Mr Heath and the Conservative party
A SENIOR CONSERVATIVE `1 will not be a Peel to split the Conser- vative party', said Arthur Balfour, and Bald- win repeated his words years later, with equal point. They both gave expression to the instinct for survival which runs so Powerfully in the Conservative party, an instinct that, fortunately, has often coincided with the interests of the country; but which, In one way or another, has procured more than an even share of power for those who Possess it. On Europe, Mr Heath appears to have forgotten the instinct. He seems to have forgotten, too, that the great author- ity allowed a Tory leader is subject to severely limiting conditions, and that these can be, and often have been. enforced. Nor is Eur- ope a case in which the Leader is confronted merely by a band of sentimentalist die- hards: for not only are the reasons for °goosing entry good in themselves, but it can be shown that Mr Heath's stance is against the long-term interests of the party —against its prospects of success, if not of survival.
This is not an argument addressed to pro- Marketeers, or anti-Marketeers, inflamed by Philosophical or nationalist ideals: it is an argument to Conservatives. It is an argu- ment about the cost of entry into the EEC, not to the country, but to the party—though the latter inevitably involves the former.
Apart from the inexplicable fanaticism of the true 'European', the arguments in favour of joining the EEC have for more than a year now been only two: defence and economic growth. Better defence against Russia as a consequence of joining the Market in the event of American withdrawal from Europe looked, at one time, a good pro-European card, and one which would meet with a measure of Tory appeal. But, as the Euro- sceptic Chiefs of Starr, and Lords Carring- ton and Balniel, equally sceptical, saw, play- ing it meant assuming that a larger EEC Would have more power to raise forces than the individual states in concert; would, that is to say, very quickly, become a state itself : so that, to use the defence argument, other than vaguely, involved raising the issue of supra-nationalism which, for party rea- sons that will be explained, was taboo. Secondly, there was the argument from economic growth. Since the publication of the Labour White Paper on the EEC in Feb- ruary 1970 it was—as Mr George Thom- son shows in the current issue of Diplomat's 141°4d—impossible to show in detail that entry would bring any certain and substan- tial economic advantages for the man in the street, so variable were the permutations and assessments involved. Growth, how- ever, was the panacea argument stressed by politicians who were unwilling to risk the generalised alternative—that there was no economic, and only a political, case for entry intia the EEC. As such, growth was .rnPhasised by the unenthusiastic Mr Maud- ling in the debate on the White Paper. The great growth gamble was superficially attractive because of the contrast in recent years between EEC success in this field and Britain's own failure—though the big EEC boom is now probably ending. However, the major reason for EPC success in the ..growth stakes was a large-scale redeploy.
ment of labour from agriculture to industry —and Italy, with the greatest resources for such redeployment, has had the most spec- tacular growth. Britain, of course, has no significant human resources to redeploy from agriculture or anywhere else. Consequently, the redeployment—in pursuit of a probably illusory goal—can take place only from a very large-scale pool of unemployment. Even if only short-term—two or three years, and in all probability it would be five or six— such a development, on top of current un- employment, would rupture, perhaps for a generation or more, the electorally vital alliance between the Conservative party and the support it has amongst working classes.
Without substantial working class sup- port, the Tories cannot be the national, and governing, party. Their hope for recovery from their present trough of unpopularity lies in two possibilities: first. that their radical policies will end the economic crisis; second, that the public will quickly forget Labour's slogan that the Government is de- liberately putting up prices. By driving on into Europe, however, the Tories will give substance to Labour charges, by providing plausible reasons—plausible to anybody who watches their Leader's enthusiasm for the EEC—why they should be thought to be deliberately increasing prices and deliber- ately creating unemployment. Already, new and radical Tory policies—the Value-Added Tax for example—cause disquiet: once Britain has joined the EEC the VAT will be levied on British food, as it will not be if she stays out, and unemployment will almost certainly grow. For the first time this cen- tury, there will be real substance to the accusation of a Tory conspiracy against the working man. Already, Mr Wilson is justify- ing the respect Tories used to accord him for political acumen, by taking steps to link his reservations about Europe with doubts about the whole structure of Heath Tory- ism. He may yet be able to say, '1 told you so': and there are Tories who, re- membering the criticism lavished on Mr Wilson for fighting a safety-first campaign last year, wonder whether his critics have not already been confounded.
In such circumstances. the present mood of the electorate is not of fundamental im- portance. Even if it could be brought, by a blitz campaign, to support entry, its known volatility would cause a sharp nervous re- verse when the consequences of entry were actually experienced. And the consequences, at'a time when long-term demographic fac- tors are working in favour of Labour, could be extremely damaging for the Tory party.
The substantial body of Conservative backbenchers who are opposed to entry have failed to press these arguments for, psychologically, very interesting reasons. To them, the fundamental question has appeared to be between integrating Britain in a West- ern European State and continued existence outside that state, with whatever measure of independent power newly devised policies can procure. But, though they have spoken out against the dangers of federalism. they have stopped short of attacking Mr Heath, whose contradictions on this subject have been numerous and staggering. and whose beliefs are the linchpin of the European cause. The reticence and reluctance of the anti-Marketeers have been the result, not merely of natural Conservative veneration for their leader, but also of the fear that a challenge on this central issue would pro- voke a wilful and powerful personal re- action from the Prime Minister. It has seemed necessary, therefore, for Mr Heath's opponents to proceed by stealth, to tell Mr Pym and Mr Whitelaw that they will go into the last ditch where they will be sufficient in number to break the government maj- ority, leaving it to those good party men to persuade or cajole the Prime Minister into behaving himself.
The fact of the matter is, however, that, as everyone close to him knows, Mr Heath's object is an integrated Western European state: and that the reason why he has been so contradictory on the subject of sover- eignty is that he finds the conception of sovereignty, literally, meaningless. Every- body knows, too, that the Marketeering young Tories near him believe fundamentally in that integrated state. and believe, too, that the issue is of such consequence that it would be quite wrong to allow the people, or public opinion, to hinder the policy. Like the Prime Minister, these men are unrespon- sive to party. This may be because, like Mr Heath himself, the young Turks who made him leader, abandoning the old styles of Toryism. have abandoned also the maxims on which old Toryism built its power and that, being in some cases not long from the working classes themselves, they are less inhibited than their predecessors in their treatment of those classes.
Unwilling, in view of Mr Heath's position, to make 'sovereignty' a major issue, the Conservative anti-Marketeers could not agree on what terms to oppose: no sooner —they feared—had they fixed a sticking point than the Government would negotiate around it at Brussels and leave them high and dry; and this may yet happen over New Zealand. It might, in these circumstances, have been wiser to stick to what they saw as fundamental. Now they are embarrassed by the evident determination of the Prime Minister to force them to choose between entry into Europe and the survival of a Con- servative government.
Of course, in that case, they must be prepared to bring down the Government and let the Labour party, if it wishes, bear the burden of entry into the EEC. and the elec- toral consequences. That, however, is not. in fact, the choice. There is no reason why a Conservative government—a government of the party that survived Suez—cannot go on without Mr Heath, if he cannot be per- suaded to back away from his European adventure. Only the mesmeric authority over his Cabinet which he has enjoyed since the election has encouraged belief to the con- trary. And it was the great significance of the week following the Paris summit that the first small crack appeared in his authority. It is now probable that Parliament will not be asked to take a final decision on EEC membership in July. This is not because Mr Heath intends a public debate: he is deter- mined that no debate on the essentials— sovereignty and party survival—will take place. because he fears that he would lose it. It is because the Cabinet were shocked by the arrogance of his behaviour after the summit and, in particular by his rudeness to the chairman of the 1922 Committee in reply to questions following his Commons state- ment. His behaviour aroused the scepticism of all but three members of his Cabinet
about the consequences of the European affair, with the result that, surprised by the manner of his colleagues, Mr Heath was willing, grumbling and gruff, to make obeisances to the myth of public debate at the Cabinet meeting following his statement.
This grudging concession may be his sal- vation as Prime Minister. It was in stark contrast to his enthusiastic arrogance in the Commons, in Paris, and speaking to Con- servative women before the summit, which arrogance startled his colleagues into the realisation that he did put his ideals before his party.
The Conservative party would miss Mr Heath's exceptional talents, but it can well survive without him, And, if he cannot be persuaded, it will survive only without him. If he cannot be persuaded, he must be com- pelled, at the decisive moment, by some Cabinet member with more profound in- stincts than his own. Already, his behaviour, and the Cabinet's taste of blood, has encour- aged speculation, and they are both, there- fore, vital links in the chain of events.
He who kills the king cannot, in all prob- ability, be king himself, and it may be that the king-killer will act only if he is sure that there can be no suspicion that he wants to be king. In any event, without appor- tioning roles, we can point to some crucial men. There is Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who was described by the nines in 1963, when he saved Mr Heath from disaster on Retail Price Maintenance, as perhaps the most power and party conscious of Conservative leaders this century. He may have reason to be bored with his role of the last few years, of always acting as Mr Heath's long-stop. There is Mr Whitelaw, who knows his party and its interests better than any other man. Or, since what is needed is to galvanise the sentiment of the Tory party to an awareness of its interest and its danger; the voice of the king-maker could come from the outside. Lord Avon's sentiments are known, and he could still speak out for what he believed in 1962. And there are others.
Whatever has happened in the past, the hour of decision is now approaching and the terms on which that decision will have to be taken have been made only too clear by the Prime Minister himself. Mr Pym, Mr Whitelaw and Lord Carrington may still make Mr Heath see reason. If they fail, anti-Marketeer backbenchers must wait in their ditches for a king-maker—and be pre- pared to act without one.
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