BOOKS.

CREASY'S DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WORLD.* BATTLES, said Napoleon, are great things ; empires lie beyond them. The remark indicated the ambitious conqueror. More than empires sometimes lie beyond them—it may be the destinies of the human race. Had Hannibal succeeded in overthrowing Rome, the whole character of the world would probably have been changed; had the Saracens defeated Charles Martel at Tours, the character of modern Europe would have been other than what it is. We speak less decidedly than is usual upon this theme, because it is much easier to predicate upon positives than negatives. We can trace the effects of Alexander's conquests in Asia, and of the battle of Hastings. The consequences are not so clear if the Persians had been victorious at Marathon, nor even of the Mahometan success at Tours. The European mind, which on both occasions confronted the Asiatic, might eventually have triumphed though the battle had gone against it, either by prolonged war, (which was possible in both cases,) or by that unyielding pertinacity which defies sub- jection, and is ever ready to revolt against a foreign foe, especially when that foe occupies rather than inhabits a country, and is far removed from his resources, or in military language from the base of his operations.

It was a happy idea of Professor Creasy to select for military description and political remark those few battles of which, in the words of Hallam, "a contrary event would have essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes." The historian mentions Marathon, Arbela, the Metaurus, Chalons, Tours, and Leipsie. To these Mr. Creasy has added, in the an- cient world, the defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse, and the de- struction of Varus and his Legions by Arminius ; in the middle ages, the battle of Hastings and Joan of Arc's victory at Orleans ; in more modern times, the defeat of the Spanish Armada, and the battles of Blenheim and Pultowa ; in our days, at least in the days of persons yet alive, Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, the battles of Valmy and of Waterloo,—which last Mr. Creasy, we think without due consideration, substitutes for Leipsic.

The author observes in his preface, that "it is probable that no two inquirers would entirely agree in their lists of the decisive battles of the world " ; and we are about to justify his observation by differing with him. Very great authorities are against us, but we doubt whether the junction of Hannibal and Hasdrubal would to a certainty have subjugated Rome, When her caution and the enormous exertions she was making are considered, and that Hannibal's ex- haustion was going on simultaneously with her own. Some qualifica- tion is also to be made in our author's estimate, after Arnold, of the defeat of Athens at Syracuse. No doubt, there was a magnificent programme. To subdue Sicily after taking Syracuse, to conquer Carthage and Southern Italy, and with all the resources these mag- nificent successes, on paper, placed at disposal, to overrun Lace- daemon and conquer her Grecian foes, " making an elbow" in her way to destroy Rome and Etruria, sounds well ; but it requires in. practice more sustained fortune than generally attends upon human affairs, and fewer elements of difficulty than are obvious on the face of the plan. Neither can we attach such importance to At- tila's check at Chalons as both Hallam and Mr. Creasy do. If Attila had been victorious, he might still have been checked ; and if finally successful, the change, it strikes us, would not have very considerably altered the drama of the world. Modern Europe might have been pretty much what it is. The destruction of the Gauls by Marius, and the battle of Pharsalia, both of which Mr. Creasy has omitted, seem to us as important as any he in- cludes. Had Marius, like his predecessors, been defeated, Rome would possibly have been overwhelmed, or her fortunes alto- gether changed; and not Rome as we now know her, but Rome without Cicero or Caesar, or Virgil or Horace—Rome without her orators, her philosophers, her emperors, her poets, and her historians. Had Pompey and the aristocratical faction triumphed at Pharsalia, no such radical change would have fol- lowed as from the overthrow of Marius, yet it would have been a " decisive battle of the world." After sundry attempts to patch up the old constitution, the Roman empire would most probably have been divided into separate kingdoms, like the dominion of Alexander the Great after his death. There was an actual tendency that way. Pompey himself, in his youth, had cut short a Ser- torian kingdom in Spain. Had Antony possessed more prudence, it is possible that a division of the empire would have taken place in spite of Cxsar and Pharsalia. Perhaps Actium was a decisive battle of the world.

Except Hastings and Valmy, none of the combats of the middle or modern ages chosen by Mr. Creasy seem to us entirely decisive. Had the Spanish troops in the Armada effected a landing, they would still have had a good deal to do ; and a check would have been destruction, for they had no other base than the sea-shore. A similar remark applies to the repulse before Orleans, to Blenheim, to Pultowa, to Saratoga, and Waterloo as substituted for Leipsic. They were all important and eventful engagements, some more than others in their direct effects • but it may be doubted whether the ultimate result would have been very greatly different from what it was had the mere victory inclined the other way. Of course, in homing to this conclusion, we must take all the elements into con-

* The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, from Marathon to Waterloo. By E. 8. Creasy, M.A., Professor of Ancient and Modern History in University College, London; late Fellow of Sing's College, Cambridge. In two volumes. Published by Bentley. sideration : as, for example, the distracted minority and the feeble character of Henry the Sixth, with the aspiring ambition of the house of York ; the persevering resolution, the inflexible will, of Peter the Great ; the popular exasperation throughout Europe against Napoleon and the French, as well as the fears and deter- mination of the Sovereigns. We should rate the battle of Plassey as more decisive than most of the above : the defeat of Clive would have involved the expulsion of the English from Bengal, and pos- sibly from India. Napoleon would have held his repulse before Acre as the most important of all ; but his visions of Eastern con- quests, surpassing those of Alexander, may be placed upon a par with the Athenian dreams of Sicilian, Carthaginian, and Italian dominion, to be followed by universal empire.

Mr. &easy has had in view the important political con- sequences of his subjects rather than military narrative ; but in the majority of the cases the battles were remarkable in a military point of view, as well for the generalship of the commanders as for the courage of the combatants. The treatment, however, varies with the subjects. The circumstances of the civilized world at the time of the battle, and the probable conse- quences at issue, are always touched upon ; very often the cha- racter and the biography of the principal commanders engaged, the quality and discipline of the soldiers, and the nature of the coun- try where the action was fought, are described •, sometimes the constitution, politics, and factions of one or both of the belligerent states, are displayed: the military manmuvres and the battle itself are always described with more or less detail, according to the intrin- sic interest, the fulness of the authorities, or the probable faMili- arity of the reader with the subject. Waterloo, for example, is confined to broad and leading outlines ; of the battle of Tom's un- der Charles Martel few particulars are preserved ; Hastings is de- scribed at length from the chroniclers. On the whole, military de- scription is kept subordinate to the social and political matter and the philosophical results.

It is the succession and variety of matter, and the choice of the subjects with the connexion involved in them, which give character and value to the work. The facts relating to military affairs are not very fresh, and some of the speculations are not in themselves novel ; Mr. Creasy, indeed, quoting authorities—Arnold, Hallam, Alison, &c.—as texts, and subsequently expanding their suggestions. _Bat in the general disquisitions connected with the social and political aspects of the periods, the Professor brings together the essence of extensive learning, which he intersperses with valuable remarks ; his biographical notices are pithy and characteristic ; the decisive features of the battles are generally well and clearly brought out; the reader's mind is attracted to the world-wide importance of the events he is considering, while their succession carries him over the whole stream of European history. This is further supplied to a degree by a chronological account of the prin- cipal events between one battle and another; but the appendixes are too meagre to match the text. A very rapid resume of the in- tervening period would give greater unity to the work and excite more interest in the reader. We may observe that the ancient period is more interesting than the modern ; and better done, as if the author were more at home in the subject.

The school of Mr. Creasy verges towards the modern rhetorical, of which Macaulay is the head. Mr. Creasy's manner is much less ambitious and artificial than that of many—perhaps not more rhetorical than is advantageous for the purpose of attracting: the reader's attention. Style, however, is but a reflex of the writer's mind, and is of less real consequence for diction than for more important matters. The cast of mind which cultivates effect at the expense of taste is likely to strive for the same end at the expense of truth. It is not altogether that false facts are stated, or false conclusions drawn from them ; but the view is narrowed to the writer's object ; opposing elements are left out of sight, and no- thing is allowed for the unceasing friction and the frequent failure in all human affairs. There is less of this in Mr. Creasy than in many other writers ; indeed, he is more natural and varied than a mere rhetorician can ever be ; but the cast of mind sometimes appears to influence the thought and the conclusion, as well as to fashion the style. The following fair and judicious remarks on the battle of Marathon will partially illustrate what we mean.

"But though 'the fierce democracy' of Athens was zealous and true against foreign invader and domestic tyrant, a faction existed in Athens, as at Eretria, who were willing to purchase a party-triumph over their fellow- citizens at the price of their country's ruin. Communications were opened between these men and the Persian camp, which would have led to a catas- trophe like that of Eretria, if Miltiades had not resolved and persuaded his colleagues to resolve on fighting at all hazards.

" When Miltiades arrayed his men for action, he staked on the arbitrement of one battle not only the fate of Athens, but that of all Greece ; for if Athens had fallen, no other Greek state, except Lacedwmon, would have had the courage to resist; and the Lacedmmonians, though they wouldpro- bably have died in their ranks to the last man, never could have successfully resisted the victorious Persians and the numerous Greek troops which would have soon marched under the Persian satraps, had they prevailed over Athens. "Nor was there any power to the Westward of Greece that could have offered an effectual opposition to Persia, had she once conquered Greece, and made that country a basis for future military operations. Rome was at this time in her season of utmost weakness. Her dynasty of powerful Etruscan kings had been driven out ; and her infant commonwealth was reeling under the attacks of the Etruscans and Volscians from without, and the fierce dis- sensions between the patricians and plebeians within. Etruria, with her Lu- cumos and serfs, was no match for Persia. Samnium had not grown into the might which she afterwards put forth : nor could the Greek colonies in South Italy and Sicily hope to conquer when their parent states had perished. Car- thage had escaped the Persian yoke in the time of Cambyses, through the reluctance of the Phcenician mariners to serve against their kinsmen. But such forbearance could not long have been relied on and the future rival of Rome would have become as submissive a minister of the Persian power

as were the Phomician cities themselves. If we turn to Spain ; or if we pass the great mountain chain, which, prolonged through the Pyrenees' the Ce- vennes, the Alps, and the Balkan, divides Northern from Southern Europe, we shall find nothing at that period but mere savage Finns, Celts, Slaves, and Teutons. Had Persia beaten Athens at Marathon, she could have found no obstacle to prevent Darius, the chosen servant of Ormuzd, from advancing his sway over all the known Western races of mankind. The infant energies of Europe would have been trodden out beneath universal conquest; and the history of the world, like the history of Asia, have become a mere record of the rise and fall of despotic dynasties, of the incursions of barbarous hordes, and of the mental and political prostration of millions beneath the diadem, the tiara, and the sword. "Great as the preponderance of the Persian over the Athenian power at that crisis seems to have been, it would be unjust to impute wild rashness to the policy of Miltiades and those who voted with him in the Athenian coun- cil of war, or to look on the after-current of events as the mere fortunate result of successful folly. As before has been remarked, Miltiades, whilst prince of the Chersonese, had seen service in the Persian armies, and he knew by personal observation how many elements of weakness lurked be- neath their imposin,, aspect of strength. Ile knew that the bulk of their troops no longer consisted of the hardy shepherds and mountaineers from Persia Proper and Kurdistan, who won Cyrus's battles; but that unwilling contin- gents from conquered nations now filled up the Persian muster-rolls, fighting more from compulsion than from any zeal in the cause of their masters. He had also the sagacity and the spirit to appreciate the superiority of the Greek armour and organization over the Asiatic, notwithstanding former reverses. Above all, he felt and worthily trusted the enthusiasm of those whom he led."

An army constituted like that described in the above extract was not exactly an instrument to conquer unknown countries lying be- yond little-known seas. But unless the Athenians had been utterly routed, the mountains whence they descended to fight afforded them a strong rallying-ground. In a little time the Spartan rein- forcements would have arrived ; and even had Athens finally fallen, through treachery or bad fortune, there was still the Pelo- ponnesus, with all the obstacles of geography and blood we have already touched upon. We do not say these things are conclusive, but they should have been considered. The known results of the battle of Marathon are important enough without seeking to in- crease them by doubtful speculations. The varied information incidentally brought to bear in the course of the different narratives, is one of the most characteristic and useful features of the work. The following is an account of an- cient sieges, taken from the defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse.

" The usual mode of assailing fortified towns in the time of the Pelopon- nesian war was to build a double wall round them, sufficiently strong to check any sally of the garrison from within, or any attack of a relieving force from without. The interval within the two walls of the circumvalla- tion was roofed over, and formed barracks, in which the besiegers posted themselves, and awaited the effects of want or treachery among the besieged in producing a surrender : and in every Greek city of those days, as in every Italian republic of the middle ages, the rage of domestic sedition between aristocrats and democrats ran high. Rancorous refugees swarmed in the camp of every invading enemy ; and every blockaded city was sum to con- tain within its walls a body of intriguing malcontents, who were eager to purchase a party triumph at the expense of a national disaster. Famine and faction were the allies on whom besiegers relied. The generals of that time trusted to the operation of these sure confederates as soon as they could esta- blish a complete blockade. They rarely ventured on the attempt to storm any fortified post; for the military engines of antiquity were feeble in breaching masonry before the improvements which the first Dionysius ef- fected in the mechanics of destruction ; and the lives of spearmen the boldest and most highly-trained would of course have been idly spent in charges against unshattered walls."

From the same narrative we take this description of the ancient economists. " There is nothing new under the sun."

" The Syracusans themselves at the time of the Peloponnesian war were a bold and turbulent democracy, tyrannizing over the weaker Greek cities in Sicily, and trying to gain in that island the same arbitrary supremacy which Athens maintained along the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean. In num- bers and in spirit they were fully equal to the Athenians, but far inferior to there in military and naval discipline. When the probability of an Athe- nian invasion was first publicly discussed at Syracuse, and efforts were made by some of the wiser citizens to improve the state of the national defences and prepare for the impending danger, the rumours of coming war and the proposal for preparation were received by the mass of the Syracusans with scornful incredulity. The speech of one of their popular orators is preserved to us in Thucydides, (Lib. vi. sec. 36, et seq. Arnold's edition. I have al- most literally transcribed some of the marginal epitomes of the original speech,) and many. of its topics might by a slight alteration of names and details serve admirably for the party among ourselves at present which op- poses the augmentation of our forces and derides the idea of our being in any peril from the sudden attack of a French expedition. The Syracusan orator told his countrymen to dismiss with scorn the visionary terrors which a set of designing men among themselves strove to excite, in order to get

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power and influence thrown into their own hands. He told them that Athens knew her own interest too well to think of wantonly provoking their hostility—' Even if the enemies were to come,' said he, so distant from their resources, and opposed to such a power as ours, their destruction would be easy and inevitable. Their ships will have enough to do to get to our island at all, and to carry such stores of all sorts as will be needed. They cannot therefore carry besides an army large enough to cope with such a population as ours. They will have no fortified place from which to com- mence their operations, but must rest them on no better base than a set of wretched tents and such means as the necessities of the moment will allow them. But in truth I do not believe that they would even be able to efket a disembarkation. Let us therefore set at nought these reports as altogether of home manufacture ; and be sure that if any enemy does come, the state will know how to defend itself in a manner worthy of the national honour.'

" Such assertions pleased the Syracusan assembly ; and their counterparts find favour now among some portion of the English public. But the in- vaders of Syracuse came, made good their landing in Sicily, and if they had promptly attacked the city itself, instead of wasting nearly a year in desultory operations in other parts of Sicily, the Syracusans must have paid the penalty of their self-sufficient carelessness in submission to the Athenian yoke. But of the three generals who led the Athenian expedition two only were men of ability, and one was most weak and incompetent. Fortunately for Syra- cuse, Alcibiades, the most skilful of the three, was soon deposed from his command by a factious and fanatic vote of his fellow-countrymen, and the other competent one, Lamachus, fell early in a skirmish; while, more fortu- nately still for her the feeble and vacillating Nicias remained unrecalled and unhurt, to assume the undivided leadership of the Athenian army and fleet, and to mar by alternate over-caution and over-carelessness every chance of success which the early part of the operations offered."