With the Shah
Roger Stevens
Iran: Dictatorship and Development Fred Halliday (Penguin £1.50) A Pelican Original by a member of the editorial board of the New Left Review; a STOP PRESS label reading 'A Prophetic Account of a Torn Land'; what can this be but trendy, instant journalism? Do not be deceived. This is a remarkable, and in many respects an excellent, book. Though its appearance in December 1978 is almost miraculously timely, it is no pot-boiler but a carefully written, well-researched and deeply serious account of modern Iran. The author positively flaunts his hopes for 'building a truly just and democratic society in which the working class and its allies will play a leading role', but does not attempt to conceal the flaws and weaknesses of the left-wing opposition to the Shah, nor the ruthless treatment of the Iranian Left by Soviet Russia.
Despite his obvious and thoroughgoing dislike for the regime, Mr Halliday gives an account of its policies which is reasonably dispassionate and in some respects less withering than that of other recent and much more detached observers. He has many penetrating reflections on the economic front: the effect of land reform has been to extend capitalism and a degree of state control into the countryside; oil wealth has provided the state with an income which has enhanced its power, more especially since the state alone can distribute the wealth, and only through the state can industrial development be generated; the new industrial sector, designed primarily to produce . substitutes for imports, has not been able to keep pace with the vast growth of demand for imports, only produced 28 per cent of non-oil exports in 1974-5 and will be ill-equipped to earn substantial foreign exchange when oil exports dry up in the 1990s. Chapters on the working class and the opposition, drawing on personal contacts and first-hand knowledge, are particularly valuable in that they deal with subjects hitherto largely veiled from the public eye.
'It is probable', writes the author in his preface, 'that all of the Shah's Iranian opponents will find something in this work with which they disagree.' For someone like myself, therefore, to offer unstinted praise would be no doubt positively embarrassing. In this spirit I can offer some criticisms. The economic motivation for the Shah's policies .is, to my mind, much overstated: his basic aim has been to protect, and secure support for, the throne, not (as Mr Halliday seems sometimes to imply) to establish and strengthen capitalism in lranper se. Absurd claims have, of course, been made for the social and educational achievements of the regime, but they deserve a little better than to be dismissed as 'negligent'.
Scathing references to the philistine culture of the Pahlevis overlook the very genuine and sensitive interest in Islamic art and culture displayed by Queen Farah. The statement (p.193) that the Iranian development programme requires consistent political repression seems to be taken out of the air. It is neither amplified nor followed up, and is to some extent contradicted when, at the end, the author gives rein to some interesting reflections on measures of liberalisation which the Pahlevi regime might introduce and still remain intact arguably the most telling passage in the entire book. The American government is cast too easily and uncritically in the role of villain, and the reader needs, in this area, to beware of slippery slopes. Thus it is said (p.84) that 'no one has been able to prove that U.S. advisers have taught or participated in torture in these countries' (Brazil, Chile and Iran); and on p.90 we read of 'the investigation practices of SAVAK learnt from the FBI . . . '
There are, too, some interesting gaps. For all his experience and qualifications, Mr Halliday has to admit that he does not know the current attitude of the peasantry towards the regime. They were enthusiastic over land reform; they have had good reason to be disillusioned since. Yet, he records sadly, 'no outspoken hostility to the Iranian state from the peasantry has yet been heard.' The political devices used by the Shah to maintain control and create division among potential rivals, with all the basic lack of trust which this implies, are barely touched upon, so busy is the author making up his mind what kind of a dictatorship it is military, Bonapartist or Fascist. His account of the most startling aspect of the current scene, namely the opposition of the mullahs, is also inadequate. He implies that this only came to life in early 1978. I was told in early November 1977 that it had been building up for some time before that, though the ostensible target then was the government, not the Shah personally. To write off the Islamic backlash because it is reactionary, or on the ground that it is lacking in organisational form, as late as September 1978 (when the book went to press) seems unduly dismissive and makes me wonder if it is not Mr Halliday's left ear which is closest to the ground. Most people, however, will wish to read this stimulating and informative book not for details of emphasis nor to reconstruct history, but simply to find out what is going to happen in Iran. Mr Halliday's answer, with which I largely agree, is both ambiguous and depressing. Like any intelligent man, he hedges his bets: almost anything might happen. Almost any outcome is likely to be unstable. The ,regime might hold out, but, because of the massive demonstrations against it, has largely lost credibility; the bourgeoisie has been largely brought into being by the regime .and is incapable of creating a stable democratic government on ,its own; the Islamic opposition can organise protests but has not the capability (nor, I may add, the desire) to form a government; the radical opposition is hopelessly divided.
Mr Halliday is inclined to think a military dictatorship without the Shah the most likely outcome; he dislikes the idea, but thinks it might provide greater economic freedom than the present regime. I cannot share his optimism. It is the Shah alone who provides a rallying point for the military; there is no military tradition in Iran save in association with the monarch; without a throne the military would split into factions, and the unhappy country would find yet another route to civil war. In practical terms, then, my gloom is as dense as Mr Halliday's. My only relief is a sense of history, which he probably would not share. The Persian people have been in many tight corners before, and have shown remarkable powers of self-extrication. They will need to draw on these again in the coming months.
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