RUSSIA, THE BALKANS, AND THE DARDANELLES.*

THE opinion of Mr. Granville Fortescue, who served with Mr. Roosevelt's Rough Riders in Cuba, has studied military matters

as a soldier, and watched the Russo-Japanese War as a corre- spondent, is entitled to respect. In this book he describes

what he saw in Poland and the Dardanelles, and draws con- clusions from what he saw. In description he is eloquent, if a little over-vehement at times, and in comment illuminating.

Although, as a neutral, he watched the Dardanelles operations from the Turkish side, his heart was wholly with the Allies. Nothing—not the suffering of Poland, which he found as grievous as that of Belgium, or the impressive stoicism of the moujik-L- moved him so much as the spectacle of British heroism on the bluff end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. "I have stood," he says, "on the ruined walls of Troy and seen the mighty deeds of the ancients outdone by a handful of Britons." And he tells us that he asked himself again and again : "Does England know

the glory of her sons ? " To those of England's sons who are fighting in the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force he dedicates his book.

Mr. Fortescue execrates Germany because he has seen at first hand the deeds of her sons. Yet it is through the voice of a mother that he is shocked into an appreciation of what German sons are fighting for. From the pocket of a dead

German a letter was taken and Mr. Fortescue road it. It was from the man's mother, and three sentences in it ran : "I went to the war prison where Russian beasts are kept. They do much hard work all day, even to dragging carts like oxen. Catch some more of the beasts, for our people enjoy to see them at this low work." Mr. Fortescue says that he cannot describe the horror of the Russians who read it. One of them, with a keen gift of poignancy surely, asked his officer to return the

letter to the mother with the words : "We are sorry that your boy is killed, mother.—A Russian Son." Such a ghoulish

spirit as that of the German mother was naturally kept out of the handbills which the Germans dropped in thousands from aeroplanes within the Russian lines. These were full of blan- dishments, promises of money to deserters, lies about France and the British Empire, and so forth. Unhappily, the German defect in humour sometimes impinged too sharply on this

campaign by proclamation, as when a shower of honeyed hand- bills to the Poles in Warsaw was followed the next day by bombs which killed some of these same Poles in the streets.

Mr. Fortescue considers that the Russians learned much in the Manchurian campaign. He found that their artillery had improved since he had last seen it in action, and he has a pro- found respect for them as trench-builders. As for the character of the Russian soldier, he says:— " The Russian common soldier is one of the most patient of creatures He has all the qualities of a willing horse. He follows his officers blindly. Judged by English and American standards, he lacks initiative, but in the war of the trenches initiative plays little part. You can put a company of Russian soldiers into a trench and they will stay there until they are all killed, captured or frozen. When it so happens that all their officers are disabled they have one simple rule—to charge. They have received orders that under no circumstances must they go back, so they merely go forward. The cold, the endless hours of battle, the smashing shell fire, and the rain of ripping bullets arc mot with what seems to be their universal answer to all the hardships of war—` Nitchevo.' " " Nitchevo "—" It doesn't matter "—is first-cousin to the Spanish "Mariana." It is symbolical of the lack of rapidity in Russian military movements which Mr. Fortescue notes as a

primary defect. Another defect upon which he dwells is faulty sanitation; but on this subject he may be too severe, as he tells us that when he was an officer in America it used to be said of him that he would send a whole squadron out to kill a fly in camp. The Russian soldier is still, evidently, of his old

opinion that the bullet is a fool, but the bayonet a trusty fellow. But above all Russian defects Mr. Fortescue places lack of training in the service of security and information. He found almost complete failure in the exchange of information between corps and divisions. We enumerate these faults as Mr. For- teseue writes with knowledge, but his admiration for the Russians as men and fighters far exceeds any technical disparagement. Before we pass on to Gallipoli we must quote what Mr. Fortescue says about the gallant little Russian ponies, which he vastly prefers to the larger horses :— The Siberian pony has something more than a fine coat, swelling * Russia, the Balkans, and the Dardanellea. By Granville Fortescue. Illus. tratrd from Photographa and Sketches by the Author. London; Andrew hialrom Ns, not.] chest muscles, and clean legs. He has unlimited endurance, courage, patience, and willingness. He is as tough as shark's skin, and can go all day, for months at a time, on a ration of a handful of hay. The sudden weather changes that made campaigning in Poland last winter the supreme test of the stamina of man and beast mean little to the Russian horse. He is a hardier specimen than the American cow pony. While he is a bit too light for shook . action, perhaps, what he lacks in weight is far outbalanced by his other qualities, and under the conditions developed by recent war the Siberian pony makes the ideal cavalry horse."

After a survey of the situation in Gallipoli and the Dardanelles, Mr. Forteseue came to the conclusion that we could win through, but only at an enormous price. But he by no means recom- mends a withdrawal. He thinks much may be gained in the general profit and loss account of the war by simply holding on.

The ground we already occupy, he says, is a Gibraltar which should never be given up. We must remark, however, that with

Russia at Constantinople—for that is her "manifest destiny," as Mr. Forteseue's countrymen would say—we should not want a Gibraltar at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Mr. Fortescue

thinks that the abandonment of the Allied offensive on the Asiatic shore • was a mistake. He shows by a diagram how

extraordinarily difficult it is for ships' fire to do much harm to the land forts. Most of them cannot be hit by direct fire. And we might add that the flat trajectory fire of naval guns is a very different thing, for the purpose of reducing fortifications, from the lobbing fire of howitzers. Mr. Fortcseue considers that wrong deductions as to the deterioration of the Turkish soldier were drawn from the Balkan War. We suspect that the failure of the Turks then was largely due to the substitution of the intellectuals of the Young Turkish Party for the old-fashioned regimental officers, who may have been unversed in political intrigue, but who thoroughly understood their men and were trusted by them. Writing of the disadvantage at which the Anglo-French troops find themselves in face of the Turks, Mr. Fortescue says :—

"In the first place they are outnumbered by two to one and, in the second, they are operating from a most difficult base. At first glance one may say that the advantage in numbers is of little im- portance, as Turkish troops during their last war were of proved inferiority. Perhaps they were a poor lot during the last Balkan war, though from the look of things at present I doubt even that, but to-day the Turkish common soldier is most formidable. With German thoroughness, the imported instructors begin at the very foundation of things and build up. I have seen the new instruction of the Turkish army from the training of the recruit to the planning of communications and defences, and, believe me, it leaves little to be desired. There has never been any question of Turkish bravery. And the grim seriousness with which the soldier of the Sultan goes about his work to-day marks him as a most worthy foeman. So the matter of numerical superiority is of considerable importance."

In his general conclusions Mr. Fortescue emphasizes the enormous value of machine guns, and argues convincingly on

behalf of shields, which he saw used successfully by the Japanese at Port Arthur. He predicts the revival of the testudo. He is extremely dissatisfied with the evidence so far afforded of strategical collaboration among the Allies. In spite of his belief that the losses of the Central Powers have been universally exaggerated, lie has no doubt, however, that the Allies will win

the war. He thinks that they will do so chiefly by means of economic pressure. "Let the Allies bold the Germans during the coming winter and the spring of 1910 will see a turn in the tide of battle."