SPANISH PROSPECTS.
AFTER five years of ceaseless turmoil, Spain seems visibly nearer domestic peace ; at least so far as the elimination of one discordant element is concerned—Carlism appears to have entered its last phase. At no previous period, not even when Concha, after the Bilbao campaign, led his soldiers against the outlying posts of Estella, have the prospects of the National party been so bright. The Royal adventurer, who has drawn so largely on Basque devotion and Ultramontane fanaticism, has never stood so high as when he covered the siege of Bilbao from the heights of Sommorostro, and threatened with capture not only the Biscayau capital, but Santander itself. That represents his grandest offensive move- ment, and since his conspicuous defeat by Serrano and Concha, he has been virtually reduced to an expectant defensive, varied by outpost fighting and foraging,—that is, plundering exploits, more or less sanguinary. No doubt there were instants when gleams of success encouraged his hopes and bewildered onlookers; when his cousin Alfonso swept down upon Cuenca, a mere useless, freebooting raid ; when his divisional Generals went forth upon promenades along the left Ebro bank, and his active partisans seized locomotives, cut telegraphs and plun- dered even churches, close to the Nationalist head-quarters ; when Sabath tried so audaciously to surprise Puyeerda, when Seo de Urgel was captured, and not only Catalonia, but Aragon, appeared to be in peril. Virtually, however, all these successes were delusive. They were isolated fragments, and did not form a well-jointed piece of solid work, which alone gives permanence and power to the offensive in war. Ever
since Pampeluna and the mouth of the Bidassoa were relieved from pressure, the Nationals have, however slowly, gained ground. Despite the daring movement of Dorregaray south of the Ebro, the gallant stand made by Lizarraga, and the efforts of such truculent chiefs as Saballs and the Cara of Flix, Carlism has gone the downward path. The restoration of the Monarchy rendered the officers loyal to the nation, and breathed fresh life into the Army, showing that class-feelings are more potent than patriotism in Spain,. as elsewhere • and just as Cartagena was rapidly taken when Castelr was overthrown, so short work has been made of Dorregaray and Lizarraga after the advent of Alfonso SIL The Royalist Generals, Jovellar and Martinez. Campos, when they had a King who could confer honours and revive class-government, really put forth their best energies. The Moderados who came back to power with the youthful monarch used their advantage to levy men, and thus supplied the means of securing their own position, as well as that of interests. Alfonso who merely embodies therests. And we frankly_
admit t their
they have shown a clearer comprehension of the conditions under which Spain can be goverened, as well an- Carlos overcome, than any set of rulers since an unknown assassin robbed Prim of his life. Whether the dominant section can rise above a somewhat low level of governing. ability, time will show the credulous ; but there are fair grounds for the inference that they represent sufficiently the national spirit at least to cast out the self-seeking Carlos before- they begin to quarrel among themselves for the spoils Of office and the luxuries of power.
The capture of Seo de Urgel is the climax of a series of movements begun months ago, when Jovellar and Martinez Campos started forth to grapple with Dorregaray in the Teruel. Almost for the first time a deliberate plan seems to have been formed, and worked out with encouraging steadfastness. Which of the two Generals furnished the brain and which the hand may be uncertain, but whatever share Jovellar has had in the business, it is pretty plain that Campos is a daring, stubborn,. and vigorous leader. By acting in close conceit, as well as- towards a definite aim, the Carats were expelled from Canta- vieja the famous stronghold of Cabrera forty years ago, de- prived of much fighting materiel, and gradually but surely pushed northward back over the Ebro. Dorregaray, indeed„ was forced to display all his adroitness in slipping past the columns, and although he is reported to have found a tem- porary resting-place in the province of Lerida, which is doubt- ful, recent events have made it plain that his opponents suc- cessfully cut him off from Seo de Urgel and the bands in northern Catalonia. He seems to have gone northward, and to- have hovered about the spurs of the Pyrenees in Northern Aragon, but not to have passed the Noguera. Thus isolated, Lizarraga, and the Bishop of Seo de Urgel had no choice, except to make a desperate defence or surrender. Neither Saballs on the side. of La Cerdana nor Dorregaray under the peaks of the Pyrenees. tothe westward, could help them. The action of the French Government in permitting a convoy to pass through their territory and reach Campos by way of Puyeerda, and in main- taining a strong frontier-guard; shows how materially they could have helped to crush Carlism at the outset, had the parties dominant in Versailles been reasonably loyal to Spain. Sheowes, in great part, a protracted civil war to the intriguers who preferred a Chambord, or even a Bonaparte, to a national republic. These politicians have been somewhat mollified by the restoration of Monarchy, and constrained by the remon- strances of Bismarck, who in opposing Carlos certainly expresses European opinion. Thus, by following out a deliberate plan, acting in masses, or by well-articulated but wider move- ments, and also being aided by France the All onsist Generals paralysed the marauding Carlist bands, and fairly netted the chivalrous Lizarraga, and the bold prelate- who has at least risked his neck for his King, in the old city and castle, which, sitting between the Bolira and the Segre, above the point where the mountain torrents rush together, blocks up one of the roads into France. The siege has been resolutely pressed, the resistance has been soldier-like, and the surrender, although a successful assault might have been delivered, has been effected by famine. The chief merit in the operation seems to have lain in the skill which rendered relief impossible, and in the prompt seizure, at all costs, of those points of vantage whence absolute command of the castle, its water-supply, and means of active defence could be obtained. Martinez Campos, the King-maker, deserves the credit, at least, for this work. He more than paved the way for the upshot— unconditional surrender—which the arrival of Jovellar made
inevitable. Lizarraga seems to be a Spaniard of the nobler type, and, respected alike in both camps, one cannot be surprised that, while he was liberated on parole—giving his word, like a Duguesclin, or King John of France, to return at an appointed time—no such consideration should have been shown towards the belligerent Bishop, who was, and is, kept a close prisoner, under watchful guard. Whether the Govern- ment will have the courage to inflict an exemplary punishment on the warrior-priest, or even upon Don Carlos himself, should they catch him is more than doubtful. But until some severe chastisement falls upon a selfish pretender and his sacerdotal allies, the tranquillity of at least two so-called Latin nations will continue to be in constant peril from their ambition and fanaticism.
On the main theatre of warfare no essential change has recently occurred. Don Carlos, like Ha.dji Stavros, is King of the Mountain, but his followers only quit that shelter to meet with defeat, or at least frustration. It has long since been correctly observed that no crown can be won by sitting on the hills, and that until he could cross the Ebro, the Bourbon pretender had no chance of success. That he has kept a realm at bay for so many years is creditable to his hardy Generals and brave soldiery, but it is absurd to suppose, no matter how obstinate and courageous the Basques and Navarrese may be, that insuperable military difficulties protect them from sub- jugation. Nothing is more deceptive than the supposed strength of mountain positions, and few scenes of combat really offer greater opportunities to a skilful assailant. Who can doubt that a Soult or a Sachet, a Von Werder or Von Manteffel, an Ochterloney or a Pollock, with fifty or sixty thousand good troops, would have long ago tumbled Don Carlos into France or the Bay of Biscay, if they did not bring him to the block. Despite the indisputable excellence of the Carlist battalions, they could not have stood against well-planned and steadily executed manceuvres. But since Concha fell, the Spanish Generals have been able to do nothing save march and counter- march, repel foragers or raiders, and relieve the threatened towns in the debateable land. Now, we presume, the Ebro army will be reinforced from Catalonia, and a fresh effort will be directed against the hills. But the main reliance of Alfonso's councillors will probably be upon that species of capitulation styled a "convenio,"—upon the discouragement produced by fruitless warfare, upon jealousies and quarrels in the Carlist camp, upon the somewhat violent and impulsive character of Carlos himself. Rumours of disintegration have long floated in the air ; we are told of Generals dismissed or superseded, and even the organs of the Roman Ultramontanes sound forth counsels of despair. Probably if the Madrid authorities would guarantee the famous, much-cherished Fueros, offer a real amnesty to the soldiers and honourable terms to the officers, the base of the rebellion would be undermined, and the Pretender would be compelled to fly in order to save hiraself from the falling ruins. But we have not yet reached that pass. The allies of Carlos in Europe still supply him with arms and munition, and experience as old as the Penin- sular war shows how arduous is the task of preventing hardy and shifty sea-dogs from landing cargoes on the coast between the Bidassoa and the Bilbao rivers. The English Admiralty could not, or at least did not, do it in 1813-14. The Spanish steamers, however, would be better employed in blockading than bombarding, and more activity and seamanship might be shown than is now exhibited. But the Navy will not ter- minate war, nor will its shortcomings materially defer the end. If the Nation is to conquer by next spring, the work will have to be accomplished by a stiff combination of diplomacy and fighting ashore, and the signs now visible on all sides point to such a desirable result.
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