TINKERING WITH IRELAND
The talks between Mr Heath and Mr Lynch have not done any great harm; and the two Prime Ministers must by now know each other's mind better than they did before, which is an advantage. It was never likely that such talks would end in agreement; it was quite likely that they would collapse almost as soon as they had begun with bitter recriminations. That they lasted something like eleven hours is to the good; that they resulted in deadlock was to be expected.
The announcement by Mr Maudling, shortly after the end of the Heath-Lynch talks, that he was prepared to chair a conference of representatives of the various Northern Ireland communities, was clearly made in the context of the Prime Ministerial conversations. It was obviously Mr Heath's purpose to persuade Mr Lynch to commend the Maudling offer to those in the north who look to Dublin, just as it Was obviously Mr Lynch's purpose to secure Dublin participation in the Maudling conference. Mr Health, standing firm on the constitutional principle of national sovereignty, refused to concede the claim of the Dublin government to be present at the Maudling talks. Mr Lynch for his part took the view that they would be a waste of time.
Mr Heath does not appear to have been intransigent. While refusing Dublin representation at or participation in the Maudling talks, he did propose a tripartite meeting between Mr Lynch, Mr Faulkner and himself; and it is difficult to see why Mr Lynch should have felt obliged to turn this down. The fact is that the Heath-Lynch talks themselves, to be resumed in November or earlier if necessary, and the offer of a tripartite meeting with Mr Faulkner, are very Public recognition by the British government of the Dublin government's involvement in the affairs of Ulster. That the British government should feel obliged to exclude a foreign government from participation in the Maudling talks, designed to reassure the Catholic minority in Ulster without alienating the Protestant majority, is understandable. Less easy to understand is Mr Heath's rejection of Mr Lynch's proposal for quadripartite talks between the London and Dublin governments and the Stormont government and opposition. With London proposing tripartite talks and Dublin quadripartite talks, room for a compromise formula may well have existed, and may still exist, whereby, if necessary in addition to the Maudling talks, a Round Table Conference can be convened.
The Maudling proposals are worth closer consideration than was given to them by those Northern Irishmen who rejected them out of hand. The Home Secretary is a reasonable and intelligent man who does not stand on his dignity, and who is not likely to allow considerations of abstract principles, or of past history, or, of sectarian loyalty to impede any settlement likely to bring peace and order to Ulster. He has made it clear that the precise size, and the location, of the talks he is prepared to chair are not fixed. He has, however, indicated broadly the terms of reference of such talks, whose purpose " will be to see what agreed ways and means can be devised, within the constitutional and democratic framework, of giving representatives of the minority as well as of the majority community in Northern Ireland an active, permanent and guaranteed role in the life and public affairs of the province." Mr Maudling declares the necessity "for further political advance " in Ulster. He lays down his version of the conditions : "The border is not at issue. Nor is the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and, within this framework, the principle of a democratically elected assembly based on universal adult suffrage." And, given this last condition, few will seriously quibble with the Home Secretary's conclusion, which forms the basis of his new political initiative, that "the reform programme which has been and continues to be carried through, and to which both the Northern Ireland Government and the United Kingdom Government are fully committed, together with increased opportunities for participation by representatives of the mniority on the lines suggested in Mr Faulkner's recent initiative, have pointed the way forward." Mr Faulkner has already brought an opposition member into his government and has suggested giving important positions on Stormont committees to the opposition parties. In addition to this, the use of proportional representation to increase the strength of the opposition, and of moderate opinion, in Stormont is now another card that the British Government, presumably through the Stormont regime, is ready to play.
The Maudling proposals offer the opposition groups in Northern Ireland the opportunity to contribute to a continuing programme of political reform within the context of Stormont. They amount to a further extension of the policy followed by British governments since 1968. That that policy has also been accompanied by a deterioration of the situation to its present disastrous condition does not, itself, mean that the policy of reform through and with Stormont will continue to fail. But on the other hand, the history of the province since 1968 can supply no grounds at all for hoping that some more doses of much the same mixture as before will provide a cure The sectarian majority in Northern Ireland has ruled in Stormont since 1922 and, as long as Northern Irish politics are sectarian, that majority will continue to rule, proportional representation, incorporation of opposition parties in the governing process, or any other constitutional device notwithstanding. The Spectator has already argued that the Stormont regime and experiment has failed. Professor Vaizey, elsewhere in this issue, and Mr Enoch Powell, from their different points of view arrive at the same conclusion The United Kingdom Government retains final responsibility for the governing of Northern Ireland. So far, although Mr Heath's talks with Mr Lynch are better than no talks, and although Mr Maudling's initiative to endeavour to find a political solution through reforms within the context of Stormont is better than no initiative, the present British Government, like its predecessor, has done nothing more than tinker with the Irish problem.
Tinkering with Ireland has not made matters better in the past, and may yet make matters worse. It is agreed on all sides that the unification of Ireland is not in present circumstances a practical proposition. While wishing Mr Maudling's initiative well, we remain of the opinion that the Stormont arrangement has outlived whatever political usefulness it may once have possessed, and we conclude that the privilege of self-government should be withdrawn, and that Ulster should be governed, like the rest of the state, from Westminster, by Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
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