THE " NAVAL BASE" FALLACY.
[To TDB EDITOR. or TED "SrEcrAton."3 Six,—Public discussion of the state of international relations existing during a great part of last summer has taught us one or two things which we should do well to take to heart. Amongst these things is the demonstration of a widespread popular error as regards the strategic value of a naval base. It has been repeatedly asserted that the acquisition by a Continental maritime Power of a port on the Atlantic coast of North-West Africa—capable of being used as a naval base —would by itself be a serious menace to other maritime Powers. The fallacy contained in this assertion is due to a belief that the possession of a seaport which can be fortified and in which ships can lie secure constitutes an addition to naval force. The truth is that possession of a port—no matter how convenient, sheltered, and defensible—can never add to naval force except indirectly, and then only on conditions which would not be found anywhere on the African coast. A distant, " outlying " naval base has no strategic value unless its possessor's navy is strong enough to enable him to secure its communications. Doing that would depend on the strength of his navy and on that alone. So far from a distant naval base necessarily increasing that strength, it would probably— indeed, almost certainly—diminish it practically, because some part would have to be employed in defending the communica- tions. It is only in special circumstances that an outlying naval base, established and equipped in anticipation of war, can be of any strategic value to its possessor or can fail to be other than a nuisance to him when hostilities occur. One would hunt in vain for these circumstances from Cape Spartel
to the Orange River.—I am, Sir, &c., C. A. G. B.
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