THE FRANCO-TURKISH AGREEMENT.
ON each occasion when there has been a serious diverg- ence of policy between France and Great Britain, a divergence which seemed to threaten the very existence of the Entente, we remarked that to compose the immediate misunderstanding would be of little use unless there were a settlement of the profound differences of principle. Unfortunately, our statesmen having patched up each disagreement by some convenient expedient, told us that the Entente was restored, and that the two nations could never fall asunder again. Once more there is a serious rift, and it matters more than any of the others, because it affects more general principles. The whole basis of peace as offered to a grateful, or ungrateful, world by the Allies is that the Allies must act in unison. If they do not the Treaty of Versailles might just as well be torn up. United action really covers everything else, because if the Allies act as a whole they cannot be false to any of the excellent objects of the Treaty of Versailles such as the guaranteed independence of the new nations and the trusteeship of mandate territories. When France took military action on the Rhine on her own responsibility, without consulting her Allies, and again when she con- nived at the Polish insurrection in Upper Silesia, she indeed did violence to essential principles, but she did not damage so many as are now affected by the separate agreement which the French representative, M. Franklin Bouillon, has made with the rebel Turkish Government at Angora. Of course, as happens in all unfortunate incidents of this kind, there is something to be said on both sides. The French can undoubtedly offer some apparently reasonable pleas for what they have done, and the strength of those pleas depends, to a considerable degree, upon the mistakes of our own Government. But for the moment let us look at the matter as though there were no necessity to make excuses for the French, and as though the British Government had done nothing foolish. Let us look at it strictly in the light of the Treaty of Versailles and in the light of the Allied policy which was expressed in the still unratified Treaty of Sevres. To begin with, France has recognised the Government of Mustapha Kemal at Angora, whereas Britain, France and Italy had hitherto agreed, as part of the plan for maintaining the neutrality of the Straits, to recognize the Sultan and his ministers at Constantinople as the true Turkish Government. Then, Prance has undertaken to give away, or rather to sell, sane of the Cilician and Syrian territory which she does not actually possess, but for which she is only a mandatory Power. The protection of Christian minorities in Asia Minor apparently goes by the board. The Kemalist Turks receive the right to transport troops over the Bagdad railway virtually up to the Mesopotamian frontier. This transaction might make the Turks possessors for all prac- tical purposes of the railway. In return for territory which she cedes to Turkey, France is to receive various commercial, mining, and river rights. Everybody knows• that what with the constant incursions of the Kemalist Turks, and the heavy expenditure on her military commitments, France has been pressed to the break- ing point. No wonder she wants to purchase tranquillity by what seems to her a reasonable deal. Nobody can blame her for looking out for her own interests, but we cannot refrain from blame when we see how seriously she has shaken the Treaty of Versailles by acting without the knowledge and consent of the Allies. Frenclunen them- selves, however, retort that she has not thus acted. They remind us that when the Kemalist envoy, Bekir Sami Bev, visited London, the British Government by receiving him consented, in effect, to recognize the Government of Angora. They also say that the agreement between Bekir Sami Bey and France, drawn up at that time, was very little different in essence from the Franklin Bouillon agreement, and that they cannot understand why the British Government did not object to the first agreement, the terms of which were communicated to them in July. The answer is. that the British Government understood that France would not sign any compact with the Angora Government which dealt with matters outside economic concessions, the frontier of Cilieia, and the question of prisoners. The Franklin Bouillon agreement is really a treaty on a considerable scale, and incidentally it violates the pledges exchanged between the Allies early in the War that no Ally would make an independent peace treaty, with any enemy country. Those pledges still hold good, though most people seem to have forgotten them, because technically we are still at war with Turkey as no general treaty has been signed. Britain has a special reason, though we do not wish to dwell upon it, for feeling rather sore at the Syrian mandate being treated in a spirit which is certainly not that of a trustee, because they were British and Arab troops who conquered Syria. Yet now we see a possible danger to our own mandate territory of • Meso- potamia appearing in the use which the Turks may make of part of the country which the British and Arabs fought for. We have Already referred to the British .share of the blame for French action. In our opinion Mr. Lloyd George made a very bad mistake when, in his headstrong way, he pinned his faith to King Constantine. The favours which he poured upon M. Venizelos were reasonable, because M. Venizelos was a very strong man and a very wise one. But that is not at all true of King Constantine, and we now find that the situation as between Greece and Turkey, instead of settling. itself by force of arms; has become more involved and more dubious than ever. The French always disliked this gamble upon the military prowess of the Greeks, and they now, not unnaturally, argue as though their interests had been betrayed by Great Britain. They have also other grievances which, though they seem to us imaginary, are, no doubt, quite sincerely entertained in France. Such are the ideas that Great Britain supported Feisal deliberately to the detriment of France, and that Britain takes independent action when it suits her own interests but denounces it when it is taken by anybody else. Let us give all the weight they deserve to these considerations. But when all has been taken into account, we are bound to say that what has happened is very distressing. There is little hope for the Entente becoming an instrument of justice and peace unless it can be conducted within the four corners of the Treaty of Versailles. We shall do no more than mention the particular difficulty which has been created for Britain herself by the French action. It is obvious that by resisting French action we shall be thrown into the position of seeming to act against Moslem interests. In India we are already being abused as an anti-Islamic power. This is no light matter. But we hope that the appeal to France will be based, not on what might be interpreted, however wrongly, as a partizan plea, but on the primary necessity of observing both in the spirit and the letter the Treaty which binds all the Allies and makes them sponsors for the general peace.
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