FRANCE AND CHINA.
THE renewal of the struggle between France and China is an unmixed misfortune for all concerned. Nobody can be the better for it, and a large section of the human race will probably be much the worse. France, to begin with, can gain nothing. She has Tonquin already, and even if the Chinese Government yielded at once, she would only have Tonquin. She does not want a million or two, and she will obtain no more in cash ; while Hainan or Formosa, if she occupies either, will bring her no advantage. The Indo-Chinese, especially in the Deltas, are controllable, and as we see in British Bur- mah, when sensibly governed, give little trouble; but owing to the Chinese habit of secret combination, and the incurable Chinese pride, the difficulty to Europeans of governing Chinese provinces is excessive, while the profit to be extracted from regions so thickly populated and so minutely divided is almost nil. France would profit much more by a careful settlement of Anam and Cambodia, than by any possible acquisition on the Chinese coast, in securing which, moreover, she must run serious risks. She may, if she threatens Canton, gravely irritate an important section of English opinion ; while it is always possible that the Chinese Government may make up its mind to fight hard. In that event, the method adopted will be a slow but determined defence of Tonquin ; and the French will find themselves com- pelled either to march to Pekin,—that is, to fight a long cam- paign with fifty thousand men, or to employ nearly the same number in driving back the half-disciplined but numberless militia, who will swarm over the frontier into Tonquin. The loss to France on any supposition must be great, and without any compensation which, even from the French point of view, will be sufficient.
On the other hand, the injury to China will be most serious. If the Government of Pekin yields without a blow, its prestige will be rudely shaken, and the authority of the Emperor diminished, in every province of an Empire where that authority, bad as it is, is almost the only check upon system- atic tyranny and corruption. Experience shows that all power lost by the Court of Pekin falls into the hands of the Mandarins, who are intent chiefly on making fortunes, and who govern with a cruelty which provokes insur- rections, always in the end put down by remorseless massacres. The militia are let loose, whole districts are given up to plunder, and in provinces studded with cities and populated by millions of quiet, semi-civilised, and most industrious persons, civilisation perceptibly re- cedes. If, again, the Court fights hard and is beaten in open battle, insurgent chiefs, who are little better than brigands, appear all over the land, destroy the prosperity of province after province, and at last disappear, having changed nothing for the better. The Taeping Rebellion was the consequence of the first great Chinese defeat in 1842, and pro- bably inflicted more direct misery on a larger number of human beings than any insurrection which ever occurred in the-history of mankind. No massacres in the history of the world approach those ordered and carried out by the Taeping leaders, who deliberately destroyed entire cities, and, but for General Gordon, might have reduced China comparatively to a desert. The prosperity of the Empire is but just recovering from that huge catastrophe, which, if France reaches Pekin, may be re- peated, on a still larger scale, and aggravated by a final struggle between the Chinese millions and the Mongol tribes, who, in the last resort, will slaughter their feebler opponents with- out mercy. The civilisation of China may be rotten, indeed is rotten, but still it secures peace to three hundred millions of people, among whom, owing to the conditions of their existence, anarchy is always accompanied or followed by famine. The over-population is so great, and its pressure upon the food supply so intense, that one year's interruption to the labours of an agriculture singularly dependant upon artificial irrigation, involves the destruction of millions by starvation. No calamity not directly threatening the civilised portion of Europe could increase the mass of human misery so directly as any severe defeat inflicted on Pekin unquestionably will. While, however, we are keenly alive to the evil results of the struggle, we see little hope of averting it. The French, who are satisfied that the Chinese will not fight in any dangerous way, are eager for a war with limited liability, and the Depu- ties cheer every sentence in which M. Ferry promises to exact an adequate reparation. M. Ferry is now so pledged that if he drew back he would lose his hold upon the Chamber, and has obviously no intention of making matters easy for the Chinese. As to any interference by England, we have causes enough of quarrel with France already, and China has placed herself unequivocally in the wrong. On the other hand, obscure as the politics of Pekin may be, it seems impossible that men accustomed to affairs should have broken the Treaty of Tientsin without an intention of defying France. That they broke it is abundantly clear, since Captain Fournier brought home its text, and the written assent of the Emperor to its provisions ; and the excuses offered show that the breach was deliberate and defiant. The war party, of course, may fall under an attack from Li-Hung-Chang ; but if they do not, they must • accept war, whatever the consequences may be. Indeed, it is difficult to perceive how, even if the war party does fall, Li could pay ten millions or half ten millions as a fine, or con- sent instead to the occupation of Hainan or Canton, without irritating Chinese pride to an extent fatal to his own power, and to the authority of the Empress. The Chinese still believe their Empire invincible ; and if it is defeated, or yields without fighting to demands for money, they will assign the blame, firstly, to Li ; secondly, to the governing juntas in Pekin ; and, lastly, to the dynasty which, in ceasing to protect the Empire, loses its raison d'être. It is useless for any Englishman to affect to predict the course of events in Pekin ; but if calculation on such a subject is worth anything, the war party, backed by General Tao, who has never been defeated, will this time defy France and take the consequences, even if they involve the step recommended by General Gordon,—the removal of the capital. France cannot penetrate into the far interior, and the Chinese statesmen endure attacks upon any city, except Pekin, with patient equanimity. The French talk, it is said, of making Macao their base, but they might almost as well talk of making a base of Hanoi. The life of the Chinese Empire centres in the capital, and unless the French can menace that or starve that—which is possible, we believe, if the grain fleets can be cut off—the ruling class will feel nothing, and may fight on for years. The whole affair is a most melancholy one, though this time the civilised Power is not to blame. It is impossible to expect France to endure such an attack upon her troops, or to censure her for insisting that such treachery shall be made expensive and inconvenient.
Previous page
