A TRUCE IN KOREA
0 NE of the most serious casualties of the cold war has been the practice of constructive, as opposed to defensive, diplomacy. The western world has become so absorbed in maintaining a stalemate in the balance of power and along its frontiers with the East that, when faced with a positive change for the good at one point, it is left incredulous and hesitant. A war has been fought and a truce is in sight in Korea. The war itelf has not resulted in decisive victory for either side. It has, in fact, produced yet another stalemate. But both sides are now committed to attempting " a peaceful settlement of the Korean question " in a political conference. And both sides are out of practice in " settling " any questions whatsoever. This, the fact that it heralds the first real exercise in settlement to be undertaken between East and West, is the wide significance of a truce in Korea. It dominates, and must be allowed to dominate, all the contingent problems— whether Communist China shall join the United Nations, whether the United States will recognise the government of Mao Tse-tung, what will be the future of Formosa and Indo- China. For, if Peking shows itself ready for a settlement, and if the West shows that it still knows how to approach a settlement, on the purely local issue, then all the other issues between the opposing powers and between the allies themselves will look entirely different. They may become soluble; at the moment they are insoluble, and if there is no settlement in Korea they will remain so.
How, in what order and with what objectives are the United Nations to negotiate with the Communists on the principles for which they went to war and, how are they going to conduct the details of the truce which may now suspend that war ? Within seventy-three hours of signature, both sides have to withdraw from a demilitarised zone stretching a few miles each way from the agreed demarcation line. This, for all practical purposes will be the line of the present fighting. Subject to this, and subject to an undertaking not to reinforce their existing strengths, Chinese and United Nations troops will remain in North and South Korea respectively until the outcome of the political conference is known. A military armistice commission, comprising officers from both sides, is to see that there is no violation of the cease-fire or of the demilitarised zone, reporting any breach to their commanders in the field. A supervisory commission of neutral nations (Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia) will enforce the prohibition on reinforce- ments. Then there are the prisoners of war; all those who want to go home are to be released by a repatriation commission of neutral nations (the same four neutrals and India), the commis- sion being served by Indian troops and by officers from all five countries. It will also have to supervise the re-indoctrinators who will be sent by both sides, throughout the truce, to those prisoners who do not now want to go home. At some point before the conference, a report will have to be made to the United Nations in New York, which remains the absentee sponsor of the South Korean cause. The report may merely state the end of hostilities. It may require, or provoke, a debate in the Security Council or the General Assembly, in the course of which the United Nations decides to appoint its own representatives to the political conference or anticipates some of the issues there to be discussed. In practice, the less discussed in New York, the better. But that is not a matter entirely within the control of the allies, and it remains one of the possible slips that lie between the signature of a truce and the opening of a conference.
There are, of course, others. In the first place, whatever the United Nations does in New York, its representatives to the conference have to be chosen somehow. Shall they represent all the nations now fighting in Korea ? Who shall lead them and where shall their instructions come from ? Secondly, with whom are the United Nations going to negotiate ? Just with the North Koreans ? But North Korea is impotent. With Communist China ? But its existence is passionately denied by many of the nations concerned. And can any settlement in the Far East be made in the absence of Soviet Russia 1 In the third and most important place, there is President Syngman Rhee. The South Korean leader could, if he wanted to, breach a truce in a number of ways. He controls two- thirds of the fighting strength within the United Nations command. It is declared American policy that that proportion should increase. And, whether he agrees to recognise an armistice and take part in a conference or not, the fact will remain that Mr. Rhee believes Korea should and can be united under his regime. It is true that his wings would be clipped if the United States were to cut off his supplies. But this would in turn leave the Americans badly bedraggled. Apart from the moral effect of the great power blackmailing the small, there is the hard truth that to disarm the South Koreans would be to leave South Korea open for a Communist walk-over. That would mean new fighting just as certainly as would a breach of the truce by Mr. Rhee.
So the two Presidents have each others' interests in their power, and they will, no doubt, have to strike a substantial bargain. Part of that bargain may already have been made The American President appears to have offered a defense guarantee and continued economic aid in return for South Korea's acceptance of a truce. But Mr. Rhee and the South Korean assembly are still demanding, in public, a drive to the Manchurian border and an end to the present stalemate. Further- more, Mr. Eisenhower included in his offer the statement that " the United States will not renounce its efforts to effect by all peaceful means the unification of Korea." Thus, ever if Mr. Rhee accepts the American guarantee as the price of his silence during the ninety days between truce and conference, it will still remain to be seen whether he will accept any political settlement that fails to provide for a united Korea and how fa' there is any further scope for influencing his reactions.
This, then, is the first and the central problem of the political negotiations. Can a " settlement of the Korean question " be reached, which is acceptable to all participants on both sides ? Assuming that Mao Tse-tung will sign a truce because he wants a peace, it is possible that he would accept some settle• ment based on the present division and falling short of a united Korea. For he must realise, as well as anyone, that unification would imply and could only follow from decisive victory of one side or the other. But even that ignores the unknown factor of Moscow's policy in the matter, and of how far Moscow can impose its policy on Peking. On the other hand, the American Administration have been equally reticent about their minimum, as opposed to their optimum, objectives. They have Mr. Rhee and the China Lobby barking in harmony if not in unison, at their heels. The Lobby and, perhaps, even more influential people in the United States believe that continued war is less dangerous than a peace which leave! Communist China with influence south of the Yalu river. Time, and it may be a great deal of time, alone can tell whether there is here the makings of a settlement for Korea. One thing only is beginning to be clear; unless and until such a settlement does appear to be possible, nothing else in the Far East will or can be settled. Mr. St. Laurent pointed the way round the vast obstacles which now obliterate the prospects of a wider settlement when he said that when he was satisfied that China was acting in accordance with the United Nations Charter, then he would favour recognition. Sir Winston Churchill himself remarked, on Tuesday, that "all this could have been settled many months ago if the Chinese government . had desired to bring these matters to a conclusion." For the moment, that is that should be said—in public. In private, the time has come Britain and America not merely. to agree to differ, but to reach agreernent on their policy in the Far East.
The United Nations is not bound to discuss anything but Korea at the forthcoming conference. But, if it is reasonable for it to demand proof of Communist China's peaceful inten- tions before recognising China's Communist government, it is just as reasonable that China should demand a tettlement in Korea to be followed by recognition of its existence and of the problems, such as Formosa, created by its existence. In negotiation, the West cannot allow the one to be made the quid pro quo for the other. Korea must come first. But if they go to the conference table without being agreed on the logical 'consequences of success, they will be directly responsible for failure.
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