THE NEUTRALISATION OF EGYPT.
-i-T is impossible to understand from Sir Same, Fergusson's 1. answer on Thursday, whether the Government have or have not authorised Sir H. Drummond Wolff to propose the " neutralisation " of Egypt to the Sultan. As, however, the statement that the "High Commissioner" has made the pro- posal has been received from two or three separate sources, and as Sir J. Fergusson's answer is substantially only a refusal to reply, we may, we think, assume that the proposal has actually been made, though its details may be, as Sir J. Fergusson says, " inaccurate." It will not, we think, he generally regarded, on reflection, as a wise scheme. In theory, of course, such a neutralisation would be an ideal plan, for it would release us from Egypt, satisfy France, content the Sultan, and leave Egypt as independent as it ever has been in modern history. It would release us, because the condition precedent of the whole scheme is the total evacuation of the Nile Valley ; it would satisfy France, because France is moved in the matter mainly by jealousy, and cares nothing about "Egyptians, having even resisted the abolition of the infamous corve'e ; and it would content Turkey, because the Sultan's would be the only living authority left in Egypt. The Turks there would obey him, and the Turks hold all commanding positions, including the Throne, if Tewfik is dismissed. These are great results, and we do not wonder that the scheme has a certain charm ; but when we study the facts instead of the theory, we see that the results are purchased at too dear a price. None of the objects for which we have expended blood and treasure in Egypt are secured. The people, to begin with, are not safeguarded. An independent Egypt, neutral or not, means an Egypt restored to its Pashas,—that is, a country in which order is kept by the kourbash, work is performed by forced labour, the last penny is exacted from the peasants, torture is used to extort the taxes, and justice is sold, in all cases where the suitors are not paupers, to the highest bidder. It means an Egypt distracted by brigands, full of alarm at the prospect of Arab descents, and honeycombed with intrigues for the possession of Court favour, and its consequence, wealth. In the second place, the security of transit will not be safeguarded, for nothing can guard it but adequate force, and adequate force does not exist, and unless the Turkish troops are readmitted, cannot be created. Any Egyptian Colonel with courage and influence can raise a revolt just as easily as Arabi. It is said that the officers of the Native Army are to be English ; but of what use is that if there is no English garrison to support them, and if they can be slaughtered out just as easily as they were in the Sepoy Army ? And, finally, neutrality is not safeguarded, for if England were occupied, say, in an Indian insurrection, Trance could and would, under some pretext of disturbances, send ten thousand men from Tunis to Egypt, whence it would take a great war to drive them out. France keeps treaties fairly well, but 'Franca cannot be trusted, as we have seen both in Tunis And Egypt, when her jealousy is stimulated by the feare of the influential .financiers who hold profit- able bonds. If the Egyptian Debt -were not paid, France would interfere at once, and with a native Adminis- tration, the Debt could never be secure. If there is still to be a European control of the Treasury, independence becomes a farce, and so does neutrality ; and if there is not, the Government and the Pashas will absorb all the money, as even Ismail, who at least could govern, latterly did. Neutrality is, in truth, a mere device for reproducing the old situation, with all its dangers much exasperated by the failure of a great experiment honestly intended, and fairly, though weakly carried out. The plain truth, which English Radicals do not or will not recognise, is, that the materials for a native government in Egypt at once independent and decent, do not exist. There is no strong ruler, no honest governing class, no "people" capable of political action. It is very doubtful if a native army could be made strong enough to resist the Soudanese, and quite certain that a mercenary army, unless European; would not content itself with maintaining order and collecting revenue for the payment of foreign usurers. Whether composed of Turks, or Circassiane, or Albanians, or Negroes, it would sooner or later become a Mameluke Army, and would act in its own interest, not that of the State. The people, with excellent qualities, want fifty years of just government to allow those qualities fair play, and even then will probably yield to any organised body of invaders, as they did to the Macedonians, to the Romans, to the Arabs, to the Turks, to the French, and to the English. Egyptians are not so much unfit to be independent, as incompetent to guard independence, and require for two generations at least to be placed in tutelage. The only question is,—Who shall be the tutors I And as we believe, the English, once freed from the present fetters, which enable them to prevent cruelty but to do no other good, would be the ablest, the most lenient, and the least untrustworthy school- masters. We would therefore go on with the present experi- ment until circumstances enabled us to rule more frankly ; or, if that is impossible without too much hazard and loss, we would call on Europe to sanction the appointment of the ablest Prince discoverable (not excluding even Arabi, who did make a fighting army), and leave him to govern, with this one guarantee,—that if invaded by Europeans, we would defend him. That project might have a little hope in it, for an able Khedive might buy allies in the Soudan, and so stop invasion from the South, and then govern in the rude Oriental way ; but in these elaborate paper arrangements we see nothing except a preparation for future complications. Neutrality is a most amiable plan ; but the world is not to be governed in the field of politics, any more than in the field of Nature, by amiabilitiee. All the benevolence in the world will not enable you to make a house of sand ; and Egypt is sand, need- ing strong compression before it can be used as building material.