THE SESSION AND THE OPPOSITION.
WE have no criticism to make on the conduct of the Opposition during the Session which ended on Wednesday. In one respect, indeed, it compares favour- ably with its action in former Sessions of the present Parliament. There have been no attacks on Lord Salis- bury for his alleged weakness in China, nor has that section of Unionists which holds that the object for which Englishmen were created is to pick a quarrel with Russia found any support on the Speaker's left. The South African business has been handled with similar reserve. The opposition to the Clerical Tithe Bill, though per- sistent, was to some extent accounted for by the intro- duction of the measure under the ten minutes rule. Where all has gone so well, we may be thought unreason- able for wishing that the best of all possible Oppositions were in any way other than it is. And yet we do desire one change. There is one function of an Opposition which can only be adequately discharged when it is numerically strong. That function is stiffening the back of the Government.
It may seem odd that this process should go on better when the Opposition is large than when it is -mall, but the experience of the present Parliament has proved the fact to demonstration. Nor, when we come to look at it closer, is it at all difficult of explanation. A Government is strengthened, no doubt, by having to do with a weak Opposition when—and only when—it commands the allegiance of a perfectly homogeneous party. In that case Ministers have nothing to do but to frame the legislation which they and their supporters desire. Once introduced, the Bills pass almost automatically. But supposing that the party is not homogeneous, that instead of being perfectly agreed on all important questions there are large differ- ences inside it as to several, what is the influence of a weak Opposition on such a state of things as this ? Plainly, to encourage the various sections of the Minis- terialists to press their several views. They can do so, they think, without danger. The Government is so strong, its position is so well assured, that the malcontents may say what they like. In presence of a powerful Opposi- tion they are under an honourable obligation not to embarrass their leaders. Any appreciable number of abstentions, not to speak of hostile votes, may place Ministers in a minority, and the knowledge of this possibility is enough to prevent it from happening. But when Ministers have such a majority as they command in the present House of Commons, there is no occasion for any sacrifice of individual opinion. The tongues of the majority are unloosed. They speak their minds freely in the House, and they are quite ready to let the record of them appear in the division lists. The consequence of this is twofold. Before a Government has made trial of the effect of a big majority it may bring in large and comprehensive measures without reference to the opinions of the rank-and-file of the party. Afterwards, when it has learnt by experi- ence how inconveniently these opinions may assert them- selves, it is apt to think large and comprehensive measures a mistake, and, to content itself with such modest Bills as will give no great offence to its sup- porters, even if they do not evoke any enthusiasm. Ministers settle down into a groove of safe legislation which looks fairly well in a, Queen's Speech, and is not likely to be remembered against them hereafter. We do not say that this is always a mischievous result. That depends on what the questions are that call for treatment. But it is mischievous if among these there are some which need really statesmanlike handling. In that case, we are reduced to seeing great subjects dealt with piecemeal, and strength wasted on details which should have been spent in establishing principles.
We have seen examples of both processes in the present Parliament. There were two questions awaiting treat- ment when Lord Salisbury took office which seemed specially reserved for handling by a, strong Unionist majority,—elementary education and local taxation. The first of these was actually taken up in 1896. The Educa- tion Bill of that year was a really great measure. Like other great measures, it was open to amendment in this or that particular. But it covered the whole ground, and it would have closed the long controversy between voluntary and rate-aided schools,—a. controversy which has done incalculable harm to the progress of education. No doubt the Bill was unfortunate in the manner of its intro- duction. It was taken out of the hands of Sir John Gorst, and Mr. Balfour, to whom it had been transferred, had not very naturally the same grasp of its provisions. But these drawbacks it might have survived. What it could not survive was the lukewarmness of some of the Minis- terialists, and the opposition, open or secret, of others. The strongest Government of modern times, with a majority of one hundred and forty at its back, was forced to withdraw the principal measure of its first Session. Since then the warning has been laid to heart. The con- troversies about elementary education are as unsettled as ever. They attract little notice for the moment because the Government is determined to leave them alone and the Opposition is not strong enough to raise them to any purpose. But they are shelved, not disposed of, and when a Radical Government is next in power we shall find a Conservative Opposition vainly struggling to defend posi- tions which the Education Bill of 1896 would have placed beyond the reach of attack. Local taxation stands on a different footing from elementary education because it is actually under investigation by a Royal Commission. But if Ministers had been less distrustful of their sup- porters, they might not have been so impressed with their need of the information a Royal Commission can give them. It is not facts that are wanted in regard to rating and its incidence, so much as the courage to frame a really great Bill. It is specially the duty of a Conserva- tive Government to take the question in hand, because the chief contributions to it which the party has made hitherto have been in the direction of grants-in.aid,—a remedy which has ordinarily the effect of increasing the area of the disease. We do not believe that the problem how to widen the incidence of rating is beyond treatment. On the contrary, it only needs to be attacked by a financier of real ability. There is nothing in it which should make Sir Michael Hicks-Beach despair of solving it, but there is a great deal which may well make him shy of taking it in hand. The first condition of rating reform is the sub- jection of new forms of property to rates from which they are at present exempt. That is not a process likely to be welcomed by the owners of such property ; consequently it would touch at every point some section of the Ministerial supporters. No more need be said to explain the unwillingness of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to undertake so unwelcome a, task.
With a stronger Opposition difficulties of this kind would be far less formidable. The question that each Ministerialist naturally asks himself is,—' What will be the effect of my voting against my leaders ? ' If the answer to this is,—` Just nothing at all ; the Government is so strong that no amount of defections can seriously damage it,'—the prospect is not likely to deter a discontented Unionist from voting against this or that clause, regardless of the injury he may inflict on the Bill as a whole. If the worst comes to the worst, all that will happen is the withdrawal of the Bill. The force of this reasoning diminishes in proportion to the growth of the Opposition. When that is strong there is more room for unexpected combinations, and unexpected combinations may be fertile in unexpected defeats. Effec- tive legislation ordinarily means legislation about which the Government can count upon the support of its party, and this support will be most likely to be forth- coming when those with whom it rests to give or withhold it know that the latter course may lead to a Ministerial defeat. Such knowledge is not to be had when the Government has a majority of one hundred and thirty votes. The margin for possible leakage is too wide.
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