HOW THE REFERENDUM WOULD WORK.
WHAT the Referendum, if adopted here, would mean in practice is this. If the House of Lords and the House of Commons could not agree upon the merits of a measure, which means in effect that the House of Lords considered that the Will of the People had not been properly expressed on the measure, that measure, instead of waiting, as under the Parliament Act, for two years before it could be forced upon the Lords, and also, perhaps, on the country, might at once be submitted to a Poll of the People. The measure as it had left the House of Commons, i.e. after it had received the careful consideration of the popular House, would be laid before the electors with the simple question, Is it your wish that this Bill shall come into operation ? Say " Yes " or "No." But that is not the only way (see the Bill of the late Lord Balfour of Burleigh) in which it is proposed that a matter of legislative dispute should be submitted to the people. It is argued, and not unreasonably, that if one particular party in the State happened to have a temporary majority in the Commons, and also one in the House of Lords, they could pass measures of tremendous importance through Parliament, and so make them law, although these measures were not, in reality, desired by the nation at large, or, to put it more scientifically, although the Will of the People had not been strictly ascertained in regard to them. Therefore, it is proposed by those who favour the Poll of the People that even when a Bill has passed both Houses of Parliament it shall he submitted to the people for endorse- ment or veto if, say, 200 or 250 members of the House of Commons sign a petition to the Crown asking that the Act shall be referred to a Poll of the People before it comes into operation. By this means the possibility of the capture of unlimited power by a party which could secure a chance majority in both Lords and Commons would be avoided.
The objections made to the Referendum are severaL In the first place it has been said that it would be too expensive. The example of Switzerland, however, and the American States show that this is not a real objection. No doubt we could, if we liked, make it extravagant, but, on the .other hand, if we took the trouble, we could hold it as cheaply as it is held in the cases named. Next, it is said that it might lead to revolutionary measures. No doubt it might, just as the existence of a House of Commons may lead to revolutionary measures. But it could not make things worse in that respect, though it might make them better. It has actually been argued that a Bill might be sent to the people proposing the abolition of all taxes on persons with less than 1500 a year. In that case we are assured that the people would rush to record their assent. But, remember, this curious Bill would have to get through Parliament first. If it could get through Parliament we should be no worse off in having a second chance of -defeating it. At present Parliament can be as silly as it likes and no second thoughts are possible. No one could guarantee that the people would always vote for the right course ; but, at any rate, it could do no harm to give them the opportunity to do so.
In truth, these are factitious objections. The real danger of revolution is not from the people, but from the usurpation of power through the bad working of the -representative machinery. What happens in revolutions is that the legitimate government breaks down, that there- upon power is usurped, as we saw it usurped- in -Russia, by a body like the Soviet. The next step comes quickly. The usurping authority uses the parliamentary machine to secure its authority as did the Jacobins during the French Revolution. There is the real peril. The Referen- dum, as the French extremists knew, is the great and only absolutely certain curb to such tactics. Therefore, they always scouted the idea of the Referendum. It was regarded as a crime to propose it. The men, for example, who desired that the question of the execution of the King should be referred to the people were at once denounced by the extremists and their names were held up to odium by the leaders of the Paris Bans-Culottes. They were described as the enemies of Liberty who had actually proposed that the People should decide whether the King should or should not die. There is nothing that usurper); dread so much as an appeal to the people. As an English Radical paper once naively expressed it, there could be no real reforms—by which, of course, it meant no crank legislation—if the people were given a right of veto. But though we believe that a truly democratic measure like the Referendum would act in an anti-revolutionary direction, we cannot absolutely guarantee this. All we will say is that what we want to ascertain is the true Will of the People. If it is the Will of the People to have revolutions, then they will no doubt have them. We are quite prepared to run the risk, nor can we make any virtue of it: If it is the Will of the People, it is obvious that we have got to run that risk whether we like it or not. If law and order are to perish, let them perish at the hands of the People themselves, and not at the hands of those who usurp the forms without the substance of Democracy. The final objection is that the Referendum would demoralize the House of Commons and take away its sense of responsibility. We do not believe it would for a moment. We believe, on the contrary, that the effect would be to strengthen the House of Commons—to cut out the canker of group rule, i.e., log-rolling. Further, it would restore popularity to the House of Commons. As we have said, the House of Commons is becoming hateful to the people because it is the repository of final and un- limited power. When the People themselves, as is the case under the Poll of the People, take the final authority into their own hands, the development of jealousy and suspicion is automatically stopped. The people cannot very well hate themselves.
The way in which the Referendum would free Ministers from coercion is worth noting. _Ministers, who naturally think that their retention of office is essential to the true interests of the country, are apt to let themselves he blackmailed by small minorities who have the power of turning them out. They make unholy bargains with these minority groups, and the tail wags the dog. Ministers often have to say to a group or group of groups, "Very well, we will pass that measure, though we do not like it, if you will promise to support us, or, at any rate, not to attack us." If the Referendum were in existence all they could say would be," We will do our best to get the country to accept your proposal ; but, remember, we are powerless in one particular. If there is a demand that the Bill shall go to Referendum we cannot prevent it." In a word, the power of the political blackmailer would be very greatly reduced.
In view of these circumstances it is surely worth while tä make the Constitution watertight by adopting the Poll of the People as an alternative to House of Lords reform. Let us leave the House of Lords as it is, save for a scheme for eliminating unworthy Peers, and merely pass with such modification as may seem necessary the excellent Bill that was introduced in 1914 by Lord Balfour of Burleigh. It is a thoroughly democratic and thoroughly reasonable measure, and if added to the Constitution would give us all the security which we could 'possibly have, or indeed ought to have, in a democratic State. It makes certain that no great or tremendous change can be introduced into our political system unless the majority of the people are definitely determined that it shall be 80. That is all we anti-revolutionaries ask, or ought to ask, or -indeed can ask.
Remember always that the proof of the -value of the Refer- endum is the fact that it is loathed and feared by every revo- lutionary, small or great, aristocratic or proletarian.
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