COMMUNISM

War of religion, 1969 style

TIBOR SZAMUELY

Twenty years ago this month, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the Chinese People's Republic. This was, by any reckoning, one of the half- dozen greatest events of our century. Loud was the rejoicing in Moscow, inordinate the sorrow in Washington. All the experts (with the possible exception of that well-known political scientist, J. Stalin) were agreed on one thing: that the most populous nation in the world had become a satellite of the

USSR.

Could anyone have foreseen then that the victory of the Chinese revolution would lead to perpetual, implacable hostility between the two great communist powers, to a state of semi-warfare along the world's longest land frontier that might go on for generations? Of all the 'ironies of history' which marxists love to talk about (in order to explain why nothing ever happens accord- ing to their 'scientific' predictions) this one must be the most ironic. Indeed—so gro- tesque does it all seem—even we in the west are still unable to believe the evidence of our own eyes. Surely they don't really mean it, we think. This is why, whenever an issue of Pravda fails to attack the 'Maoist clique', or the Pekin Review contains somewhat fewer references to the 'New Tsars', or Kosygin and Chou En-lai scowl at each other in the Pekin airport lounge, a great cry goes up: the Russians and the Chinese are settling their differen'ces at last. Despite all the repeti- tive false alarms of the last few years, we still expect them to kiss and make up. Why? Simple: because they are all communists.

In the study of Soviet affairs I invariably follow the rule that anything, anything at all, can happen in that country. But one should never lose sight of another basic law concerning relations between communist states: there is no one a communist hates as much as a communist of another nationality. That is why the forecasts of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement should be treated with some scepticism. Many believe that this will come about after Mao's death. Even the Great Helmsman, I suppose, is mortal, and the day when he ascends the dragon cannot be too far off. But I doubt whether his passing will result in a radical change. The breach between the two giants is far too deep.

The border clashes, the hints at territorial claims, the thinly veiled racialist allusions to the Yellow Peril, and so on—all these have combined to create the impression that what we are witnessing is essentially a national conflict. That, of course, would be serious enough in itself—many a war has been sparked off by nationalism. But thwarted national ambition is only a part, perhaps only the lesser part, of the story.

The Sino-Soviet conflict can be pro- perly understood within the context, not

of twentieth century wars of nationalism, but of sixteenth century wars of religion. Communism is a secular religion—we underrate this point at our peril—and the present struggle between Pekin and Moscow is a clash not merely between two communist states, but between two very different types of communism.

Western rational man, having down- graded religion and rejected ideology, can hardly be blamed for refusing to distinguish between two equally abhorrent systems of tyranny masquerading under an identical idealistic label. The differences, nonetheless, are not only very real—they are the combus- tible materials for new, possibly centuries- long, wars of religion.

The essential divergence between the Russian and Chinese varieties of commun- ism first became apparent in 1958, when Mao began establishing his People's Com- munes (though they had originated much earlier, even before 1949, in the Spartan fastnesses of Yenan). Significantly, 1958 marked the beginning of the real conflict. But the final parting of the ideological ways came three years ago, with the 'Great Pro- letarian Cultural Revolution'. At that time, when most commentators were discussing the fresh convulsion in terms of a vulgar power- struggle, I wrote in this journal : 'We are confronted by an experiment of truly unique magnitude: the first deliberate attempt actually to create the classless Communist society envisaged by Marx and Lenin. . . . The essential core of the Cultural Revolu- tion and of the preceding developments is a sweeping egalitarianism: the eliminations of all distinctions within Chinese society. This seems to be Mao's guarantee against a pos- sible bourgeois degeneration'.

Nothing that has happened since has made me modify this opinion—rather, the contrary. Yet it is not widely shared in the west : power-struggles or generation gaps or mobilisations for total war are far more intelligible to us than the crazy, romantic notion of building a classless society. All the more important, therefore, that last month a long theoretical analysis of the Cultural Revolution in the Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta should have made exactly the same point — and made it, to heighten the irony, in the form of a bitter accusation. The heirs of Lenin have denounced Mao for the ultimate, unspeak- able offence: for actually daring to imple- ment Lenin's theories! This latest Soviet indictment tells us as much about the USSR —the most inegalitarian, bureaucratic and unjust society in the world—as it does about China.

The Cultural Revolution, say the authors, Yu. Ostrovityanov and A. Sterbalova, was 'a

peculiar reaction to the rapid growth o tradictions' caused by the `difficulti building Socialism in a backward cot Until 1958, they continue, all went we just as in the -ussa): a new industrial ing-class was created and paid accord differentiated piece-rates ; a new 'state ratus' was set up and a new intellig educated ; the peasantry 'became the source for capital investment, for pr ing the material means needed to full economic and political plans'. So fi good: all sound, orthodox Stalinist tice. Naturally, say the authors, pro arose, namely 'grave disparities in standards': some workers earned ten more than others ; 'the great major' peasants received hardly anything for work on the collective fields and e, solely thanks to their individual hou plots', etc. As a result, 'dissatisfaction up amongst the poorest categories of ing-people'. In other words, China h created the happy conditions of Ru the mid-1930s, and the authors ar fectly satisfied.

Stalin, of course, had solved his little lems by unleashing the most ghastly re terror known to history. Yet was thi rect path followed by the deviationist No. With unfeigned horror the a describe how Mao 'utilised the mute ment within Chinese society to laun "cultural revolution" and declare him protector of the poorest masses aga "embourgeoise" section of the popul the party bureaucracy, the Stakhanovit state apparatus. And what did the viii next? Why, 're-distribute incomes uniformly low level, abolish financial tives, and advocate [just think of it principles of egalitarianism that have tionally influenced the social psycho' the popular masses'.

There it is, the principal Soviet ideo indictment of Mao: that he has h infernal cheek to carry out the prim] Marxism-Leninism. The contempt which Soviet propagandists treat readers surpasses belief. Every I Russian has read Lenin's The Suu Revolution, and must realise that China today corresponds exactly to vision of the first phase of the Corn society : 'All citizens are transform into hired employees of the state, wh sists of the armed workers. Al! become employees and workers of a nation-wide state "syndicate". All required is that they should work do their proper share of work, a equally paid. . . . The whole of six] have become a single office and a factory, with equality of labour and of pay.'

The Soviet propagandists tie the into knots to explain why egalita despite Lenin's words, is contrary 'true spirit of socialism', and how Ma Engels and Lenin really meant so quite different from what they wrote. They certainly have a lot of e ing to do.

The choice between egalitarian and arbitrariness, on the one hand. rigid caste system and police tyran the other, is not very exciting, But. at things from a distance, one must the Chinese variety of commums least free of the hypocrisy of its counterpart—even if that is about all man Mao has to show for his twen in power.

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