BOOKS.
WAR ACCORDING TO CLATJSEWITZ.*
MAJOR-GENERAL PILCUER has been well inspired in preparing his very readable summary of the first volume of Clausewitz, On War, for the benefit of civilians as well as soldiers. The old Prussian General, who fought at Jena and at Waterloo, was one of the two great military writers on strategy whom the Napoleonic Wars produced. Like Jomini, his French rival, whom Napoleon described as " a poor soldier but a writer with some sane ideas about war," Clausewitz was for a time in the Russian service, and thus enlarged his experience. It is safe to say that on modem militarist Germany Clausewitz has had a far stronger influence than any other German author, not excepting Luther. We do well, therefore, to read him not merely for his sound general views on warfare, but also for the light which he throws on the working of the German military mind. The civilian reader who may hesitate, thus late in the day, to begin his military education may be reminded that President Lincoln, after McClellan's failure to invade Virginia, collected a great library of military books and pored night after night over the pages of Jomini and Clausewitz. As Colonel Henderson points out, Lincoln did not learn the art of war, but he learned the invalu- able lesson that " strategy, the art of manoeuvring armies, is an art in itself, an art which none may master by the light of nature, but to which, if he is to attain success, a man must serve a long apprenticeship." Lincoln ceased to trust in his own power of direct- ing military operations and moving armies here or there according to his uninstructed judgment. When he appointed Grant to the chief command in 1864, he said : " I neither ask nor desire to know anything of your plans. Take the responsibility and act, • War according to Clauscaritz. Edited, with Commentary, by Major-General T. D. Pitcher. London : Cassell and Co. [7e. ed. net'
and call on me for assistance." Lincoln's implicit confidence in his commander was rewarded a year later by complete victory.
We do not suppose that all civilians would be taught by Jomini or Clausewitz to respect the soldier in his own sphere of action, but we cannot help thinking that a little elementary knowledge of the principles of strategy, such as may be acquired from this book, would be of advantage to those who are set in authority over us, as well as to the ordinary citizen who tries to understand the daily bulletins.
Many old disciples of Clausewitz will doubtless be shocked to find that Major-General Filcher has dealt very freely with the classic treatise, not only condensing it but rewriting it in his own words. Yet it must be confessed that the old strategist had an execrable style, even for a German, and that his ponderous and oracular sentences have been the despair of many a British soldier since On War became a text-book. It is a relief, then, to have the principles of Clausewitz stated in a simple and intelligible form, with a few interpolated comments to relate those principles to the actual war. At the moment the section on " the combat which with its consequences, moral as well as physical, is tho decisive factor in war " has an all too vivid interest :— " Battles are the deciding factors in war, all other activities being merely its appendages. The object of a battle is the destruc- tion or conquest of the enemy, and in any particular combat the enemy is the armed force immediately opposed to us. . . . Now we maintain that in most combats, but particularly in great battles, the special object for which the battle is fought is of only secondary importance compared with the general object, which is the destruc- tion of the armed forces of the enemy, and that if the special object be achieved without accomplishing this destruction, the most important reason for the battle has been left unfulfilled. . . . Theorists of former times held very erroneous views on this matter, and considered that by following certain principles and by a small destruction of the enemy's forces at a vital point, so as to paralyse him, it was possible to achieve the main object without actual destruction of these forces."
Clausewitz goes on to point out that by " the destruction of the enemy's force " he means " a diminution of it relatively greater than that on our own side." He continues in a famous passage :-
" It is, however, not only in physical forces that the vanquished suffer, for the moral forces are also sure to be shaken, and in deciding whether it be feasible to continue the combat the commander has to take these moral forces into consideration. The comparative strength of the physical forces is, as a rule, difficult to estimate during a battle, but there are two things by which the moral forces can be gauged. These are loss of ground and the state of our reserves. The calls which we have made on these as compared with those which we have reason to believe the enemy to have made on his, in order to maintain the equilibrium, clearly demonstrate on which side the moral superiority lies. It must never be for- gotten that men who have been for a long time engaged are more or less like cinders which have burnt themselves out. Their ammunition as well as their physical and moral energy is in the process of becoming exhausted, and irrespective of their diminution in numbers they are of much less fighting value than they were at the beginning of the combat. Consequently the loss of moral force may be measured by the reserves which it has been found necessary to put into action. Lost ground and want of fresh reserves are, therefore, generally the principal causes which deter- mine a retreat, unless, indeed, this retreat be rendered necessary in other to conform to the movement of the rest of the army. Every combat is, therefore, a bloody and destructive trial of strength between the moral and physical forces ranged on each side. Who- ever at the close has the greater amount of both left is the conqueror. Defeat is generally attributable to a loss of moral force, and after a decision has been arrived at the moral forces reach a still lower ebb. A deterioration in morale is, therefore, the chief factor in the destruction of the enemy's fighting power, and this is the real object of the combat. By this means the spirit of the whole is broken."
Clausewitz then remarks that the only certain test of victory is afforded by the refusal of the defeated adversary to continue the contest. The casualty returns issued by either side are never exact, and, as we know from the boastful German despatches, " even the statement of the trophies captured is seldom to be abso- lutely relied on." The battles of the Marne and the Somme were thus true victories in the view of Clausewitz.
The strategist's remarks on the use of reserves are also most apposite :— " If a combat was not actually decided against us before rein- forcements arrived and put a new complexion on matters, the temporary disadvantage which occurred before the arrival of rein- forcements may be looked on merely as a phase in the battle."
Clausewitz recalls Frederick's experience at Kunersdorf in 1759, where his right wing at the first rush carried the Mithlberg with its seventy-two guns defending the Russian left, but the Prussian left wing failed against a tenacious enemy and the day ended in the worst defeat that Frederick ever had. It was the opinion of Clausewitz that the " final decision is mostly affected by the relative number of fresh reserves remaining at the last." Again, " the commander who carries to the farthest the principle of conducting the combat with the greatest economy of forces, and makes the most of the moral effect of strong reserves, goes the surest way to victory." That was Napoleon's way, and the maxim ought to be continually remembered now that we are told daily how the Germans attacked
this or that position in seemingly overwhelming numbers and were thrown back or checked. To use the fewest possible men to achieve a result is the mark of a great General, and Sir Douglas Haig has, we think, satisfied the test laid down by Clausewitz. The remark that " a battle on parallel fronts and without an action against the flank will seldom yield as great results as one in which the defeated army has been turned or has been compelled to change front " must have haunted the German Generals since this battle began, for the fronts remain parallel and the flank attacks have yielded no result. Clausewitz points out also that the reserves should, if possible, be used in a new direction instead of being gradually fed into the battle- line to support the exhausted troops—a pregnant observation on which we need not comment. We might go on quoting indefi- nitely, but we must content ourselves with one more very well known passage on the text that omelettes cannot be made without breaking eggs. After pouring contempt on the eighteenth-century " Brahmins " who tried to carry on war without bloodshed, and contrasting them with Napoleon, he says :- " Not only a correct conception of war, but also experience teaches us to expect great decisions only as the outcome of great battles. Even Napoleon would not have seen the day of Ulm, which was unique in its way, if he had shrunk from the idea of shedding blood. The capitulation of Mack's army is only to be regarded as a second crop resulting from the fear instilled by the victories gained by Napoleon in preceding campaigns. It is not only rash generals who have sought to complete their work by venturing to fight a decisive battle, but great and successful ones have also done so, and we may rest satisfied with their verdict on this important question. Let us never hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed. If slaughter be a horrible thing, that is a ground for thinking twice before we commit ourselves to war, but it is no reason for blunting our sword on account of feelings of humanity, for if we do so someone will step in with a sharp one and lop off our limbs."
The modern German Generals may have carried that principle to fantastic lengths, but they believe firmly in it, and will not be deterred by the most appalling losses from pursuing their aims so long as they have reserves available. Until the German reserves are finished, the battle will no doubt continue.
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