BOOKS.
THE FLEETS AT WAR.• Ma. HURn's book is a manual for any one who wants to have in a handy form the essential facts about the navies at war. But it is more. Mr. Hurd has given us a rapid summary of the naval events that preceded the outbreak of war, brief biographies of Sir John Jellicoe and of Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl (Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet), and some account of the German naval bases and of the Kiel Canal. The value of the canal, he thinks, may possibly be overrated, for reasons which he states. What the British Navy accomplished in the first few days of the war was so quiet and invisible a triumph that it would be easy to be partly blind to its significance. In the history of sea- power, as Mr. Hurd says, there is nothing comparable with the rapid strangulation of German shipping in all the seas There were more than two thousand German steamers of nearly five million tons gross afloat, and two thousand seven hundred sailing vessels. Some were captured, others ran for neutral ports, others were laid up in Germany—" the heart of the German mercantile navy suddenly stopped beating." Mr. Hurd wonders what the feelings of Herr Ballin, and the other pioneers of the notable marine expansion of Germany, must have been. The strategical advantages of Britain at sea, guard- ing as she does every approach to Germany from distant places, had never been grasped by the mass of Germans, nor by their statesmen. Shipowners bad some conception of the truth, but even they, in Mr. Hurd's opinion, did not foresee that German oversea trade would be brought to a standstill in less than a week. Then the system of State insurance checked panic among British merchants, although some German cruisers and armed merchantmen were still roaming the seas in search of British ships. Within a fortnight of the declaration of war the British Expeditionary Force had been transported across the Channel in perfect security, and— a fact which is so obvious that it is taken for granted and yet is extremely important—the seas were free for the unimpeded transport of troops from every part of the British Empire. In comparison with all this the German Navy has, of course, accomplished very little. It is no doubt wise for the German authorities not to risk a general engagement, at all events at present. The almost certain defeat of the German Navy would mean that it might lose the power which it now exerts to prevent Russian ships from using the Baltic, and from con- veying troops across the Baltic to some strategic point in a manner highly inconvenient to Germany. The German Commander-in-Chief probably has no thought, as things are, of dropping the bone in his mouth in order to seize that other bone which is reflected in the waters of the North Sea.
Mr. Hurd in setting forth a record highly creditable to the Navy goes too far in his hero-worship of Lord Fisher. Be implies that Lord Fisher rescued the Navy from decadence, that what has followed was all due to him—that the Navy of to-day is, so to speak, only good because it has been Fisherized. We do not for a moment admit this. Lord Fisher's policy has been reversed in some important respects, and even his chief gospel, embodied in the Dreadnoughts, is by no means accepted as necessary to naval salvation by many of the officers who now rightly enjoy Mr. Hurd's trust and admira- tion. Mr. Hurd talks of the Dreadnought era as the "rebuild- ing" of the British Fleet. This is a curious way of stating the facts that the Dreadnoughts, whether rightly or wrongly, set a new fashion to the world, and that it was the British Admiralty which by its own act rendered all its old building obsolete. After the launching of the 'Dreadnought ' nothing else counted by comparison, and Germany thus had a better chance than ever before of overtaking us in the naval race.
With considerable reserve in accepting Mr. Hurd's Homeric view of Lord Fisher's regime, we may now follow him in his • Mt Floats at War. By Archibald Hurd. (Daily Telegraph War Books.) London: hiodder and Stoughton. [Is. net.] interesting statement as to some of the incidents in the pro- gress which brought the Navy to its present state of admitted efficiency. In 1909, he says, when Mr. McKenna proposed his large building programme, he found a great part of the Cabinet arrayed against him. " Unknown to the nation," says Mr. Hurd, using italics, "the Admiralty resigned, and for a time the Navy had no superior authority. This dramatic act won the day." As to the rest of this episode of obtaining the eight Dreadnoughts, as well as the other ships demanded by the Admiralty in 1909, we must quote Mr. Hurd :— "Neither the Government nor the Admiralty was in a position to tell the country that, though all the ships were not to be laid down at once, they would all be laid down in regular rotation, in order that they might be ready in ample time to meet the situa- tion which was developing. Perhaps it was well in the circum- stances that this fact was not revealed. Public opinion became active. The whole patriotic sentiment of the country was roused, and the jingle was heard on a thousand platforms, 'We want eight and we won't wait.' The Admiralty, which had already deter- mined upon its policy, remained silent and refused to hasten the construction of the ships. Quietly, but firmly, the Board resisted pressure, realizing that it, and it only, was in possession of all the facts. Secrecy is the basis of peace as well as war strategy. The naval authorities were unable to defend themselves by announcing that they were on the eve of obtaining a powerful weapon which could not be ready for the ships if they were laid down at once. By waiting the Navy was to gain the most powerful gun in the world. In order to keep pace with progress in Germany, it was necessary to lay down two of the eight ships in July, and be satisfied with the 12-inch guns (projectile of 850 lbs.) for these units. The construction of the other six vessels was post- poned in order that they might receive the new 13.5- inch gun, with a projectile of about 1,4000 lbs. Two of the Dreadnoughts were begun at Portsmouth and Devonport Dockyards in the following November, and the contracts for the remaining four were not placed until the spring, for the simple reason that the delivery of the new guns and mountings and their equipment could not be secured for the vessels, even if the hulls were started without a moment's delay. Thus we obtained six battleships which are still unique; in no other Navy is so powerful a gun to be found to-day as the British 13.5-inch weapon."
A very important point in the preparations for the war that was ultimately to be forced upon us was the creation of what is known as the War-Book. The nature of this compilation deserves to be much better known than it is by the mass of Englishmen. The War-Book has been invaluable in helping the Empire to leap to war with unexampled promptitude. On July 25th, 1912, Mr. Asquith lifted a corner of the veil that hides the deliberations of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He stated that the Committee had appointed " a sub-com- mittee for the co-ordination of departmental action at the outbreak of war," and continued as follows:-
" This sub-committee, which is composed of the principal officials of the various Departments of State, has, after many months of continuous labour, compiled a War-Book. We call it a War-Book—and it is a book which definitely assigns to each Department—not merely the War Office and the Admiralty, but the Home Office, the Board of Trade, and every Department of the State—its responsibility for action under every head of war policy. The Departments themselves, in pursuance of the instructions given by the War-Book, have drafted all the proclamations, Orders in Council, letters, telegrams, notices, and so forth, which can be foreseen. Every possible provision has been made to avoid delay in setting in force the machinery in the unhappy event of war taking place. It has been thought necessary to make this Com- mittee permanent, in order that these war arrangements may be constantly kept up to date."
At the end of last July, when war had become almost inevit- able, the War-Book was opened, and from eleven Departments proclamations, Orders in Council, letters, telegrams, and notices flowed forth to every part of the Empire.
Sir John Jellicoe and his Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral Charles Madden, are in complete accord as to strategy and tactics. " They were members," says Mr. Hurd, " of the famous Dreadnought Design Committee, and were associated with Lord Fisher in his many reforms in naval administra- tion." Sir John Jellicoe was born in 1859, the son of Captain J. H. Jellicoe, whose death, we are sorry to record, has taken place this week. He entered the Navy in 1872, and passed out of the Britannia' first by over a hundred marks. Six years later, in his examination for Sub-Lieutenant, he took three "firsts "—an unusual achievement. After serving in the Egyptian War, he won the £80 prize for Gunnery Lieutenants at Greenwich. In 1886 he was awarded the Board of Trade silver medal for taking a gig to the rescue of a stranded ship near Gibraltar. The boat was capsized in the heavy sea, but he and his crew were washed ashore. As every one knows, be was in the ' Victoria' when she was rammed by the
Camperdown,' and was washed off the deck where he and other sick men had been brought from below. In the Boxer Rebellion he commanded the Naval Brigade and received a severe gunshot wound. Some of Admiral Jellicoe's best work was done when he was Director of Naval Ordnance. The present methods of fire control owe much to his initiative and enthusiasm.
Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl was born in 1857, and entered the German Navy when he was seventeen. In those days the German Navy had little prestige, and the young " bloods " were all attracted to the Army. Even now there are few officers in the Navy who are hereditary nobles. Admiral von Ingenohl was ennobled by the present Emperor. At one time he commanded the Imperial yacht Hohenzollern.' He was appointed to his present position eighteen months ago. He is said to have specialized in cruiser tactics, and to have urged upon the Navy Department the need to build battle cruisers after the British Admiralty had launched the ' Invin- cible.' He is the chief advocate of the system of tactics known as the "riicksichtslose Offensive," which means going for the enemy hammer and tongs. The teaching of this school does not by any means preclude a preliminary period of trying to wear down the enemy by "mosquito warfare." It only means that when a battle is actually engaged a sort of Berserker rage is the right method. The momentum with which the German Army throws its weight at the chosen spot is no doubt taken to be an analogy and an encouragement-
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