THE NEUTRALITY OF AMERICA.
IT can scarcely be expected that the most omnivorous reader will be able to keep abreast of all the voluminous war literature of the day. Nevertheless, it may be hoped that Professor Shield Nicholson's admirable pamphlet, The Neutrality of the United States in Rela- tion to the British and German Empires (Macmillan and Co., 6d.), will be widely read both in the United States and in the United Kingdom. It affords abundant food for reflection to the English-speaking race on both sides of the Atlantic. Amidst the many errors into which German materialism, in its scorn for all moral influences, has fallen, probably none is greater than the miscalculation made of the effect likely to be produced on American public opinion by the war. The German view, as originally held, may, broadly speaking, be stated in the form of a syllogism, thus :- The Americans care for nothing but making money. They will make more money if the English, who are their commercial rivals, are crushed out of existence. Ergo, America will be wholly on the side of Germany.
Those' who, like myself, had seen something of the spirit displayed by the American people during the 'great struggle of more than half a century ago, when they were fighting for the unity of their country and for the predominance of a high over a relatively lower moral standard of civilization, were not likely to be deceived by a transparent sophism of this description. They would deride the attempt made by a, German megalomaniac, by name Professor Sombart, whose silly diatribes are quoted by Professor Nicholson, to divide the Teutonic race into German heroes and Anglo-Saxon hucksters. They had learnt from history that the hucksters had often displayed the truest heroism, and, especially if they had been behind the diplomatic scenes, they knew that the heroes had at times shown themselves adepts in the art of huckstering. There are, without doubt, sordid devotees of Mammon in New York and Chicago, as there are in London and Berlin, but it was a very serious political error to suppose that a great nation, which bad heretofore; posed as the special champion of international morality and of the observance of treaty rights, would suddenly abandon all its most cherished principles, and subordinate them wholly to monetary influences. Absolutism is, however, a bad judge of democracy. The German absolutists do not, indeed, 'appear until quite recently to have made any really serious effort to understand American public opinion. This mistake being at last recognized, some belated efforts were eventually made to show the Americans how entirely they had misunderstood the spirit which animates 'German policy. Herr von Mach, for instance, has denounced Bernhardi and all his works. He has explained how erroneous it is to suppose that Germany is the home of militarism ; how the Kaiser, whose title of " War Lord" is merely a synonym for the more usual 'expression of "Commander-in-Chief," is, in truth, "the great prince of peace" ; and how the divine right of Kings, 'a belief in which has been banished from the Anglo-Saxon world since Charles I. lost his head, is "no more than a deep personal religious conviction." The effect of these blandishments is somewhat discounted' by Professor Sombart, who writes exclusively for a German public, and who stoutly declares that " militarism is German heroism made visible" ; that it is "a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth" ; that the State—that political creation which is so dear to the German mind—is super- individual, inasmuch as it is " the conscious organization of something above the individual," that " something " being apparently incarnated in the Kaiser ; that the Germans are " the representatives of God's thought on earth " ; that they intend "to take as much of the sea and of the earth as they need for their'existence and for their natural increase," but with the consolatory proviso that they "do not want anything more than this " ; and that when the aged Kant, who is the solo known• German representative of pacificism, wrote a "wretched book" on Everlasting Peace, he sinned against "the holy ghost of Germanism." Which is the true representative of con- temporaneous German thought—Herr von Mach or Professor Sombart? All the evidence available points to the conclusion that this honour may be assigned to the latter rather than to the former of these antagonistic political philosophers. The English democracy never made any such serious blunders as these. From the first they felt no doubt that they would secure the sympathies of their brother-demo- crats on the other side of the Atlantic. Neither have they been disappointed in their expectation. But it cannot be denied that as outrage succeeded to violation, as more and more solemn treaty obligations were added to the scrap- heap, and as it became daily more apparent that no considerations based on public morality or the dictates of humanity would be allowed to interfere with the ruthless execution of the policy of "frightfulness," Englishmen, notably before the sinking of the Arabic' led to a change in the attitude assumed by President Wilson, were somewhat amazed at American patience, and, albeit they were very reluctant either to criticize the action of the United States Government or to have the least appear- ance of proffering advice as to what course was dictated by American interests, they began to mutter 010718que tandem, ? beneath their breath.
Professor Nicholson now explains that the strictures which the policy adopted by President Wilson has evoked, whether in America or in England, arise from " failure to grasp the distinction between national interests and national sympathies." To an outside observer, who has not the privilege of having been brought personally into contact with Mr. Wilson, his public conduct reveals a typo of character with which the world has for long been familiar. He is apparently a high-minded man of thought rather than a resolute man of action. He is deeply and very rightly impressed by the responsibility of his position. He is earnestly desirous of doing his duty not only to his country, but also, it cannot be doubted, to the civilized world. Professor Nicholson pays a high and well-deserved tribute to his learning. " Of the theory and the history of political science," he says, " Mr. Woodrow Wilson knows more than all the other rulers of the world put together." Before forming any opinion he examines the arguments on both sides of any controversy with the most scrupulous care and conscientiousness. " He is himself so reasonable and impartial that he wants to make all the people in the United States equally open-minded and patient." Thus, if he eventually decides on taking any definite action, he will almost certainly have the whole public opinion of America at his back. This is unquestionably a very great advantage. On the other hand, Mr. Wilson cannot escape from the defects of his qualities. " Academic 'training," Professor Nicholson remarks with great truth, "is liable to beget, not only the very great merit of patience, but the very grave demerit of indecision."
The main issue involved in the present struggle has been stated in many epigrammatic forms. It may be submitted for the consideration of the people of the United States that the essential point, in so far as they are concerned, is this—that the result of the war will supply a practical answer to a crucial question in which they, perhaps More than any other community on the face of the globe, are deeply interested. That question is as follows—" Is democracy a failure ? " Political philosophers, at least from the days of Bacon downwards, have repeatedly pointed out that war and revolution afford the surest tests in estimating the solidity of the foundations on which any political fabric is based. How' will democracy stand this test ? The experience so far gained tends to show that democracy possesses some important, but nevertheless relatively minor, defects which absolutism avoids, whilst, on the other hand, it can secure one triumph to which absolutism can never hope to aspire. The defects are manifested by unpleasant symptoms, such as strikes, which seem to indicate an abuse of liberty and a failure to appreciate the gravity of a great crisis, the latter being, in the case of the English democracy, due in some respects to the insular position of England. The triumph, which is of world-wide interest and importance, is that the true basis of Imperial rule has been clearly shown to consist, not in an increase of coercion, but in an extension of liberty. The cohesion displayed in the face of menace by the scattered units which constitute the British Empire is one of the most remarkable and instructive facts recorded in history. But no final verdict can as yet be delivered on the relative merits of the two systems when judged by the test which has now been applied. The sword has been thrown into the scale, and the sword must, in so far at all events as the present generation is concerned, decide. In the meanwhile the general sympathies of the citizens of the United States can scarcely be a. matter of doubt. On every point German ideals run diametrically counter to all the principles of government which the American people hold as most sacred. British ideals, on the contrary, are in complete conformity with those principles. It would be inconceivable that Americans should not display sympathy in the one, and antipathy, amounting almost to a feeling of repulsion, in the other case. That, how- ever, is in iteelf uo reason why America should actively interfere in the contest. " The United States," Professor Nicholson very truly remarks, "cannot set up to be the general judge and policeman for the whole world. Don Quixote himself might have quailed before such a task." It is perfectly reasonable to maintain that active interference on the part of the United States can only be justified. in the eyes of American citizens by arguments based, not on sympathies, but on interests. Nevertheless, it would appear to outsiders that a, wide interpretation should be given to the word " interests." That, however, is a point which Americans alone can decide. The main object of Professor Nichol. son's work is to elucidate the various pleas and circum- stances which merit consideration in arriving at a decision. It would be difficult to strengthen the logical force of the chain of the arguments which he employs in his treatment of this subject, or to improve on the felicity of the language in which those arguments are clothed. He con- cludes by a statement which is of a nature to carry conviction to the minds of all lovers of justice and humanity in democratic countries. " What," he says, " America owes to others is to support, so far as her duty to herself will permit, the law of nations as against the arbitrary violation by military power." Before leaving this instructive work it may be mentioned that even those who are fairly familiar with the economic writings of List are possibly unaware of a feature in the history of German development to which Professor Nicholson draws attention—namely, that the political programme which of late years has been steadily pursued by Gorman statesmen was originally traced out almost in its complete entirety by List. There is, however, this notable difference in the method foreshadowed by List and that actually employed by his successors—that whereas List contemplated that his ideals would be attained by none but peaceful means, his successors, .being in a hurry, and being, moreover, intoxicated with the sense of German omnipotence, have considered it advisable that those ideals should be speedily realized by the use of force. Inci- dentally, it may be mentioned, as a point which is perhaps worthy of special attention at Amsterdam, that List held that " Holland belongs as much to Germany as Brittany and Normandy belong to France." The remark naturally leads to the reflection that if Germany should be vanquished in the present contest, all will fortunately be well for nations which have been able to preserve their neutrality. The triumph of the Allies will incidentally involve their triumph. But if—pod Die non placed —the contrary should prove to be the case, and if Germany should emerge victorious from the struggle, neutrals will eventually have to ask themselves whether a more timely and active interference on their part might not have obviated the disastrous results which must inevitably ensue both to themselves and to the world in general. Unless they are in a position to answer this question with a very confident negative, history will record the highly condemnatory verdict of " Too late "—than which none is more fatal to the reputation of statesmen—on the conduct of the politicians who, during this period of crisis, have guided the destinies of their respective countries.
CROMER.
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