In the Vienna Woods
For his European frontiers, on the other hand, Mr. Malenkov has a different recipe. One moment he refuses to discuss an Austrian treaty. The next, by allowing free access to the Soviet zone, by granting some measure of autonomy within the zone to the Austrian Government, and by proposing to send a civilian Ambassador to Vienna, he draws applause even from the profoundly sceptical Cabinet of Dr. Gruber. There are various possible interpretations. It is just possible that Mr. Malenkov is working round to concessions cif substance but does not 'wish to make them at the point of President Eisen- hower's gun; therefore, he rejects the " test " of a four-power conference on Austria, but proceeds, by degrees, to a de facto settlement. Outside the Kremlin, nobody can know whether this or any other hypothesis is nearest the truth. But for practical purposes, the West should probably assume, as the Austrian Government appears already to have done, that Mr. Malenkov is feeling his way; and they too must feel their way, rather than declare it in advance. In this game of cat-and- mouse diplomacy, it is facts, rather than intentions, that must determine policy. Since Moscow refused to submit its good faith to a test at a conference on an Austrian peace treaty, the West must for the present maintain its assumption that the tension in Europe is to continue. But since Moscow has chosen, for whatever reason, to modify its control on the Soviet zone of Austria, the West must, by the same token, still entertain the possibility of a relaxation of tension at some future date. Here, in fact, is one more proof that the Bermuda meeting must prepare an essentially fluid programme for its dealings with the Kremlin. Mr. Malenkov will not be bullied into making concessions by the mere demand for them. If he comes to see that they are in his interests, the West must be ready to recognise them wherever and whenever they appear. If he does not, they must still be ready for an indefinite extension of the cold war.