TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE BULGARIAN BLUE-BOOK.
WE can understand the excitement created in the minds of many politicians by the new Blue-Book on Bulgaria ; but we do not understand its form. We find many traces in the despatches justifying the belief that the relations between this country and Russia have recently been strained to a degree unsuspected by the people, and even that war was regarded as a not impossible contingency ; but we find no trace of "Battenbergism," unless it is Battenbergism to consider that a ruler, acknowledged, or rather elected by his own people and all Europe, is not deprived of his rights by being kidnapped. The British Foreign Office and its agents on the spot had exactly the same right to acknowledge Prince Alexander after his seizure, and the same obligation to do it, as they would have had to acknowledge Czar Alexander if he had been seized by Nihilists. Suppose the Emperor was kidnapped for ten days and then released, would not Sir Robert Morier treat him as still reigning? That was all Lord Iddesleigh did, and he did it boldly and openly, telling the Russian Ambassador with unmistakable clearness that he had done it. Prince Alexander, who was the nominee of all Europe, Russia included, had, in some way never yet explained, but probably by displaying military qualities which excited the admiration even of General Kaulbars, excited a furious Russian hatred against both his person and his people. This hatred, as we have often pointed out, was not unnatural, for an able and independent soldier holding the Balkan ridges bars the land road of Russia ; but so deep was it, that it was expressed by M. de Giers to Sir Robert Morier, the British Ambassador at St. Peters- burg, with a frankness rarely found in Russian diplomacy. " The Emperor," exclaimed the Russian Foreign Minister on September 7th, " can never be reconciled to his cousin :"- "'I could form no idea,' he said, 'of the intensity of the hatred animating every class of the Russian nation, from the highest to the lowest, against the Prince, which late events had revealed, and of which he himself had no adequate conception till he had, as it were, come into bodily contact with it, when recrossing, three days before, the Russian frontier.' I expressed my amazement at this statement, observing that I had always believed that the feud was a personal one between the Emperor and his cousin, in which the nation only took part from loyalty to their Sovereign. He replied that this was altogether a wrong conception. That unfortunate young man (cc pauvre jeans homme)—for,' said M. de Giers," I cannot but sincerely pity him, and regard him even more as a victim of circumstances than of his own faults, though these have been many—has become, in the eyes of the Russian people, the incarnation and embodiment of everything which most deeply stirs the national indignation. He represents, in the first place, the untold ingratitude of the Bulgarians for their deliverers, and reminds them of the losses of blood and treasure incurred in a war which yielded no other results but disappointments. In the second place, he reminds them of all the humiliations submitted to in the Constantinople Conference and since. Lastly, he represents the hopes and desires of Russia's enemies. Never, therefore, could there be peace between him and the Russian people.' " Sir R. Morier told M. de Giers plainly in reply that his statement opened out a black prospect, for the English people would hardly bear open Russian interference in Bulgaria ; but M. de fliers hastened to reply that Russia would not interfere. He had, however, revealed the truth. It was in consequence of this hatred, and for no other reason, that the Prince had been kid- napped by mutinous officers in his own Army, who not only believed they were acting in the interests of Russia, but who were protected by the Russian Government with an openness without a precedent in modern history. They threatened war if the mutineers were punished. The British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir A. Paget, affirms this in the most positive manner, and on October 28th, 1886, gives as his authority no less a person than the Chancellor of the Austrian Empire. He telegraphs to Lord Iddesleigh :— " With reference to Sir F. Lascelles' telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to state that Count Killnoky informed me yesterday that the Russian Ambassador had made a com- munication to him, stating that, should the condemnation of the officers who took part in the coup ditat be immediately proceeded with, Russia would be forced into extreme measures." When the unexpected news of the Prince's safety reached Bulgaria, people and Army rose on his behalf, as, if
loyalty has any meaning at all, they were bound to do, and Lord Iddesleigh indirectly, but still plainly, adjured him to accept the popular demand for his restoration. What else was a British Government to do Y Was it to acknowledge that the dislike of a foreign Power to a particular man invalidated all public law, or to recognise kidnapping as one of the Euro- pean methods of creating a vacancy in a Throne P It might as well have recognised assassination, or better ; for while the crime is hardly greater, assassination does create a vacancy, and kidnapping does not. If Lord Iddesleigh was deserted by Europe, as is alleged, so much the worse for the European Sovereigns, who thereby recognised a precedent full of danger both for themselves and for the Monarchical prin- ciple ; but he was not in reality deserted. The Powers, aware of Russian implacability, thought the Prince had better not return ; but no one impeded his restoration, and he might have been reigning in the Bulgarias now, and have been Generalissimo of the Balkan States besides, if his own nerve and judgment had not given way. He could not get rid of the impression that the Czar was too strong for him. He was so entirely a German officer, that his resentment at the dis- affection among the soldiers whom he had led to victory overcame both his fortitude and his clear-sightedness. He fancied the Bulgarian Army honeycombed with treason ; and though he admitted that the people were with him, he declared that "it was impossible to govern with the people" (p. 134), that his rule rested on his Army, and that he must resign. An attempt had been made to throw his train off the line on his way from Rustelink ; he must, if he remained, shoot so many mutineers that it would be a massacre, and he knew that if he shot them, many officers had taken an oath to put him at once to death. The Prince, in short, had lost heart; and after one desperate effort to conciliate the Czar, he signed, in spite of strong English dissuasions, a proclamation announcing that he had abdicated, and, amidst deep popular regrets, and protestations from his Army of an almost mutinous character, left Bulgaria.
So far, at all events, the British Foreign Minister and his agents were absolutely in the right. They were loyal, in spite of tremendous pressure, to the public law of Europe, and to the Prince whom Europe, in the common interest, had set to govern the great road between Russia and Constantinople. They advised him while still on the Throne ; they pressed him, after his kidnapping, to return ; they counselled him, when he shrunk from the dreadful difficulties before him, to continue his task ; they went to the verge of war to defend his independence ; but they valued him and supported him only as the Prince best suited to Bulgaria, and best able to excite Bulgarian loyalty. All subsequent history proves that they were right, for if the Bulgarians were only free, they would next week, by an unanimous vote, recall Prince Alexander. When he lost heart, they stood aside, only remonstrating with Russia at the im- possible position to which she reduced the Regency Govern- ment, and striving, by every means in their power, to protect the independence of the deserted country. How far they went in that direction we have no means of knowing ; but it would be wanting in frankness for us not to admit that we see some evidence that the Government went very near war. They feared, as Count Kalnoky did, a Russian occupa- tion of Bulgaria ; and though there is no direct proof of it in these pages, we hardly doubt that if that aggression had occurred, and if Austria and Turkey had resisted it, as M. Tisza promised the Hungarians that it should be resisted, this country would have resisted it too. Sir R. Morier is one of the ablest diplomatists in the service, and on November 4th, while General Kaulbars was still flourishing his sword about in Sofia, he telegraphed to Lord Iddesleigh a long despatch, of which the following is the final and important paragraph :- " Before leaving M. de Giers, I said that, since my arrival in Russia, I had never known a time when the political atmo- sphere seemed so charged with electricity, and when so many sinister rumours prevailed. His Excellency, who seemed in better spirits than I had seen him in for some time, spoke with much confidence of the future. There was many a mauvaio quart d'heure to be got over, but he felt assured that peace would be maintained. I said this was a consummation devoutly to be wished, but that I could not give General Kaulbara the credit of contributing much to this result." Diplomatists do not mention peace or war unless events have grown very serious ; and it is quite possible—remembering Lord Salisbury's speech at Guildhall on November 9th, when he said, as plainly as man could speak, that he believed England would fight for the Balkans if she had a sufficient
and trustworthy ally—that the Government did provide for the eventuality which all men then expected. We do not see that anything has been concealed, or that the Blue- Book does more than accentuate the impression created by Lord Salisbury's speech. If he was wrong—and we think he was in a way wrong, because he did not know that he was not saying more than the country would stand to—his error has long since been condoned. Liberals may say that Parliament has not yet had an opportunity of discussing his foreign policy ; but the whole situation has changed, and we question if Parliament, as matters now stand, will tie the Premier's hands. As we said on November 13th, English opinion about foreign affairs has now become too obscure to forecast ; but whatever the feeling of the people, the Premier has been at least as frank as diplomatists ever are. He stated before the whole people that England would fight if she had allies ; and in the face of that declaration, the story of a secret intrigue concocted by the Queen and Lord Salisbury to fight on behalf of " the Battenberg," without warrant from the people, is sensational rubbish. We should have fought, if at all, to resist the subjugation of the Balkans, and not a man could have been moved without a previous summons to Parlia- ment, and the assent of the nation expressed in old Constitu- tional form.
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