Brown is the only one of his front-bench colleagues who has the combination of sheer ability with width of experience and force of per- sonality (apart from Wilson himself) to do the job of co-ordinating party policy and projecting it as a coherent whole. Brown, moreover, is a natural 'Empire-builder.' His energies no less than his continuous fear of being done down impel him to grasp power wherever he sees it.
The question Mr. Wilson must be asking him- self is whether, after a summer election, this situation would or should alter. There are two main possibilities. Either Brown is given the single, key portfolio for which he hai hankered for so long—the new Ministry of Production; or alternatively he is given a less all-absorbing but still prestigious position such as the Home Office which could be combined with some trouble- shooting functions.
What seems absolutely vital is that the decision on what to do with Mr. Brown should be kept entirely separate from the decision on what to do with the Ministry of Planning. All through last summer the essential discussion raged about whether a new Ministry was necessary, what re- lation it should have to the Treasury and the Board of Trade and how much authority it should exercise over other departments. But because Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Brown were identified as the potential Ministers concerned, the whole debate was conducted on the level of personalities.
Since then, a certain air of sanity, though not perhaps amity, has returned, and much real work has been done on the basic problem. The Fabian Society, the NEC, the Transport House Research Department and a number of individuals and skittle groups have been at work. The detailed arguments which have flown back and forth can be discussed on another occasion. For the pre- sent purpose it is enough that the consensus of opinion seems in favour of a moderate solution. The new Minister should be responsible for in- dicative planning and physical planning both centrally and for the regions and will, without actually being an overlord, have considerable say in the programmes of individual Ministeries like Power, Transport, Housing, etc. On the other hand the Treasury will maintain control of short- term expenditure under the balance of payments which gives it in many situations the whip hand. The suggestion that the Board of Trade should be submerged seems to have been rejected and it will maintain most of its pre-Heath functions.
If this consensus is indeed accepted on economic grounds by Wilson then certain con- clusions about Brown's future may follow. The situation envisaged is one of tension and balance between Treasury and Planning Ministry. This will only work if one Minister does not com- pletely swamp the other and if Mr. Wilson him- self can maintain control. Mr. Brown would almost certainly upset his equilibrium and Mr. Wilson might therefore find him more useful and a less upsetting force in the trouble-shooting role. But unless some of the strain can be taken off Mr. Brown between now and the election he may not be much good for either.
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