SCEPTICAL PATRONAGE OF THE POPE.
MALLOCK, in his contributions to the Nineteenth Century, is making for himself a new and curious function,—that of a sceptical patron of the Pope. In paper after paper he explains to his astonished readers why it is pro- bably reasonable to be a Roman Catholic, though he himself, as he adds emphatically in the last paper, is not a Roman Catholic, but a sceptic,—" a literal sceptic," as he expresses it,—in other words " a complete outsider, who is desirous, in con- sidering the religious condition of our time, to estimate fairly and fully the character and the prospects of the one existing reli- gion that seems capable either of appealing to or of appeasing it." But Mr. Mallock's papers hardly correspond with this defini- tion of his position. lie is, of course, outside the Church of Rome, but if he is weighing all that can be said for and against it, as a true sceptic would, he is keeping one side of his thoughts to himself, and only giving the other to the world. He suppresses his difficulties, and divulges only the recommendations of the Church of Rome. A true sceptic would tell you what it is that still keeps him doubtful of the claims which he so strongly urges upon us. But Mr. Mallock writes his testi- monials for the Church of Rome without confiding to us why these testimonials have not prevailed with himself,—why he has not yet engaged for his own spiritual case the physician whose fame he is doing almost all in his power to spread among his countrymen. He is not unjustly severe on the agnosticism of Professor Tyndall, who boasts in one breath of the mystical humility with which he accepts the incomprehensible agency of human conscious- ness in the sequences of the natural universe, and withdraws in the next, all reality from his concession. But is not Mr. Mallock himself doing much the same thing, when he explains
so elaborately why the Roman Catholic Church has such admir- able claims to a hearing, and then only tells us blankly that he is not a Catholic, but a sceptic, without any of the reasons why he has not been persuaded by his own arguments ? If Professor Tyndall declines to be either a Materialist or an Immaterialist, Mr. Mallock declines to be either a believer or a disbeliever, and we do not know why the suspense of opinion between apparent contradictions which he denounces in Professor Tyndall as illogical and cowardly, should be more praiseworthy in Mr. Mallock. We do not doubt that he has his reasons for not becoming a Catholic, and is really hesitating between inconsistent conclusions, unable to accept either, and still more unable to accept both ; but if so, how does his position differ from Professor Tyn- dall's, as to the material and immaterial character of causation ? He, too, hesitates between two opposite conclusions, unable to accept either, and still more unable to accept both,—though in a moment of unusual imaginative catholicity he de- clines to treat them as mutually exclusive, — which Mr. Mallock, if we understand him rightly, thinks an unpar- donable weakness. Yet we doubt whether from Professor Tyndall's point of view, it really is so. If human reason be to some extent a glimpse of the Infinite reason, if its laws are impres- sions of the thought which is part and parcel of creation, then, indeed, contradictions in thought must correspond to incompati- bilities in fact. But if not, if the theological view of the universe be a dream of fanatics, if consciousness itself be an accident not belonging to the true chain of causation at all, but rather an irrele- vant redundancy, which has crept into the universe as an impotent interloper who can alter nothing,—why might it not be one of the natural imbecilities of such a position that man is compelled to see radical inconsistencies between things which are actually consistent because they consist, or indeed that he should regard as perfectly consistent things as mutually exclusive as hate and love? We doubt whether it be even so illogical for an agnostic to take the benefit of absolute contradictions in thought, as it is for a sceptic to re- commend the Church of Rome to others, while suppressing the weighty reasons which still deny to him the benefits he perceives. Is it possible that Mr. Mallock rather likes the position of a patron ab extra, and shrinks from that of obedience ab infra, to which he would have to betake himself, if he were to be convinced by his own arguments ? Some features in his essays look like it. There must be something novel and dignified in patronising so old and mighty an organisation as the Church of Rome. There must be something grati- fying in sensibly promoting by fallible reasons the prospects of an infallible Pope. There is an " Ego et rex meus " tone about Mr. Mallock's papers, which of course he would have to abandon, if he ever entered the Church. He does not act at all as Dr. Newman acted when, by long and slow and reluctant approximation, he rather felt than saw his way into the Roman Church. Dr. Newman thought it essential to his position to protest against the Church of Rome ; and be protested, as long as he could, till he had sounded all his own objections, and believed that he had found them wanting. But Mr. Mallock airily defends the Church, from the high ground of his scepticism. He tells the English people that if there be a faith worth anything, there it is, though, for his own part, he is not satisfied that there is a faith worth anything anywhere,—a position which seems to us rather ominous of the doubtful value of Mr. Mallock's creed. For our own part, we should have thought that this position involved so much more ultimate and profound a doubt than any other, that it would have been better to be quite sure on that point first, before proceeding to determine the hypo- thetical question as to which guide is the true one, if any guide there be. We do not usually rate very highly the power of any one to discriminate between shades of excellence, who has not as yet assured himself whether there be such a thing as excellence at all. We should hardly choose a man who doubted whether sound finance were possible, to point out which of existing systems of finance were the sound- est. We should hardly choose a profound sceptic of all virtue, to compare for us the moral worth of different men. And we confess to a doubt whether the point of view of complete scepticism as to the existence of any supernatural faith, is the best for determining which of the actual faiths of mankind in the supernatural is the truest.
The defect of Mr. Mallock's method, in proposing rather to find out where God's revelation is, if there be any revelation, than from a profound belief in revealed truth to find out the Church which has preserved that truth most faithfully, is very strikingly illustrated in the curious pages which conclude his new paper in the Nineteenth Century, on Intolerance and Per- secution. His contention there is, that certainty is always and rightly intolerant of that which undermines certainty, and that per- secution is nothing but the means which a just intolerance takes, when it can safely take it, for preventing the great mischief which comes of the undermining of certainty. He points out that we are all, and quite rightly, intolerant of immoral teaching ; that the law of a healthy State persecutes immoral teaching ; and he maintains that, on precisely the same grounds, a State which had a strong faith in the supernatural would be in- tolerant of scepticism, and persecute it, as a sanitary measure, if it seemed probable that the persecution would be effectual. But here the nature of his scepticism really makes his argument worthless. If he had been quite sure, to begin with, that there is a supernatural world and a supernatural life to know, he would have seen why it is impossible to put the incul- cation of immoral principles, and the inculcation of wrong views concerning that supernatural life, on the same basis. The very core and essence of our faith in God is our faith in righteous- ness. On that point, Revelation hinges ; from that centre, all re- vealed truth proceeds. It is therefore quite allowable and natural to be more certain of the heart of the matter, than of the less ulti- mate and far more mysterious and vaguely-defined truths which are more or less derivative,—which depend on our grasp of the heart of the matter. It is precisely the same in natural science. If we find a man believing, and acting as if he believed, that two and three make nine, we no longer consider him competent to manage his own affairs, and even empower others to supersede him. But if we find a man merely believing, like the late Mr. Urquhart, that Russia is the author of all evil in politica, or, like certain Currency fanatics, that a paper currency would make States prosperous, we permit them to air their crotchets freely, because we think that it is the greatest possible security for truth, to be constantly challenged to resist, and to be obliged to answer, error. So in relation to theology, it may be and is necessary to assume the moral law as at the very basis of human life, though the moral law is intellectually open to criticism. But it does not follow that we should pro- hibit what we think to be error, in relation to the less ultimate though still sure truths of Revelation, because it may be the very best test of those truths, the very best evidence of their divine power to vivify the human conscience, that they should dis- pute their position with erroneous views on the same subject, and prove their power, like all other divine power, to hold their own. Mr. Mallock ignores the fact that in relation to hundreds and thousands of natural laws and truths which it is very mischiev- ous to doubt, we permit the open advocacy of doubt, and even denial, and find our full advantage in permitting it, the result being that they prove their truth in the best possible way, by vanquishing these doubts and denials. Why should not the same method be applied to theology ? The Roman Church herself admits that such conclusions as she has reached were only reached through doubt, denial, discussion, and the pronouncement which followed discussion. Where is the proof that the method which established these truths is not also the best method to maintain them ? Is the supernatural world so unreal, that it cannot vindicate its truth against the illusions of human philosophy, though the natural world succeeds in vindi- cating its truths against the illusions of false science ? The truth is that Mr. Mallock's ultimate scepticism has blinded him to the fact that there is no real parallelism between tolerating criminal immorality and tolerating false theology. If we do not know what righteousness is, even better than we know what God is, we do not know God at all. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a deeper certainty concerning righteous- ness than concerning those truths about God which go be- yond the assumption of his righteousness. And it does not follow at all that we should not welcome that check upon false theological conclusions which is secured by free discussion, because we do not welcome a check which we do not need on the possible dogmatisms of moral decency. It is certain, that even in relation to Revelation, discussion was the first condition of eliciting the truth. A priori, then, it might be expected to remain the best condition of maintaining the truth. Those who deny that it is so ought to prove their case, not to throw the onus of proving it on their opponents.
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