POLITICS
Not the best possible advertisement for the summit of our achievements
SIMON HEFFER
If the European Summit at Edinburgh this weekend reflects the British presidency that has preceded it, it will be a shambles. Since the two most significant figures in the Community, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, were both too busy wash- ing their hair even to see Mr Major during his pre-summit round of shuttle diplomacy, the Euro-sceptics' hopes of continued chaos and acrimony seemed to be justified. On the crucial issue of bringing Denmark back onside, there seemed little hope of progress. The Foreign Secretary himself added weight to the overall pessimism. Mr Hurd claimed the EEC was on a 'razor's edge' over Maastricht. Britain's difficulty lay in trying to find a formula to meet Dan- ish fears (and, just as importantly but less explicitly, British ones too) about the Treaty without having a renegotiation. Without, effectively, a renegotiation of cer- tain points, the Danes may well not play.
Mr Hurd might have been bluffing. The Government is desperate to look good as it concludes its presidency. An obvious ploy is to talk down chances of success. That way, any advance can be claimed by Mr Major as one of his triumphs, and any defeat has been discounted in advance.
In most respects, though, the summit is irrelevant. It would only change what is likely to happen in Britain if, from Mr Major's point of view, it is a disaster. The Danes would have to announce at the end of it that they were not satisfied, and the bullies in Bonn and Paris would need to fulfil their threats to press on with union on their own. In such apocalyptic circum- stances even this Government would see little point in having the guerrilla war need- ed to ratify Maastricht. There is more likely to be a fudge, with the 'problem' of Den- mark (and related issues such as subsidiari- ty) merely passed to the Danes themselves to sort out during their own presidency. Thus the pantomime of trying to make everyone believe Maastricht is plausible would continue. Despite the desire for a second referendum in Denmark, there are as yet no calls for a second in France, where the result was as close, though in the other direction. If the French had known in September what they know now about the EEC's desire to end the privileged status of their farmers, Mitterrand would already be in retirement, with plenty of time to wash his hair and receive visits from Mr Major. Mr Hurd, in making his 'razor's-edge' remark, knows there is as much chance of the EEC falling apart this weekend as there is of the Germans being voted the world's most lovable nation. But he also demon- strates the most depressing feature of Britain's presidency: that the Government has learned nothing about the realities of `Europe' in the last six months. To objec- tive witnesses the Danish rejection of Maastricht, the exit of the pound and the lira from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and the overwhelming desire in Britain for a referendum on the Treaty would seem to suggest that political and economic union was not such a good idea after all. Stub- bornly, the Government intends to ratify, though makes gestures to the anti-federal- ists — 'demanding' a definition of sub- sidiarity and, of economic necessity, plead- ing for Britain's budget contributions to be pegged. Mr Major wants to ratify not just because he thinks the Treaty will be good for Britain. He is equally determined to save his face whatever the consequences for his country. The Treaty with opt-outs was, you will remember, his foremost 'triumph'. However, when the Treaty was initialled at Maastricht 53 weeks ago it was clear to some that it was not a 'triumph' at all. The formula Messrs Major, Hurd and Lamont had accepted was a centralising one that paved the way, however inexplicitly, to fed- eralism. No one among the High Contract- ing Parties had pointed out that the Treaty was already an anachronism before it was signed. It had been designed by socialists in the 1980s to protect their vision of social- ism against the threat from the federation of communist states beyond the Iron Cur- tain, and, indeed, from Thatcherite capital- ism. Nor is it likely that any leader will point out at the summit that Maastricht is even more unsuitable now as a result of the events of 1992. Instead, the Twelve keep wasting immense amounts of time and money trying to pursue the Maastricht pro- cess. All they prove is that they are all will- ing to be ostrich-like together.
Britain has still not learned this lesson, even after the humiliations and ridicule endured during her presidency. As ex-Pres- ident, Mr Major is now facing another threat. For what it is worth, a Gallup poll this week showed that 75 per cent of Britons want a referendum. An increasingly well-organised campaign is being mounted to try to secure one. Given the promising capacity Labour is at last demonstrating for mischief-making, the Opposition could even support an amendment to the Maas- tricht Bill to force a plebiscite. The Liberals have always wanted one. A protest march has been organised for London on 17 Jan- uary to demonstrate the strength of opposi- tion to the Government's ratification plans. And there is the possibility that the Danes, should they have another referendum, will reject Maastricht again.
Britain should have learned that shaping events, rather than being shaped by them, is the way to conduct European affairs. When Mrs Thatcher was Prime Minister all supposed failures by Britain to be suffi- ciently 'European' were blamed on her. Her methods did, indeed, make fatally few allowances for the feelings of her oppo- nents. Mr Major has sought to present a more emollient front to his fellow heads of government, and it has got him precisely nowhere. Mrs Thatcher was not unpleasant to her partners because she had nothing better to do. She was unpleasant because she saw they were seeking to advance their self-interest at the expense of Britain's. Mr Major is now even more marginalised. His fellow leaders cannot be bothered to see him, even when he is President of the Com- munity. They have not taken him seriously since he promised, in his desperation to win last month's Commons vote on Maastricht, to postpone ratification until the Danes have voted again. He has avoided taking a lead where it might have boosted him to do so. The ERM debacle presented him with a great opportunity to shape a new approach to realistic co-operation. Instead, his friends bleat about 'Black Wednesday', cit- ing it as a prominent example of the tad luck' that has 'dogged' Britain. His poor presidency, which no claims of `triumph' can salvage this weekend, can be blamed on the Foreign Office and the close circle of Europhile advisers, inside and out- side the Cabinet, with which Mr Major sur- rounds himself. In their utopianism, they failed him over ERM and are failing him over this related issue of the best way to direct the future of the EEC. Ultimately, though, the failure is Mr Major's. He should have worked to make his partners realise that things have changed. That he did not is the most damning indictment of six wasted months.
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