It should not be forgotten that the Khedive is very
powerful in Constantinople. He is the only vassal remaining who actually sends troops when his Sovereign is in difficulty ; he can provide a large gum occasionally, when the Sultan needs immediate cash ; and he understands the by-ways of the Seraglio as no European Ambassador can. The Porte might remove him, if it were able to reduce Egypt to its old. rank as a province, but it will scarcely remove him in order to increase British influence in a Mussulman country. As to the Bondholders, Turkey would be glad if Egypt repu- diated, as more money would be left to send to Constantinople. Indeed, it is difficult to see why, if repudiation is tried at all, the tribute should not once again be paid in cash, and annexed, as it was before the Crimean war, for the benefit of the Sultan's privy purse. Of course the Porte will yield, if the bondholders outbid the Khedive, or if direct menace is applied; but the bond- holders cannot raise funds, and menace to Turks is inconsistent with the whole policy of Lord Beaconsfield. The difficulties of action, OA suggested elsewhere, are so serious, that we should not wonder if Ismail were left in possession of the field, with his Fellaheen at his mercy, his revenue restored by repudiation, and himself at the height of his prestige. It is mortifying for France, —but there is Bismarck.; and for England,—but there are Yakoob Khan and Cetewayo.
