THE RUMOURED ABDICATION OF THE CZAR.
WE do not quite see why everybody rejects M. de Blowitz's news. It is sensational, no doubt ; but earthquakes do occur sometimes in the political, as in the natural, world, and of all the men who hear rumblings early M. de Blowitz is the first. Very great people tell him things with that confidence which, as all memoirs show, belongs to the very great in their intercourse with some men ; and when it is wanted to break news to Europe to see what its impact will be, he is often selected, we hardly know why, but probably from the rank of the Times among newspapers, as the intermediary. He certainly believes his own story, and there is nothing in the story itself to make it impossible. To any but a very resolute or a very resigned man the weight of the Russian crown must be almost insupportable. Alexander III. supported it, though keenly sensible of his own inadequacy, because he had a firm belief, which turned out well founded, that as God had placed him there, God would enable him to do his duty ; but faith of that kind is given only to a few. The mere work, which increases every day as the Empire grows larger and more civilised, and therefore more conscious of wants, would try any ordinary man, and it is all made so heavy by its importance either to the world, or to Russia, or to individuals. The Czar must issue hundreds of orders a week, each one of which may have momentous consequences. He is not only Premier as well as Sovereign, but he is supreme legislator, Com- mander-in-Chief of the largest of armies—in itself a task for more than one man—chief, and to an enor- mous extent supreme, Judge of the Civil Service, and possessed of the initiative, as well as of the final power of decision, in all foreign affairs. No doubt he has much assistance, and can " devolute " much work, but devolu- tion often fails in a Monarchy, as it fails in our own House of Commons. The necessity of a final decision comes back in a different form. It is the strength and the curse of autocracy that Ministers, unless exceptionally strong men, will not act for them- selves ; that they seek constantly the shelter of a "supreme order" which relieves them of responsibility ; that they are always wanting to be approved by the ultimate master for their conduct of their work. That approval is their guarantee of favour, and the favour of the throne is in a true autocracy more necessary, not only to the authority, but to the happiness, of the great agents of the Empire than even the confidence of the people is in a democracy. Affairs will go on as regularly under a despot as under free institutions, but it is only on condition that the despotism shall be fairly energetic. Under a fainéant autocrat everything goes to pieces with almost unintelligible rapidity, as you may see in the history of every Asiatic State. The only alternative is a great Vizier, and something in the history or circum- stances of Russia, or it may be something in the very separate and peculiar character of its reigning house, has always prevented a great Vizier from growing up. No one can name in the last five centuries any one, except possibly, for a brief period, Potemkin, who has fully occupied that position,—who has, in fact, been great enough to dwarf the Czar. The Sovereign in Russia actually does the ruling, and it is easy to under- stand how, if the Sovereign is weak, or nervous, or in feeble health, or conscious of a. frequent collision between his circumstances and his aspirations, he wearies of his burden, or even, if the situation is aggra- vated by accident, resolves to throw it off. He may not act on his resolve, for the pressure upon him to retain his power must be tremendous,—pressure from the Ministers he has chosen, who fear to be superseded ; pressure from brother-Sovereigns, who dread the effect of his example ; pressure from his own conscience, which accuses him of shirking unpleasant duty ; but still he may have men- tioned his resolve, and even have taken steps to carry it out. Many of the usual obstacles, it must be remembered, do not stand in the present Czar's way. There is no Con- stitutional difficulty, for there is in law no Constitution other than his will. He has no son whose rights he might conceive to be injured by his renunciation. He has an heir who in a few months will be twenty-one, and whom he may regard as more competent than himself. He has no policy to which he is devoted, unless it be the main- tenance of peace ; and he may perceive a growth of opinion within his own Army, of which he is conscious, while Europe is not, which will prevent peace being much longer be maintained. It is hard to believe in abdications because there have been so few in history, the charm of the first place being to most men irresistible, but to say that an Emperor of Russia cannot resign is going beyond the limit within which incredulity is reasonable.
The burden of empire, real empire, on the mind must be terribly severe. It maddened most of the early Ctesars, whose conduct, if truly reported by their chroniclers, is inconsistent with full possession of ordinary reason. It has driven at least two Emperors of Russia, Ivan and Paul, into the lunacy which justifies confine- ment. It killed Nicholas I., a really strong man, even if it did not, as is persistently rumoured, induce him to commit suicide. It plunged Alexander II. into a melancholy only distinguishable from melancholia because his reason remained clear and he could compel himself to work. It shattered the splendid constitution of Alex. ander III. so that disease found him without power of recuperation, and unless all stories from St. Petersburg are incorrect, it afflicts Nicholas II. with spasms of doubt and mental pain which occasionally seem to take all happiness out of his life and convert his magnificent position into a source of torment. It seems to English- men that it must be easy to lighten the burden, but we fancy the difficulties are enormously great The best Russians declare that the Parliamentary system would not suit Russia, that the materials for it, in fact, do not exist within the Empire. The Asiatic method, the Grand. Vizierate, seems, as we have already remarked, never to find foothold in Russia, probably because the loyalty felt for the Czar, a loyalty which often rises into a passion of devotion, cannot be transferred. Diocletian's idea—the multiplication of Emperors—which is even now carried out in Persia, each Prince being in fact Shah within his province—would end, in the circumstances of Russia, in dismemberment or civil war. Great Cabinets do not grow under the shade of an autocracy, and great Councils are hampered by the desire of the people for orders from the Sovereign himself. They attribute to him something of sacredness, which cannot be transferred or subdivided, and the abnegation of which destroys in their minds the moral claim to rule. Armies, moreover, are impatient of an impersonal Commander-in-Chief, and though the Russian autocracy is not purely military, inasmuch as it would be sanctioned if a mass vote were taken by ninety per cent. of the population, the favour of the Army is still essential to its perfect safety. There seem to be no alternatives for a Russian Emperor except to go on sturdily trying to perform a task too great for any mortal, or to venture on the transference of power,—tbe abdication, in fact, which Europe, the moment it is spoken of, deems so impossible, that the mention of it is received with derisory smiles.
We have said nothing of the consequences, the momen- thus consequences, to Europe which might follow if M. de Blowitz's story proved to be correct, because it is as yet only a story, and because the consequences depend upon an unknown quantity, the character of the Grand Duke Michael. He is said to he a healthy man with much vigour of mind, but likely to be more under the dominion of the military party than his brother has ever been. Reports, however, about an heir-apparent are always untrustworthy, first, because his position forces him to pose, and usually to pose as chief of the party which is not in the ascendant ; and secondly, because his character while expecting furnishes but an imperfect clue to his character in possession. His advisers, his interests, and his fetters are all changed, and very often his abilities are changed too. That is to say, his mental powers prove to be more fitted or less fitted to his new circumstances than was suspected even by himself. Even, therefore, if the Czar should abdicate during his visit to Darmstadt, the Continent must wait to know what its fate is to be. The only thing certain is that as regards war or peace that fate will be in the hands of the new Czar.
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